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This dissertation examines game theory models in the context of persuasion and
competition wherein decisionmakers are boundedly rational by considering two com-
plementary threads of research. The first thread of research pertains to offensive and
preemptively defensive behavioral models of influence, and the second thread of re-
search discussed herein pertains to behavioral and behaviorally robust approaches to
deterrence and other military operations via the utilization of behavioral game theory
and mathematical programming under uncertainty.
Persuasion is a fundamental element of human interaction applied to both individ-
uals and populations. Although persuasion is a well-studied, interdisciplinary field of
research, this work advances its prescriptive, quantitative characterization and future
use. That is, this research complements the qualitative psychological literature with
respect to the processing of persuasive messages by developing an offensive influence
campaign design framework. We adapt the classic Decision Analysis problem to a
bilevel mathematical program, wherein a persuader has the opportunity to affect the
environment prior to the decisionmaker’s choice. Thereby, we define a new class of
problems for modeling persuasion. Utilizing Cumulative Prospect Theory as a de-
scriptive framework of choice, we transform the persuasion problem to a single level
mathematical programming formulation, adaptable to conditions of either risk or un-
certainty. These generalized models allow for the malleability of prospects as well as
Cumulative Prospect Theory parameters through persuasion update functions. We
detail the literature that supports the quantification of such effects which, in turn,
establishes that such update functions can be realized. Finally, the efficacy of the
model is illustrated through three use cases under varying conditions of risk or un-
iv
certainty: the establishment of insurance policies, the construction of a legal defense,
and the development of a public pension program.
However, in an influence setting, it may be the case that multiple actors com-
pete over a population’s decisions. This is especially true in modern international
relations. As such, this work presents two new game theoretic frameworks, denoted
as prospect games and regulated prospect games, to inform defensive policy against
these threats. These frameworks respectively model (a) the interactions of competing
entities influencing a populace and (b) the preemptive actions of a regulating agent to
alter such a framework. Prospect games and regulated prospect games are designed
to be adaptable, depending on the assumed nature of persuaders’ interactions and
their rationality. The contributions herein are a modeling framework for compet-
itive influence operations under a common set of assumptions, model variants that
respectively correspond to scenario-specific modifications of selected assumptions, the
illustration of practical solution methods for the suite of models, and a demonstra-
tion on a representative scenario with the ultimate goal of providing a quantifiable,
tractable, and rigorous framework upon which national policies defending against
competitive influence can be identified.
Moreover, even when acting in isolation, the central task of an influencing entity
is confounded by uncertainty of either a structural or parametric form. The research
herein also sets forth a modeling framework to identify robust influence strategies
under such uncertain conditions. Furthermore, the utility of this framework and
its proper parameterization are illustrated via an application to the contemporary,
global problem of the Afghan opium trade. Utilizing a variety of open source data,
we demonstrate how counternarcotic policy can be informed using a quantitative
method that embraces the bounded rationality of the economy’s decisionmakers and
the government’s uncertainty regarding the degree of this deviation from rationality.
v
In this manner, we provide a new framework from which robust influence decisions
can be made under realistic information conditions, and elucidate how it can be used
to inform real-world policy.
Related to the second thread of research, since Thomas Schelling published The
Strategy of Conflict (1960), the study of game theory and international relations have
been closely linked. Developments in the former often trigger analytical changes in
the latter, as evidenced by the recent behavioral and psychological focus among some
international relations and defense economics scholars. Despite this connection, de-
cisions regarding military operations have rarely been influenced by game theoretic
analysis, a fact often attributed to standard game theory’s normative nature. There-
fore, this research applies selected behavioral game theoretic solution techniques to
classical interstate conflict games, demonstrating their utility to inform the plan-
ning of military operations. By reexamining classic Cold War deterrence models and
other interstate conflict games, we demonstrate how modern game theoretic tech-
niques based upon agent psychology, as well as the ability of agents to think strate-
gically or learn from past experience, can provide additional insights beyond what
can be derived via perfect rationality analysis. These demonstrations illustrate how
behaviorally focused methods can incorporate the uncertainty related to human deci-
sionmakers into analysis and highlight the alternative insights a bounded rationality
approach can generate for military operations planning.
Under the assumption that a nation’s adversaries are boundedly rational, the final
contribution defines a methodology for strategy identification. That is, recent ad-
vances in behavioral game theory address a persistent criticism of traditional solution
concepts that rely upon perfect rationality: equilibrium results are often inconsistent
with empirical evidence. For normal-form games, the Cognitive Hierarchy model is a
solution concept based upon a sequential reasoning process, yielding accurate char-
vi
acterizations of experimental human game play. However, to derive predictions using
Cognitive Hierarchy, an accurate estimate of the average number of reasoning steps
players utilize is required. Such information is generally unknown ex ante and is a
source of uncertainty in practice. Moreover, the Cognitive Hierarchy model, like much
research in game theory, analyzes a game holistically. Herein, we adopt a different
approach, considering the normal-form game as a decision problem from the perspec-
tive of an arbitrary player. Assuming such a player is confronting a set of boundedly
rational opponents whose play is characterized by the Cognitive Hierarchy model,
we develop a suite of six mathematical programming formulations to maximize the
player’s minimum payoff, with the appropriate model identifiable under varying lev-
els of information with respect to their opponents’ reasoning abilities. By leveraging
robust optimization, stochastic programming, and distributionally robust optimiza-
tion techniques, our set of models yields prescriptive strategies of how a normal-form
game should be played. A software package implementing these constructs is de-
veloped and applied to illustrative instances, demonstrating how these behaviorally
robust strategies vary in accordance with the underlying uncertainty.
vii
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PERSUASION, POLITICAL WARFARE, AND DETERRENCE: BEHAVIORAL
AND BEHAVIORALLY ROBUST MODELS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The evolution of war’s manifestation - its character - is evident in history. The
development of stirrups enabled Genghis Kahn’s armies to advance and apply cav-
alry tactics to overwhelm their enemies and conquer the steppes of Asia (Saunders,
2001). The advent of the longbow and the use of highly trained archers changed the
character of war as exhibited at the Battle of Crecy (Burne, 2016). More recently,
beginning in the American Civil War and more fully exhibited during World War I,
the development of weapons having greater firepower and higher rates of fire, along
with the tactics to use them, marked the ascendancy of the defense over the offense
in wars of attrition or exhaustion (United States Military Academy, 2014a,b). In
World War II, the character of warfare changed with the use of armored forces, close
air support, and well-coordinated combined arms (United States Military Academy,
2015a,b).
However, students of Clausewitz would argue that such changes in war’s man-
ifestation do not imply a change in its essence, i.e., the nature of war. Although
technology and tactics may evolve over time, its nature is unchanging.
Clausewitz (1989) described war as an “instrument of policy” that uses “violence
intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” Therefore, warfare can be consid-
ered to be a type of violent persuasion. An enemy is confronted with multiple courses
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of actions, and we try to impel them to choose one in accordance with our preferences.
In the contemporary operating environment, other methods beyond physical violence
are often utilized to achieve the same objective. The character of warfare is currently
undergoing a shift from a kinetic to a narrative focus. Fueled by modern technology,
the weaponized use of communication is a critical piece of political warfare (Kennan,
1948; Boot and Doran, 2013; Polyakova and Boyer, 2018), hybrid warfare (United
States Government Accountability Office, 2010; Kofman and Rojansky, 2015), influ-
ence operations (Larson et al., 2009), and information operations (United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2012; Air University, 2018).
Therefore, we contend that key elements of war’s underlying nature can be rep-
resented within the purposeful manipulation of an adversary’s decision tree. Such
manipulation may affect how the adversary perceives the underlying uncertainty, val-
ues the payoff associated with each outcome, and/or evaluates the available set of
prospects. In conventional conflict, examples of how these effects may be achieved
respectively include military deception (e.g., Operation Fortitude in WWII), combat
engineering (e.g., countermobility obstacles and defensive structures), and shows of
force (e.g., Freedom of Navigation operations). If such actions are successful, an ad-
versary acts in accordance with our will, and the underlying desired effect has been
achieved.
When considering international competition prior to war, a similar dynamic holds.
However, we must now consider manipulating a decision tree via alternative means.
A simplification of this dynamic can be seen in Figure 1 wherein the adversary wishes
to adopt COA 1, but we desire them to select COA 2. In conventional conflict, these
underlying choices are replaced with the respective proxies of “Fight” and “Surren-
der”.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that this type of hybrid warfare does not limit
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Figure 1. A Decision Analysis Visualization of International Conflict
itself to affecting the decisions of a nation’s leadership. The target of an attack is
often a nation’s citizenry. Russian aggression has illustrated this numerous times on
both the United States and its NATO allies (DHS and FBI, 2016; The Economist,
2019). These tactics have been shown to be sufficiently effective that some experts
suggest such acts of political warfare may become the “default mode for conflict in
the coming decades” (Cohen and Robinson, 2018).
1.2 Research Objectives and Scope
This research aims to address this evolved character of 21st Century warfare.
New technologies must be accompanied by changes in tactics to use them effectively.
Political warfare is a reality, and its current application is best characterized as an art,
because we currently lack the science of tools and tactics necessary to best utilize
it in either an offensive or defensive setting. This work seeks to make a first step
towards developing useful models to advance strategy and tactics in conflicts below
the threshold of conventional war.
To ensure the effectiveness of these modeling efforts, we advocate for the use
of behavioral theories. Various studies (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Selten,
1998; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002) have shown human decision making to diverge
from perfect rationality and, when building models of persuasion, such limitations
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must be considered. Behavioral theories are informed by psychological studies, often
taking the form of human subject testing, and have proven themselves effective to
describe human behavior.
This dissertation examines game theory models in the context of persuasion and
competition wherein decisionmakers are not completely rational by considering two
complementary threads of research. The first thread of research pertains to offensive
and preemptively defensive behavioral models. Research in this thread makes three
notable contributions. First, an offensive modeling framework (i.e., a persuasion
program) is created to identify how an entity optimally influences a populace to take
a desired course of action. In doing so, we summarize the foundational literature upon
which future research can build to effectively parameterize such models, and illustrate
the utility of the framework over a variety of civil applications. Second, a defensive
modeling framework is defined wherein a regulating entity (e.g., a government) takes
action to bound the behavior of multiple adversaries simultaneously attempting to
persuade a group of decisionmakers. Third, an offensive influence modeling framework
under conditions of ambiguity is developed in accordance with historical information
limitations, and we demonstrate how it can be used to select a robust course of action
on a specific, data-driven use case.
The second thread of research pertains to behavioral and behaviorally robust ap-
proaches to deterrence and other military operations. Research in this thread makes
two notable contributions. First, we demonstrate the alternative insights behavioral
game theory generates for the analysis of classic deterrence games, and explicate the
rich analysis generated from its combined use with standard equilibrium models. Sec-
ond, we define behaviorally robust models for an agent to use in a normal form game
under varying forms of uncertainty in order to inform deterrence policy decisions.
Both of these research threads pertain to some form of influence; the first considers
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influence at a more tactical level (e.g., a targeted information operation) whereas
the second is more strategic (e.g., deterring hostile enemy aggression). Both research
threads rely on descriptive theories and explore solution methods when the adversary’s
behavior is uncertain; however, the first thread focuses on behavioral theories of choice
and the second on behavioral game theory.
Finally, we note that influence is a central component of a variety of civilian
activities as well (e.g., marketing, criminal justice, politics). As such, the models de-
veloped herein are described in general terms and their relevance to national security
is elucidated via representative use cases.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapters II through IV of this dissertation pertain to the development of of-
fensive and defensive behavioral influence models. Chapter II defines the general
persuasion program enabling an influencing entity to optimally engage a population
under conditions of either risk or ambiguity. This generalized model utilizes tools
from Cumulative Prospect Theory, Support Theory, and nonlinear optimization to
identify optimal offensive behavior in an influence operation. Chapter III builds upon
the general persuasion program by modeling additional influencing entities as well as
a preemptive, regulating agent. Using non-linear optimization techniques, a suite of
models are developed for the regulating agent to bound the behavior of the influencing
entities under varying rationality assumptions and game theoretic solution concepts.
In Chapter IV, we extend the general persuasion program presented in Chapter II
while retaining its original persuader-populace structure. We focus on parametric and
structural uncertainty associated with the populace’s behavior, and the identification
of behaviorally robust strategies given these knowledge limitations. The efficacy of
this methodology for real-world policy development is then illustrated on an Afghan
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counternarcotic use case informed by open-source UN, American, Afghan and NGO
data.
Chapters V and VI concern behavioral and behaviorally robust approaches to de-
terrence. In Chapter V we illustrate how the Cognitive Hierarchy and Experience
Weighted Attraction algorithms can be utilized to inform military operations plan-
ning. This topic is extended in Chapter VI, wherein we develop a suite of mathemat-
ical programs for the selection of robust strategies given this underlying behavioral
uncertainty.
Chapter VII provides concluding remarks and the two appendices provide relevant,
supplemental material. The first appendix illustrates how the general persuasion pro-
grams of Chapter II can be extended when decisionmakers are assumed to maximize
expected utility. The second appendix documents an ancillary research contribution
regarding the identification of erroneous reports of instance infeasibility when solv-
ing power program problems with a leading commercial solver for global optimization
(i.e., BARON), as well as the development and testing of theoretically-grounded mod-
eling techniques to reduce their occurrence, thereby enhancing solver efficacy. Such
a computational challenge was identified (and resolved favorably, in most instances
tested) when solving a simplified form of the persuasion program presented in Chapter
II.
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II. Influence Modeling: Mathematical Programming
Representations of Persuasion under Either Risk or
Uncertainty
Abstract
Persuasion is a fundamental element of human interaction applied to both in-
dividuals and populations. Although persuasion is a well-studied, interdisciplinary
field of research, this work advances its prescriptive, quantitative characterization and
future use. That is, this research complements the qualitative psychological litera-
ture with respect to the processing of persuasive messages by developing an influence
campaign design framework. We adapt the classic Decision Analysis problem to a
bilevel mathematical program, wherein a persuader has the opportunity to affect the
environment prior to the decisionmaker’s choice. Thereby, we define a new class of
problems for modeling persuasion. Utilizing Cumulative Prospect Theory as a de-
scriptive framework of choice, we transform the persuasion problem to a single level
mathematical programming formulation, adaptable to conditions of either risk or un-
certainty. These generalized models allow for the malleability of prospects as well as
Cumulative Prospect Theory parameters through persuasion update functions. We
detail the literature that supports the quantification of such effects which, in turn,
establishes that such update functions can be realized. Finally, the efficacy of the
model is illustrated through three use cases under varying conditions of risk or un-
certainty: the establishment of insurance policies, the construction of a legal defense,
and the development of a public pension program.
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2.1 Introduction
Persuasion is ever-present in human society. Television advertisements persuade
consumers to buy a product. Parents convince children to eat their vegetables. Laws
outlining punishment persuade citizens to abide by certain behaviors. A suitor per-
suades their beloved to marry, and a government attempts to influence other countries
in the realm of international relations. Such ubiquitous activities are well-studied in
a variety of disciplines but are not addressed frequently in a prescriptive, quantitative
manner. Therefore, we formalize herein a new class of decision problems which can
mathematically model persuasion and its influence on others, in either situations of
risk when outcome probabilities are known, or uncertainty when they are unknown.
Many persuasion scenarios can be modeled with a framework similar to that used
in the discipline of Decision Analysis. Using Prescriptive Decision Analysis when
outcomes of a given choice are not deterministic, an advisor often represents problems
as decision trees to help a client take the best action in accordance with the axioms
of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Such a methodology is applicable in the context
of risk or uncertainty (e.g., casino games or stock prices, respectively). The approach
is identical in either setting with the exception that uncertainty requires a subjective
assessment of outcome probabilities. The generic Decision Analysis problem of an
individual choosing between |J | options (i.e., choosing among a set of prospects, J)









ζj = 1, (1a)
ζj ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ j ∈ J. (1b)
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The value EU(j) =
∑
k∈Kj pjkujk, where Kj are all possible outcomes that can oc-
cur from a selection of prospect j, each occurring with non-negative probability pjk
and having utility ujk units to the decisionmaker. At optimality, the prospect cor-
responding to ζ∗j = 1 is the option that will maximize the decisionmaker’s expected
utility.
We now reexamine the Prescriptive Decision Analysis problem by assuming the
advisor is no longer altruistic but self-interested with a distinct preference on what
alternative the decisionmaker selects. Consider a perfectly rational, risk-neutral de-
cisionmaker selecting between two risky prospects as illustrated by the decision tree
shown in Figure 2, and a persuader with three available actions (i.e., a1, a2, and a3).
Each decision tree represents the discrete set of feasible decisions available to the
lower-level decisionmaker(s), whereas the utilities represented at the leaf nodes of
the tree respectively depend on the upper-level persuader’s actions via the indicated
functions.
The persuader affects the decision problem prior to prospect selection and desires
the decisionmaker to choose prospect B subject to the constraints listed. For an
interested reader, the Appendix details an explicit model of this influence setting.
Although this particular instance can be solved by inspection (e.g., a1 = a2 = 0, a3 >
216.67 is one of many alternative optimal solutions), it provides a simple illustration
of influence in a decision analysis setting. Likewise, such influence problems can be
represented as bilevel programs:
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s.t. Constraints (1a)− (1b),
EU(j) = f1 (a) , ∀ j ∈ J,
Φ = f2 (ζ) ,
Φ ∈ {0, 1} .
Within the bilevel programming framework, the lower player is the individual
being persuaded and who selects the prospect maximizing their expected utility. The
upper-level player is able to affect the individual’s expected utility through some
action a from a larger action space A to maximize the binary persuasion indicator
variable Φ. At optimality, the prospect corresponding to ζ∗j = 1 is the prospect
selected by the decisionmaker, and a value of Φ∗ = 1 indicates that such a prospect
is the one preferred by the persuader.
The persuader’s actions are designed to induce some selection, indicating the
modeling of choice must be governed by the decisionmaker’s psychology. However,
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it is well documented that without assistance, humans violate the Expected Utility
paradigm (e.g., see Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). As evidenced by the constant
consequence and constant ratio paradoxes, decisionmakers do not always make choices
that maximize expected utility. Therefore, the corresponding behavioral decision






subject to Constraints (1a)− (1b),
wherein DU(j) represents the subjective utility of a prospect j ∈ J under some
descriptive theory of choice (e.g., Kontek and Lewandowski, 2017)
Given the bounded rationality exhibited in empirical psychological testing, we
contend a descriptive theory of choice is most appropriate to model human persuasion.
Utilizing such a descriptive model, the problem of influencing an individual to adopt










s.t. Constraints (1a)− (1b),
DU(j) = g1 (a) , ∀ j ∈ J,
Φ = g2 (ζ) ,
Φ ∈ {0, 1} .
For the remainder of this research, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is utilized
to model the descriptive utility, DU(j), for reasons described in Section 2.2 (Tversky
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and Kahneman, 1992). Under this theory, a prospect f having n gain outcomes and
m loss outcomes, indexed separately as 1 through n and -m through -1, each with
value xk from the reference point is evaluated via CPT as














+(Ak ∪ ... ∪An)−W+(Ak+1 ∪ ... ∪An), 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
π−k = W
+(A−m ∪ ... ∪Ak)−W+(A−m ∪ ... ∪Ak−1), 1−m ≤ k ≤ 0.
All outcomes Ak are indexed in ascending order of their corresponding xk-value.
W+ and W− are the event weighting functions for gains and losses, respectively.
The values π+ and π− are the decision weights utilized to determine the respective
component gains, V +(f), and component losses, V −(f), in conjunction with a utility
function v(·) that is concave for gains and convex for losses.
Whereas CPT is often viewed as a theory of decision making under risk, Tversky
and Fox (1995) illustrated its applicability to decision making under uncertainty, and
that the uncertainty weighting function demonstrated similar behavior to the prob-
ability weighting function. Moreover, Fox and Tversky (1998) demonstrated that
decisions under uncertainty can be modeled suitably using a two-stage method. In
the first stage, probability judgments comporting with support theory (Tversky and
Koehler, 1994) are first ascertained to characterize and quantify the uncertainty and,
in the second stage, these results are substituted into the original CPT framework
that accounts for risk. Utilizing these results, we incorporate CPT into our mathe-
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matical programming representations of persuasion under both conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
Our modeling framework unifies and augments three separate strands of research:
decision analysis problems, cheap talk games, and multi-level programs. Within the
context of the Decision Analysis discipline, our work considers a self-interested advisor
(i.e., persuader) as opposed to one who is altruistic. It is unique in the realm of cheap
talk games to allow for multiple, lower-level players who assess the value of an outcome
via Cumulative Prospect Theory; to address uncertain outcomes; and to enable the
upper-level players to adopt a wider range of actions. Finally, the modeling framework
is original in the context of multi-level programming by modeling a principal-agent(s)
problem with the incorporation of behaviorist methods applied to the lower-level
players in a stochastic, Stackelberg framework.
Therefore, in a manner akin to Fry and Binner (2016) and Becker-Peth and Thone-
mann (2016), our research also furthers the Behavioral Operations Research paradigm
described in Hämäläinen et al. (2013) with respect to incorporating agent psychol-
ogy in problem solving situations. More specifically, this work advances the Behav-
ioral Operations Research thread referenced by Franco and Hämäläinen (2016) that
“concentrates on the use of the OR approach to model human behavior in complex
settings” by combining quantitative psychology theories with mathematical program-
ming. In this way, our work is akin to that of Shi and Lian (2016), Keller and Kat-
sikopoulos (2016), and Argyris and French (2017) who adopt a behavioral perspective
in queuing theory, heuristic optimization, and multi-criteria decision analysis appli-
cations, respectively, as our research attempts to address the task outlined in Becker
(2016) of developing a “close connection with the core disciplines of OR”.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we pro-
vide an overview of scholarly research pertaining to persuasion and also explain why
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CPT is selected as the preferred theory of descriptive utility. In Section 2.3, we de-
velop single-level mathematical programming formulations of the descriptive bilevel
persuasion problem corresponding to situations exhibiting risk and uncertainty, re-
spectively. Therein, we establish the soundness of our modeling methodology, as
supported by literature that quantitatively documents experimental evidence of the
underlying theories, and which portends the ability to parameterize instances of our
models. In Section 2.4, we provide illustrative instances of the models’ use: one under
risk, one under uncertainty with an evidence strength metric, and one under uncer-
tainty without an evidence strength metric. Section 2.5 discusses the implications of
this research, its limitations, and the potential for application.
2.2 Relevant Literature
We begin by providing a multi-disciplinary review of persuasion literature to il-
lustrate the relevance of our models and emphasize their complementary nature to
previous studies. The section concludes with a discussion of alternative frameworks
for decision making under uncertainty and defends subsequent modeling choices.
Persuasion.
Persuasion has been widely studied in the field of social psychology. Gass and
Seiter (2015) defined persuasion as an “activity of creating, reinforcing, modifying
or extinguishing beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations, and/or behaviors within
the constraints of a given communication context”. Thus, persuasion is not limited
to speech, as it may include any number of action types. Scholars in this field have
extensively studied persuasion and propaganda. Research conducted immediately fol-
lowing World War I attempted to describe the effects of messaging on attitude (Jowett
and O’Donnell, 2014). During World War II emphasis was placed on understanding
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propaganda, counterpropaganda, attitudes, and persuasion (Jowett and O’Donnell,
2014).
In recent history, the focus shifted alternatively to predicting or altering future
behavior (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2014). Many formal theories of persuasion have
been presented. Two prevailing models in social psychology are the Elaboration
Likelihood Method and the Heuristic Systematic Method (Gass and Seiter, 2015). The
Elaboration Likelihood Method postulates two distinct avenues of persuasion: central
and peripheral processing. Central processing encapsulates conscious deliberation of
a message whereas peripheral processing involves the effect of stimuli not directly
related to a message (e.g., a salesperson’s pitch vis-a-vis their physical appearance).
The Heuristic Systematic Method also proposes that persuasion occurs through two
avenues (i.e., deliberate systematic processing and instinctive heuristic processing)
but contends that messages can traverse both paths simultaneously.
Related ideas in social psychology are the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Expo-
sure Theory, and the Theory of Planned Behavior. The Theory of Cognitive Disso-
nance postulates that humans desire a state of cognitive consistency in thought and
will change opinions and/or behavior in order to achieve it (Festinger, 1957). In con-
trast, Exposure Theory propounds that people who are highly exposed to an idea are
more likely to accept it. The content or quality of the idea is not nearly as important
as the frequency of exposure; the mere comfort of familiarity is the convincing factor
(Zajonc, 2001). Finally, the Theory of Planned Behavior hypothesizes that a person’s
choices of behavior are influenced by societal pressures; individual perception, power,
and attitude; and other factors facilitating or inhibiting the choice (Ajzen, 1991).
Scholars in the field of Communications focus less on the mental processing of
persuasion and more on the features of the messaging itself. Shen and Bigsby (2013)
presented a thorough literature review regarding the effects of message content, struc-
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ture, and style on persuasion and provided an overview of how these features interact.
The effect of messaging is also well studied in Economics, particularly with regard
to games of incomplete information. It is common in such games for players to en-
gage in signaling, an act of providing or receiving information which may be costly
or, in cheap talk, a similar but cost-free information sharing action. In this setting,
emotions of the players are generally disregarded, and perspectives are manipulated
according to the tenants of Expected Utility Theory. Signaling games and cheap
talk are covered extensively by Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) with a unique fo-
cus on natural language processing. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) and Croson
et al. (2003) discussed applications of cheap talk and its potential consequences in
persuasion and bargaining games.
With a view towards applying persuasion operations, agents often attempt to ma-
nipulate subjective and emotional assessments to gain support. For instance, recruit-
ing efforts by terrorist organizations usually involve a radicalization process wherein
recruits’ political or world views are shaped to align with the group’s interests. Mc-
Cauley and Moskalenko (2008) described a variety of tactics utilized for radicalization
such as isolation, personal victimization, and the use of political grievances. Other
behavioral modification campaigns are central to Military Information Support Op-
erations (MISO) designed to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organi-
zations, groups, or individuals (Boyd, 2011). To implement a successful persuasion
operation, an agent must understand the effects of one’s actions on a decisionmaker.
However, such knowledge is not only useful in the development of offensive messag-
ing, but it also provides insight regarding how to counter persuasion operations (e.g.,
counter-terrorist organizations, influence resistance campaigns).
The field of Marketing has a long history of studying how to sway opinions. Belk
(2007) described the evolution of commercial marketing research from a focus on de-
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scriptive data to qualitative research. The qualitative research the author describes
is focused on understanding the underlying motivation for consumer behavior. How-
ever, the qualitative study of persuasion is ill-equipped to solve strategic marketing
allocation problems. In this vein, Cetin and Esen (2006) tailored the weapon target
assignment model to marketing campaigns, but they focused on budget and schedul-
ing constraints while largely abstaining from psychological factors. Therefore, the
next evolution in commercial marketing research is arguably a transition from quali-
tative to quantitative influence modeling. Our research provides the initial models to
make such an advance with the necessary incorporation of qualitative psychological
effects. Moreover, our research provides the impetus to perform the psychological
and physiological experiments necessary to make this advance (e.g., see the consumer
research described in Ares and Varela, 2018).
Similar concepts to those discussed by Belk (2007) have been applied to Social
Marketing, wherein the underlying goal is to influence behavioral patterns within a
society for the greater good. Kotler and Zaltman (1971) described the power and lim-
itations of such applications and explained how social marketing has been conducted
by churches to increase their attendance, by charities to generate income, and even by
symphonies to draw a larger audience. Many non-profit groups have tried to engineer
such social change against drug or tobacco use in the United States (Truth Initiative,
2018). Research in criminology has advocated the use of similar social marketing
tactics to reduce crime of varying types (Homel and Carroll, 2009). With regard to
politics, the role of emotion in campaigns has been studied by Brader (2005), wherein
he determined that emotional appeals in campaign ads can affect voter behavior.
Brader (2005) concluded that “emotionally evocative ads do not simply sway voters
directly, but change the manner in which voters make choices”. These overarching
changes in decision making are part of what we seek to model within a prescriptive,
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quantitative approach to the problem of persuasion.
Other Models for Decision Making Under Uncertainty.
We choose to utilize CPT as our framework for decision-making under conditions
of either risk or uncertainty. This choice is driven by (1) the interpretation of CPT
as a characteristic of intuitive thinking (Kahneman, 2011) and the deep heuristic-
and-bias decision-making literature describing how to affect such thought processes
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1981; Park and Lessig, 1981; Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; Taylor, 1982), and (2) CPT’s applicability to risk and uncertainty (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Fox and Tversky, 1998).
Other models that challenge the preeminence of CPT as a descriptive model were
considered but set aside. For example, the Adaptive Toolbox proposed by Gigerenzer
and Selten (2002) purports that a collection of situational specific cognitive heuris-
tics are utilized when acting under uncertainty. Historically, the Adaptive Toolbox
framework has been the leading competitor of CPT. However, we choose to not utilize
this framework due to the disaggregated, environment-specific nature of its models.
CPT provides a single mathematical model that can be applied without regard to the
underlying decision environment, whereas the Adaptive Toolbox provides a variety of
methods to be utilized in differing environments. Furthermore, Pachur et al. (2017)
demonstrated how a variety of boundedly rational heuristics exhibit characteristic
CPT parameter profiles. If a decisionmaker is assumed to use such a heuristic deci-
sionmaking process, their behavior can be incorporated into our models by utilizing
the appropriate profile.
Other, less established alternatives to CPT exist, but they are not well suited
for a general persuasion model. The Decision-by-Sampling (DbS) model proposed by
Stewart et al. (2006) describes decision making as a process of binary, ordinal com-
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parisons of an attribute with past experiences; it does not assume a stable probability
weighting or utility function, and argues its comparative framework is the founda-
tion of CPT-characteristic behavior. DbS supports the notion of affecting choice via
persuasion, but it may restrict actions to only those based on the Exposure The-
ory of messaging. More recently, Kontek and Lewandowski (2017) proposed Range
Dependent Utility (RngDU) as a model describing the same decision making para-
doxes addressed by CPT, albeit without the use of probability weighting. Instead,
each lottery in a specified range of low and high outcomes possesses its own utility
function, and a single decision utility function can be derived by linearly scaling the
utility of all lotteries (i.e., with the lowest possible utility having a value of zero and
the highest utility having a value of one). The linearity-in-probability is a convenient
feature for calculation, and the authors claim RngDU to be a better predictive model
for multi-outcome prospects compared to CPT by providing comparative examples
from the literature. However, the RngDU theory is relatively nascent and does not
yet incorporate loss aversion. In contrast, the mathematical framework presented
in CPT provides a well-established and generally accepted quantitative manner to
describe psychological and qualitative phenomena related to persuasion that can be
adapted to accommodate other descriptive theories of choice.
2.3 Influence Modeling
Herein, we set forth the mathematical programming formulation describing how
a persuader can optimally interact with a subset of individuals based upon assump-
tions of how persuasive actions affect each prospect, as well as respective individuals’
evaluation of the prospects.
To provide proper context prior to introducing the model, we detail the litera-
ture supporting the viability of quantifying the parameter update functions included
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within our modeling framework (e.g., general functional forms to represent the effect
of persuasion on prospect characteristics or decisionmaker risk attitude) which, in
turn, establishes that such update functions can be realized. Often, the components
comprising an individual’s risk attitude (e.g., the probability weighting and utility
functions) are assumed to be static, cognitive features. However, modern psycho-
logical and neuroeconomic studies have shown risk attitudes to be dynamic traits
affected by emotional, pharmacological, and other context-dependent factors (e.g.,
Kugler et al., 2012; Lempert and Phelps, 2014; Stewart et al., 2015). The following
section introduces readers to related parametric-oriented research before providing the
General Persuasion Program (GPP) variants for conditions of risk and uncertainty.
The Parameter Update Functions.
Two fundamental assumptions underlying our GPP models are (1) a persuader’s
actions can influence an individual’s perception of the probability and utility of out-
comes for a given prospect, and (2) such impacts can be quantified. In this section, we
address the literature that supports the quantification of such effects which, in turn,
establishes that these effects can be realized. Given a thorough review of findings in
the literature that are supported by well-conducted human subjects research, we find
evidence that influence on the perception of an outcome’s likelihood, the perception
of an outcome’s value, and an individual’s cumulative prospect theory parameters
each can be quantified.
Of course, if a persuader has direct control over the source of risk (uncertainty)
or the event outcomes (e.g., a casino), the update functions for these parameters are
readily apparent. However, a persuader may still be able to influence how individ-
uals perceive an event’s likelihood or its utility in situations wherein there exists no
formal, direct control mechanism. We find justification in the psychological literature
20
pertaining to human evaluation of uncertainty and decision-making. Lerner et al.
(2015) detailed extensively the psychological literature that empirically shows the ef-
fects of emotion on risk perception. For example, fearful people tend to see greater
risk whereas angry people perceive less risk, and prideful individuals view gains as in
their control whereas surprised individuals view gains as unpredictable (Lerner and
Keltner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2015). Furthermore, in the heuristic-and-bias approach
of statistical reasoning (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011), the affect,
representativeness, and availability heuristics, as well as their derivatives (e.g., the
simulation and fluency heuristics), demonstrate how superfluous information can al-
ter the perceived likelihood of an event or the value of its outcome (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1981; Hertwig et al., 2008; Kahneman, 2016). In a persuasion setting, the
source of this information is simply a self-interested external agent. The Tom W. ex-
periments of Kahneman and Tversky (1973) demonstrate such an interaction through
representativeness; the authors affect the participants’ perception of probability by
controlling the stimuli used to make this judgment.
With specific regard to the probability weighting and utility functions, Stewart
et al. (2015) observed statistical evidence concerning their malleable shapes. The
authors found that the “manipulation of the distribution of gains [and] risks... sys-
tematically changes the utility, weighting, and discounting functions”, and they con-
cluded that these functions are not stable but are instead context dependent. As the
probability weighting and utility functions collectively describe risk attitude, their
results also imply its malleability. This is confirmed by Kugler et al. (2012) who
demonstrated that fear and anger alter an individual’s risk attitude, by Ariely and
Loewenstein (2006) who found a similar effect in men due to sexual arousal, and by
numerous economists who have examined the effect of past losses on the risk attitudes
of stock brokers (e.g., Thaler, 1985; Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Liu et al., 2010). How-
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ever, with few exceptions, such changes are not quantified in terms of the associated
CPT-parameters (Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty, 2014; Schulreich et al., 2014)
When affecting decision under uncertainty, the belief-based model by Fox (1999) il-
lustrates that the probability weighting function parameters may be affected through
a source preference appeal. The authors provided evidence of the competence hy-
pothesis such that ambiguity aversion is reversed in situations wherein a person feels
knowledgeable of the source. It is suggested that this effect can be accounted for
by varying a parameter in the probability weighting function. Therefore, if the per-
suader has some control over the source of uncertainty, they may be able to affect
the weighting function parameters by appealing to an individual’s preference. Similar
results could be accomplished by adapting an individual’s perception of the source of
uncertainty, perhaps through education.
Likewise, since the “loss aversion [parameter] is volatile and depends much on
framing” (Wakker, 2010), there exists empirical evidence of its malleability. Plott
and Zeiler (2005) were able to make it disappear completely when participants were
explicitly instructed on loss aversion and framing effects. Gächter et al. (2007) showed
that loss aversion increases with age, wealth, and income but decreases with educa-
tion. Furthermore, the correlation found with respect to activity in areas of the brain
when confronted with gains and losses by Tom et al. (2007) suggest that, if these
areas can be stimulated when a participant is facing a decision, perhaps loss aversion
can be altered. Moreover, Lerner et al. (2004) found emotional stimuli to reverse the
endowment effect, implying emotions affect either the loss aversion parameter or the
frequency of outcome evaluation.
With regard to reference points, their manipulation depends largely on the decision
context. For example, if the decision to be made is measured in monetary units, the
persuader may be able to move the reference point by instituting fines or payments
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before a lottery is selected. In general, the perception of reference points is highly
susceptible to framing effects which can be controlled, to some extent, by a persuader
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Wakker, 2010).
Moreover, if an Adaptive Toolbox heuristic (e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002) is
assumed to be employed for a decision problem, the results of Pachur et al. (2017)
imply the malleability of CPT parameters. That is, if a decisionmaker can be com-
pelled to switch from one heuristic to another, the parameter update functions can
map the change from one heuristic’s CPT parameter profile to another.
Ultimately, risk and value perception, as well as an individuals CPT parameters,
are mathematical constructs designed to capture cognition. From a neuroeconomic
perspective, they all arise from neuronal interactions in a dynamic brain learning from
a dynamic world. Therefore, the hypothesis that these elements are static and not
malleable is incongruent with the field’s underlying tenets. Such a perspective is doc-
umented with numerous works published within Neuroeconomics: Decision Making
and the Brain edited by Paul Glimcher and Ernest Fehr, to include studies focusing
on the effects of emotions and pharmacology in decisions under risk and uncertainty
(Lempert and Phelps, 2014; Crockett and Fehr, 2014).
Acknowledging that such a mapping is feasible, as evidenced by the quantifiable
impacts of persuasion on decisionmakers’ CPT parameters via the published liter-
ature, we seek to demonstrate the utility of such mappings via our mathematical
programming formulations and several use cases in Section 2.4.
Proposed Model under Risk.
Herein, we develop a single level representation of the aforementioned bilevel math
programming formulation to represent the effects of persuasion on a human decision-
maker under conditions of risk with a generic upper level objective function. This
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model is general in that it concerns influencing multiple decisionmakers, each of whom
may have different values for their Cumulative Prospect Theory parameters, to prefer
a certain prospect (i.e., become supporters). In this setting, a persuader may have
multiple, competing objectives; it may be desired to achieve a threshold of support
at minimum cost, to maximize the number of supporters, to optimize a weighted
combination of both objectives, or any number of variants. However, the majority of
these objectives are concerned with the number of supporters and the persuasion ac-
tions utilized. As such, we represent the objective function within our mathematical
programming formulation as a generic function of these variables. Likewise, our gen-
eral model allows for the malleability of Cumulative Prospect Theory parameters via
persuasion operations, and so the perceived outcomes and probabilities of individual
prospects can be affected accordingly. Our models, therefore, can accommodate a
range of persuasive actions, to include the intentional triggering of the incidental af-
fect wherein an emotion unrelated to the decision can shift choices. This phenomena
is well document in the neuroscience literature but, to our knowledge, has not been
adapted to quantitative decision models (Lempert and Phelps, 2014). The models
presented are therefore versatile; however, if one disagrees with the malleability of a
parameter subset, it can be assumed constant and the optimization formulations are
still applicable. Such applications are illustrated in Section 2.4.
We begin by introducing the requisite sets, parameters, decision variables, and
intermediary decision variables. In defining the model, we use the single parameter
weighting function and utility functions originally set forth by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992). However, other probability weighting functions or utility functions can




I : Set of targeted members upon which persuasion is being conducted of the form I = {1, 2, ...}
Ji : Set of ni prospects offered to each member i of the form Ji = {1, ..., ni}
Kij : Set of mij events (i.e., outcomes) for member i in prospect j of the form Kij = {1, ...,mij}
A : Space of feasible persuasion actions
Parameters
qi : Preferred prospect in Ji that persuader wants member i to support
ŷijk : Baseline raw value for k
th event of prospect j for member i before persuasion
p̂ijk : Baseline probability of k
th event of prospect j for member i before persuasion
γ̂i : Baseline gain probability weighting coefficient for member i before persuasion
δ̂i : Baseline loss probability weighting coefficient for member i before persuasion
α̂i : Baseline gain utility coefficient for member i before persuasion
β̂i : Baseline loss utility coefficient for member i before persuasion
λ̂i : Baseline loss aversion coefficient for member i before persuasion
r̂i : Baseline reference point for member i before persuasion
∆ : Discriminable Factor for favored prospect
M : Arbitrary, sufficiently large real number
We assume a set of members, I, are offered a set of prospects, Ji. Members
of I can be individuals or aggregate demographic populations, depending on the
setting. The set Ji has ni prospects which may or may not be unique to each member.
Each prospect j ∈ Ji has mij potential events. The effect on the editing phase on
these events is determined a priori. Also, the value of an event before persuasion as
discerned from some measure is represented by ŷijk and its associated probability by
p̂ijk.
The persuader desires for each member i to select a prospect qi. By taking ac-
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tion(s), represented by the vector a ∈ A, the persuader is able to potentially affect
the outcomes and probabilities for each prospect, or alter a member’s baseline ref-
erence point, loss aversion, probability weighting, and utility curvature parameters,
depending on the specific assumptions of the functional forms that adapt our general
model to a specific context.
Primary Decision Variables
a : Vector of influence operations conducted
T+ijkk′ : Equal to 1 if the k
th event of prospect j faced by member i is the (mij − 1 + k′)th
greatest gain among events in Kij , and 0 otherwise, defined for all (i, j) combinations
T−ijkk′ : Equal to 1 if the k
th event of prospect j faced by member i is the (k′)th greatest
loss among events in Kij ,and 0 otherwise, defined for all (i, j) combinations
Φi : Binary indicator equal to 1 if member i strongly favors prospect qi, 0 otherwise
zqiij : Binary indicator for qi 6= j that equals 1 if member i prefers prospect qi to
prospect j, 0 otherwise
sposij : Positive portion of difference in prospect values qi and j for member i
snegij : Negative portion of difference in prospect values qi and j for member i




ij cannot be positively-valued
CPT relies upon a rank-based ordering of each prospect’s outcomes to properly
calculate its value. If we allow the persuader’s actions to change outcome values,
their probabilities, and a member’s Cumulative Prospect Theory parameter values,
then the original ordering of a prospect’s events can change. As such, a mapping
is developed to ensure the events are indexed in ascending order of their outcome
values for use in the probability weighting functions. The binary variables T+ijkk′
form a matrix mapping of unordered gains to ordered gains, and T−ijkk′ a mapping of




mapping that sorts the updated gains and losses in ascending order.
The variable Φi equals one if a member i strictly prefers prospect qi to all others.
A strict preference is induced versus a weak preference (i.e., strict versus weak in-
equality) to ensure that members who are indifferent among qi and some other subset
of prospects are not misrepresented as supporters via an optimistic assumption by
the persuader. Members demonstrating such indifference may or may not be sup-
portive, and we assume a conservative persuader will presume them to be the latter.
Likewise, the discriminable factor ∆ enables the persuader to specify a minimum
difference value between prospects such that a member is identified as a supporter.
Binary comparisons between prospects are represented via zqiij ; this binary variable
equals one if member i prefers prospect qi to prospect j, and zero otherwise. The
variables sposij and s
neg
ij are utilized to quantify either the positive or negative difference
between prospect qi and prospect j, wherein s
pos
ij > 0 indicates prospect qi is preferred
and snegij > 0 indicates the converse is true. Finally, Ψij is utilized in the ensuing math
programming formulation to ensure that only sposij or s
neg
ij may be positively valued.
Intermediate Decision Variables
fijk(a) : Persuasion effect on event k
th raw outcome value for prospect j and member i
gijk(a) : Persuasion effect on event k
th probability for prospect j and member i
hθi (a) : Persuasion effect on curvature, distortion, loss aversion or reference point
parameters for member i
xijk : Gain/loss for member i for k
th event of prospect j after persuasion
pijk : Probability of k
th event of prospect j for member i after persuasion
γi : Gain probability weighting coefficient for member i after persuasion
δi : Loss probability weighting coefficient for member i after persuasion
αi : Gain utility curvature coefficient for member i after persuasion
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βi : Loss utility curvature coefficient for member i after persuasion
λi : Loss aversion coefficient for member i after persuasion
ri : Reference point for member i after persuasion
t+ijk′ : Ascending rank based list of xijk gains corresponding with mapping T
+
ijkk′
t−ijk′ : Ascending rank based list of xijk losses corresponding with mapping T
−
ijkk′
b+ijk′ : Corresponding probabilities for sorted t
+
ijk′ events
b−ijk′ : Corresponding probabilities for sorted t
−
ijk′ events
π+ijk′ : Gain decision weight for member i for k
′th event of prospect j after persuasion
π−ijk′ : Loss decision weight for member i for k
′th event of prospect j after persuasion
The intermediate decision variables are functions of the primary decision variables.
The variables xijk and pijk respectively represent the updated events, in terms of
gains or losses from the updated reference point, and the updated probabilities of
these events after persuasion. Likewise, the variables γi, δi, αi, βi, λi, and ri are
the probability weighting, utility curvature, loss aversion, and reference point values
after persuasion, respectively. The effects of persuasion on outcomes, probabilities,
and prospect theoretic parameters are correspondingly represented by the values fijk,
gijk, and h
θ
i , where θ is an index on the functional parameters γi, δi, αi, βi, λi, and
ri. The list of updated gains and losses in ascending order is represented by t
+
ijk′ and




ijk′ . The last six intermediate
decision variables are drawn from Tversky and Kahneman (1992), wherein π+ijk′ and
π−ijk′ are the decision weight values derived from the probability weights w
+(b+ijk′ , γi)
and w−(b−ijk′ , δi), and V
+(xijk′ , αi) and V
−(xijk′ , βi) are the values of updated gains
and losses, respectively.
As previously mentioned, other probability weighting functions can be utilized
if their parameters and functional forms are substituted as appropriate. However,
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the decision regarding which probability weighting function is most appropriate de-
pends on the modeling context. If members are aggregate populations, the Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) form can be expected to estimate the weighting function well
(Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). However, under the assumption that members of the set
I are individuals instead of groups, a two-parameter probability weighting function
such as the Linear-in-Log-Odds or Prelec’s compound invariance functions may be
most appropriate (Cavagnaro et al., 2013).
General Persuasion Program (GPP) Formulation
max f(Φi,a) (2a)
subject to
Parameter Update Constraint Set
xijk + ri = ŷijk + fijk(a), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij , (2b)
pijk = p̂ijk + gijk(a), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij , (2c)
θi = θ̂i + h
θ



















T−ijkk′xijk, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Kij , (2h)
t−ij(k′+1) ≥ t−ijk′ , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k 6= mij , (2i)
t+ij(k′+1) ≥ t+ijk′ , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k 6= mij , (2j)
t+ijk′ ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Kij , (2k)




























, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k 6= mij , (2p)
π−ij,1 = w















+(t+iqik′ , αi) + π
−
iqik′






+(t+ijk′ , αi) + π
−
ijk′V
−(tijk′ , βi, λi)
)
− sposij + snegij −∆ = 0,
∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji,
(2s)
Preferred Prospect Constraint Set
sposij ≤M(1−Ψij), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (2t)
snegij ≤MΨij , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (2u)
Msposij ≥ zqiij , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (2v)
(ni − 1)Φi ≤
∑
j 6=qi
zqiij , ∀i ∈ I, (2w)
Decision Variable Domain Constraint Set
a ∈ A, (2x)
Φi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, (2y)
zqiij ,Ψij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (2z)
sposij , s
neg
ij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (2aa)
T+ijkk′ , T
−
ijkk′ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij,, k′ ∈ Kij , (2ab)
where ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Kij we have
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γ + (1− b+ijk′)γ
)γ−1 , (3a)




δ + (1− b−ijk′)δ
)δ−1 , (3b)




V −(t−ijk′ , βi, λi) = −λ(−t−ijk′)βi . (3d)
The objective function (2a) maximizes a function of the number of supporters
and the persuasion actions taken, where the specific form of the function depends
upon the context of the problem instance. The constraints can be grouped as follows:
the Parameter Update (Constraints (2b)–(2d)), Ordering (Constraints (2e)–(2n)),
CPT-Value (Constraints (2o)–(2s)), Preferred Prospect (Constraints (2t)–(2w)), and
Decision Variable Domain (Constraints (2x)–(2ab)) Constraint Sets. More formally,
Constraints (2b) and (2c) ensure that, for each member, for every event in their set of
prospects, the event’s value and associated probability are updated in accordance with
the persuasion action. Constraint (2d) updates each member’s probability distortion,
value curvature, loss aversion, and reference point values with respect to the same
persuasion action. This research assumes the independence of parameter updates
and that they are functions of only the persuasion action. The exact natures of these
functions are not known, as the possibility of such updates has only recently been
studied in the literature. Moreover, such parameter updates may be interrelated. For
example, the function to update the loss probability distortion parameter may depend
on the action and the previous gain probability distortion parameter. We will exclude
such a possibility for this study, assuming instead that the updated parameter values
are a function of only the current parameter value and the persuasion actions.
Constraints (2e) – (2n) create the mappings, T+ijkk′ and T
−
ijkk′ , from the new gain
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ijk, values. Constraints (2e) and
(2f) enforce a bijective mapping. Constraints (2g) and (2h) perform the mapping
of outcomes for each decisionmaker, and Constraints (2m) and (2n) do likewise for
probabilities. Constraints (2i) and (2j) ensure the values are in ascending order, and
Constraints (2k) and (2l) enforce the positivity and negativity of gains and losses,
respectively. The decision weights for gain and losses are calculated and enforced
via Constraints (2o) – (2r) utilizing the Kahneman probability weighting functions
specified in Equations (3a) and (3b). Constraint (2s) calculates the difference between
prospect j and the preferred prospect qi for each individual, utilizing the previously
described decision weights and the Kahneman value functions listed in Equations (3c)
and (3d). Constraints (2t) – (2v) ensure only one of the decision variables sposij or s
neg
ij
assumes the entirety of this value, depending on the sign of the difference. Note that
a value of zero for zqiij is always feasible but, if properly constructed, the relation of
the objective function to Constraint (2w) will induce a value of one whenever feasible.
Constraint (2w) ensures an individual can only be labeled a supporter if he prefers
prospect qi to all of the other ni − 1 prospects.
Persuasion actions are broadly defined in this formulation. They may be discrete
or continuous, depending on the context. Moreover, the space A of feasible actions is
assumed to be bounded. Likewise, the measure associated with the value of an out-
come is not explicitly defined in this formulation. CPT usually assumes the measure
is monetary in nature. Utilizing actuarial practices, monetary values can be applied
to many non-monetary outcomes; however, these measures may still be ill-suited to
describe some situations wherein persuasion is of interest. For example, in a presi-
dential election, the monetary effects of a choice have value, but so do a wide array of
other measures. Thus, it is probable that some situations may be better described by
adapting a multi-attribute measure in the vein of Value-Focused Thinking (Keeney
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and Keeney, 2009). Depending on the setting, these measures and their associated
weights may be specific to individuals, making their estimation challenging. In such
situations, the adaption of a discrete or continuous Likert Scale may be more ef-
fective. This course of action is promoted by Gass and Seiter (2015) who provided
self-reporting scales (e.g., Likert Scales or Semantic Differential Scales) as an option
to explicitly measure persuasion.
An interesting property of this formulation, in part driven by the restrictions
on the parameter update functions fijk, gijk, and h
θ
i , is that there always exists a
feasible solution. Whenever no attempt at persuasion is made, the parameter update
functions are assumed to equal zero. Thus, the sorted outcomes t+ijk and t
−
ijk are
merely the (ŷijk − ri)-values, listed in ascending order and separated by sign (i.e.,
positivity or negativity). Under such a null action by the persuader, the objective
function value can be determined simply by calculating the prospect values for all
individuals, counting those individuals who strictly prefer prospect qi to all others,
and substituting those values into the specific form of the objective function.
Finally, many situations may not allow for all prospect theory parameters, raw
outcomes, and probabilities to be simultaneously affected. In such a scenario, the
appropriate decision variables can be affixed as parameters and the presented formu-
lation simplified. The malleability of outcomes such that rank-order is not preserved is
perhaps the most complicating feature of this scenario. If rank-order can be assumed
to be preserved, then the persuasion program can be greatly simplified.
Adaptations from Risk to Uncertainty.
To model an uncertain environment, we assume some probability-like measure is
utilized to quantify uncertainty. Such an assumption accords with the belief-based
model of decision under uncertainty by Fox and Tversky (1998) and is validated by the
33
work of Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Kilka and Weber (2001). These authors quan-
tified uncertainty using Support Theory developed by Tversky and Koehler (1994),
wherein judged probabilities are measured by the support of a focal hypothesis com-





wherein the function s(·) is characterized as the degree of support for a given hypoth-
esis.
Under Support Theory, judged probabilities lose the property of extensionality.
The probability of a disjunction of two independent and mutually exclusive events can
no longer be assumed to be their sum because the implicit disjunction of a two events
is assumed to be perceived as less likely than their explicit disjunctions. Namely, if
hypothesis A is equal to the union of mutually exclusive hypotheses B and C, then
A is an implicit disjunction, whereas B ∪C is an explicit disjunction. In this setting,
the authors propose s(A) ≤ s(B ∪ C).
Therefore, to adapt our model to a belief-based approach using Support Theory,
we introduce the sets Cij and Ωu.
Cij : Set of all Ωu subsets of Kij such that {Ωu ∈ Kij : 1 ≤ |Ωu| ≤ mij}
The set Cij is a collection of subsets of Kij. Each of these subsets, Ωu, represents a
possible disjunction of the uncertain events in Kij. CPT utilizes the assessed likeli-
hood of these disjunctions to determine the decision weights. In the case of risk, these
disjunctions are merely the sum of the component probabilities. However, as the as-
sumption of extensionality fails to hold, the judged probability of each disjunction
must be obtained. As such, the decision variables p̂ijk and pijk from the risk model
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must be substituted with the following.
p̂ijΩu : The judged probability that the disjunction of events in Ωu occurs
pijΩu : The judged probability that the disjunction of events in Ωu occurs
after persuasion
To account for uncertainty in lieu of risk within the general model, one may respec-
tively replace Constraints (2c) and (2m)–(2r) with Constraints (4a)– (4g) to leverage
these Support Theory based, disjunction-oriented probabilities.






































, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k 6= mij , (4e)
π−ij,1 = w
−(b−ij1, δi), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (4f)
π−ij,k′ = w
−(b−ijk′ , δi)− w−(b−ij(k′−1), δi), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ 6= 1, (4g)
Constraint (4a) is a natural analog to Constraint (2c), except that a separate
persuasion update function is required for each event disjunction. The same applies
for Constraints (4d)–(4g). However, Constraints (4b) and (4c) are only required
when a persuasion action can disrupt the rank-order of outcomes; they ensure that
the proper disjunctions are assigned to the appropriate positions for calculation of the
decision weights by utilizing the decision variables associated with the order mapping.
Furthermore, if a measure of evidence strength can be ascertained for an uncertainty,
Constraint (4a) can be written in terms of the persuasion action’s effect on this metric.
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Tversky and Koehler (1994) and Fox (1999) demonstrated that judged probabil-















wherein s(A) is the support of hypothesis A, ŝ(A) is an evidence strength metric for
A, events B1 to Bn form the explicit disjunction comprising the implicit disjunction
Ac, and the global weight wAc represents the ratio of support between these implicit
and explicit disjunctions.
In such a situation, once values of k and wAc have been identified via regression
analysis of data pertaining to observed behaviors and the effect of persuasion on
ŝ(A) ascertained, Constraint (4a) can be rewritten in a form similar to Equation
(5). Such a functional relationship is highly beneficial, especially when the evidence
strength metric is observable. In Section 2.4, we provide an example demonstrating
this concept.
2.4 Example Applications
The estimation of all parameter update functions in a GPP formulation under
either risk or uncertainty is feasible, but it is also expensive and dependent upon the
specific persuasive action. Previous data collection efforts in human subject research
are generally insufficient to simultaneously estimate all of these functional forms.
The dynamic nature of risk attitude is alluded to in the literature, but few studies
have translated these changes quantitatively into the complete CPT framework. In
this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed model to specific contextual
instances wherein a persuader can reasonably assume a subset of the decision variables
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to be constant. By doing so, we demonstrate the flexibility of the GPP and provide
motivation for estimating the dynamic effects of persuasion on CPT parameters via
future human subject research.
The first application demonstrates the model under risk and considers groups of
decisionmakers at an aggregate level. The persuader is able to alter the respective
outcomes, probabilities, and reference points of two groups of decisionmakers. The
probability weighting and utility functions are assumed to be constant. The remain-
ing examples demonstrate the model’s efficacy under uncertainty, with one modeling
decisionmakers at an individual level and the other at the aggregate level. In the
second of the three models, the persuader is able to affect judged probabilities for a
set of individuals by strengthening or weakening the support for a hypothesis. Like-
wise, the uncertainty weighting function can be altered through either an emotional
appeal or by affecting source preference. The third model assumes only the prospects
faced by demographic groups can be affected and the remaining elements are con-
stant. All instances are solved utilizing the global solver BARON on an HP ZBook
equipped with a 2.70 GHz Intel i7-4800MQ processor and 32GB of RAM. Our selec-
tion of a commercial solver is informed by the results of Caballero et al. (2018) on a
similar mathematical program having sorting constraints coupled with functions that
use decision variables in both the base and exponent of an expression. For further
information regarding BARON, we refer the interested reader to selected research
conducted to develop and improve the solver’s algorithms, as conducted by Ryoo
and Sahinidis (1995, 1996); Tawarmalani and Sahinidis (2004, 2005); Khajavirad and
Sahinidis (2013); Sahinidis (2018); and The Optimization Firm (2019).
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Influence under Risk: Insurance Policies.
Insurance is a popular application area for Cumulative Prospect Theory. In an
extensive review of its descriptive capability, Camerer (2000) discussed how prospect
theory explains phenomena with respect to automobile, health, and telephone wire
insurance. Given this interest in the literature, our first application of the GPP relates
to a home insurance company designing policies to maximize their expected profit.
For this use case, we make the following assumptions. The insurance provider
is developing a business model with “no hassle” policies. All homes of a given type
are provided a ready-made plan with set premiums and deductibles. Two aggregate
groups of homeowners of home types i ∈ I = {1, 2} each have two lotteries j ∈
J = {Buy Policy, Opt Out} = {1, 2} from which to chose. It is assumed that any
one of four events can occur to a home, where Kij = {Fire,Hail,Wind,Nothing} =
{1, 2, 3, 4} for every homeowner group and prospect. Only one event is able to occur
in a given payment period. A decision tree for homeowner group i based on the
insurer’s decision variables can be seen in Figure 3. Of note, we assume ŷi1k = 0 and
p̂i1k = p̂i2k = p̂ik, ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K1i, where p̂ik is defined for notational convenience for
this use case only.
Figure 3. Customer Decision Tree for Purchasing Insurance Policy
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This example is designed to illustrate our model’s applicability towards risk.
Therefore, in the vein of an actuarial example, we make the assumption that fre-
quentest probabilities and associated monetary damages of an insurable event are
known (or can be reasonably estimated) and are utilized to inform both customer
and insurer decisions. The probability of any given event is assumed to be disparate
for each home type. The insurance provider is assumed to use aggregate data in set-
ting prices. As such, the original probability weighting function proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) is adopted, in addition to their proposed (power) utility func-
tion and the parameters associated with these functions (e.g., loss aversion parameter,
utility curvature, etc.).
Coinciding with the emergence of separate wind/hail deductibles in the U.S. mar-
ket, the insurer’s policies incorporate both fixed rate premiums (ai) and event-based
deductibles (aik). In addition to setting the premium and deductible amount for
each policy, the insurance provider faces two additional decisions: (1) whether to
require all policy holders to upgrade their roof to a cutting-edge material costing κi
that affects the hazard probability by ωik; and (2) whether to implement a contro-
versial advertising campaign of cost σ = $500 to emphasize household hazards that
could either impel insurance purchase or harden resolve against it, depending on the
decisionmaker. These binary decisions are respectively represented as aup and aad.
Additionally, a binary variable νik is introduced to determine whether the damage
incurred exceeds the deductible.
The formulation of this instance utilizes the majority of the constraints in the
proposed GPP under risk. However, there do exist a few modifications, as the pa-
rameters within both the probability weighting function and utility functions are
assumed to be constant. The insurance provider operates via Expected Utility as a
risk neutral decisionmaker and optimizes its profit using the following mathematical
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program, assuming customers purchase insurance in accordance to CPT. We note
that the “Opt Out” prospect preserves rank order, and the base probabilities are not
affected. Therefore, we need only consider the case where j = 1 for many constraints.






νikpi1k(−ŷi2k + aik + ai)
)
(6a)
subject to Constraints (2e)–(2v),(2y)–(2ab),
νikaik ≤ ŷi2k, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki1, (6b)
aik ≥ (1− νik)ŷi2k, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki1, (6c)
xi1k = ai + aik + κiaup − ri, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki1, (6d)
xi2k = ŷi2k − ri, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki2, (6e)
pi1k = ai + ωikaup, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki1, (6f)
ri = r̂i + ρiaad, ∀i ∈ I, (6g)
Φi = z
1
i2, ∀i ∈ I, (6h)
νik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki1, (6i)
0 ≤ a1k ≤ 5, 000, ∀ k ∈ K11, (6j)
0 ≤ a2k ≤ 10, 000, ∀ k ∈ K21, (6k)
0 ≤ a1 ≤ 2, 000, (6l)
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 4, 000. (6m)
Table 1 presents the correspondence of constraints between this particular for-
mulation and the general GPP formulation set forth in Section 2.3. The objective
function (6a) calculates the total expected profit obtained by the insurer, deducting
expected expenditures from expected revenue. Constraints (6b) and (6c) determine
whether damage exceeds the set event-based deductible, whereas Constraints (6f)–
(6g) update the outcome values, probabilities, and reference points specific to this
context. Likewise, in this setting there is only one alternative prospect, implying Φi
can be determined directly via Constraint (6h). Although the formulation can be fur-
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ther simplified for this instance by replacing Φi with z
1
i2 throughout the formulation
and eliminating Constraint (4i), we refrain from doing so to maintain consistency of
terminology.
Table 1. Correspondence of Instance-specific and GPP constraints
Instance GPP Remarks
(6a) (2a)
(2e)-(2v), (2y)-(2ab) As presented
(6b), (6c), (6i) N/A These constraints are used to compute the
instance-specific objective function
(6d)-(6g) (2b)-(2d)
(6h) (2w) The GPP constraint (2w) can be simplified
because there are only two prospects
(6j) - (6m) (2x)
The values for all parameters for each homeowner group are presented in Table
2. Each homeowner may have disparate reference points pertaining to the amount
they expect to pay for home repairs. Thus, we see homeowners of Type 1 have a
reference point of −$1, 000 , whereas homeowners of Type 2 have a reference point
of $0. The cost of upgrading a roof (κi) must be born by the policy holder and will
reduce the hazard of some insurable events but may increase it for others. Specifically,
we assume the upgraded roof is more resilient to wind and hail but more susceptible
to fire damage, as it is made of a more flammable material. As such, we provide the
corresponding pik and ωik-values in Table 2. Likewise, the advertising campaign is
anticipated to affect the reference point for customers, as represented by the values
of ρi. Ceilings of $2,000 and $5,000 are respectively imposed on the premium and
deductible amounts for Home Type 1, and ceilings of $4,000 and $10,000 are imposed
for these values on Home Type 2. These limits are applied to ensure the plans remain
economically feasible for the socio-economic condition of the region and bound both
ai and aik from above. It is possible for such constraints to make it unprofitable to
offer insurance to a specified home type. In this situation, additional modifications
would be required to the GPP. However, this example has been constructed such that
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the insurer can profit by offering insurance within the socio-economic limits. Finally,
a discriminable factor of ∆ = 5 is adopted for ascertaining whether a homeowner
prefers to buy the policy.
Table 2. Parameter Values Associated with Insurance Persuasion Program
Parameter Home Type 1 Home Type 2
Value $100,000 $200,000
Reference Point (r̂i) -$1,000 $0
Fire Probability (pi1) 0.005 0.001
Hail Probability (pi2) 0.02 0.03
Wind Probability (pi3) 0.01 0.01
Fire Damage (ŷi21) -$70,000 -$160,000
Hail Damage (ŷi22) -$20,000 -$30,000
Wind Damage (ŷi23) -$11,000 -$18,000
Upgrade Fire Probability Effect (ωi1) 0.001 0.001
Upgrade Hail Probability Effect (ωi2) -0.015 -0.01
Upgrade Wind Probability Effect (ωi3) -0.0075 -0.005
Advertising Reference Point Effect (ρi) $500 -$2,000
Upgrade Homeowner Cost (κi) -$2,000 -$4,000
The commercial solver BARON was alloted five hours of computational effort to
identify a global optimal solution. The time limit was reached prior to convergence,
but the reported maximum amount the insurer can earn per period for a set of these
two home types is $3,095.26. Therefore, optimality of this solution is not guaranteed.
However, it does provide the insurer with a lower bound on the expected profit that
can be attained. This level of profit is obtained by foregoing the advertisement but
instituting the mandatory roof upgrade policy. The deductibles for the $100,000 home
are listed as {$4,915.52; $4,999.50; $4,919.150} and for the $200,000 home as {$0.67;
$0.70; $0.53}, and their respective premiums are $1,999.93 and $2,586.00.
In this solution, owners of both home types prefer to buy their offered policy.
However, the policies exhibit different behavior with regard to their deductibles; Home
Type 1 is required to pay substantial deductibles, whereas Home Type 2 has virtually
no deductible for any event. This behavior is due to the socio-economic constraints
placed on these values, in addition to the relation of the premium and the deductible
to the profit function. Positive profit is only obtained by increasing the premium,
42
whereas an increase in the deductible merely curtails an expenditure. As such, if
able to do so, the insurer prefers all payment in the form of the premium and only
resorts to increasing the deductible values when the premium is near the homeowner’s
socio-economic limit. This behavior is appropriate for our simplified model because
we ignore moral hazards and extraneous claims, two commonly cited reasons for
implementing a deductible. Were these considerations desired to be modeled, an
alternative lower bound on the deductibles could be instituted, but doing so would
likely lessen the expected profit through an associated premium reduction.
Influence under Uncertainty with Evidence Strength Metric: Defending
a Client.
A defense attorney’s goal is to convince a jury of their client’s innocence. The
jurors, for their part, are asked to listen to both the prosecution’s and the defense’s
arguments to determine whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Diamond (2003) defended the jury as a decisionmaker in response to criticism of the
U.S. Constitution’s Seventh Amendment and concluded that juries are competent,
albeit imperfect decisionmakers due to their human nature. In this example, we show
how an attorney can use the tools of decision under uncertainty to leverage the human
nature of the jury to their benefit.
In this context, each juror’s decision can be viewed as a decision under uncertainty,
as depicted in Figure 4. Jurors are not provided with the probabilities of guilt but
must infer them through the arguments presented in court. A verdict of guilty is
preferred if a juror assesses the probability of guilt to exceed a threshold of reasonable
doubt. This threshold of reasonable doubt is determined by the utilities associated
with either a correct or an incorrect verdict.
Consider a defense attorney in a criminal trial trying to achieve an acquittal for
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Figure 4. Juror Decision Tree: Two Available Verdicts
his client (i.e., not a hung jury or a mistrial). Two of the twelve jurors are perceived
through voir dire to be of such strong personality, it is determined that, if they can be
convinced of acquittal, the rest of the jury will follow. We assume the prosecution has
just rested their case, and the defense attorney is deciding how to respond. Utilizing
the 0–100 suspicion scale from Tversky and Koehler (1994), the defense attorney
estimates the prosecution was very effective and that each of the two jurors of interest
views his client as a 95 (i.e., most likely guilty). However, through cross examination,
the defense attorney was able to cast suspicion on three other individuals such that
their respective values on the suspicion scale are 25, 20, and 15. Even though the
three other individuals are not on trial, if a juror has high suspicion values for the
group compared to the person on trial, then reasonable doubt will exist. We define
event A as the defendant having committed the crime (i.e., defendant is guilty) and
events B, C, and D as one of the three individuals referenced by the defense having
committed the crime (i.e., the defendant is not guilty).
In this setting, it can be observed that I = {Juror 1, Juror 2} = {1, 2}, Ji =
{Rule Guilty, Rule Not Guilty} = {1, 2} ∀i, and Kij = {Guilty, Innocent} = {1, 2}
∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Should we assume the example estimates from Fox (1999) of k = 2.2
and wAc = 0.65 to be applicable and static, the judged probability that juror i assigns
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to the defendant of being guilty (i.e., p̂i11 = P (A,A
c) = p̂i21) can be calculated
via Equation (7). We further note that the support assigned to the defendant not
committing the crime is assumed to equal the weighted support that one of the other
individuals did. However, it is assumed the jurors do not unpack Ac on their own
(i.e., with additional hypotheses regarding who, specifically, might be guilty, if not
A); their task is to consider the collective set of alternatives, Ac = B ∪ C ∪D. Due
to binary complementarity, it can also be observed that both p̂i12 and p̂i22 are equal
to Pi(A




ŝi(A)k + wAc [ŝi(B)k + ŝi(C)k + ŝi(D)k]
(7)
A common reference point of zero is assumed for all jurors along with a ∆-
parameter of zero. Jurors are further assumed to have Linear-in-Log-Odds probability
weighting functions with parameter values corresponding to experiments conducted
by Kilka and Weber (2001), which are identical for gains and losses such that, for
each juror i, we have δ̂i = {1.096, 0.953} and γ̂ = {0.489, 0.415}. The general form of
the Linear-in-Log-Odds function is stated in Equation (8).
w+(p) = w−(p) =
δ+pγ
+
δ+pγ+ + (1− p)γ+ . (8)
We assume these estimates correspond with familiar and unfamiliar sources of uncer-
tainty from the Kilka and Weber (2001) experiments. As such, we assume Juror 1 is
familiar with the underlying uncertainty whereas Juror 2 is not. The reference point
adjusted utility for a given outcome is assumed to be fixed such that a correct ver-
dict yields u(G,G) = 1 = u(NG, I), an incorrect guilty verdict yields u(G, I) = −5,
and an incorrect not guilty verdict yields u(NG,G) = −4. Therefore, the persuasion
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action preserves rank order of outcomes.
The prosecutor has seven themes to utilize in crafting a defense argument, and
any combination of these themes may be employed. A binary decision variable al is
associated with each of the seven themes, each of which has the potential to increase
or decrease the suspicion for a given individual, with the specific effect dependent
upon the juror. For instance, one potential theme may be to insinuate that a corrupt
government official is the real culprit. From jury selection, the defense attorney may
know that one juror has experienced mistreatment from authority figures and may
identify personally with such an argument. However, if the second juror is a lifetime
civil servant, such a theme may not resonate with them. Support for some hypothesis
E ∈ {A,B,C,D} after persuasion is denoted as s̄i(E).
We also assume the themes utilized can affect the probability weighting function
of either of the two jurors. This effect may result from a theme’s emotional content or
the jurors’ respective familiarity with the source of uncertainty. For example, if the
underlying suspicion of the defendant is rooted in ethical finance practices, a selected
theme may include educational aspects relating to the nuances of this profession.
Should one juror be unfamiliar with these nuances, this theme may help reduce the
adverse source preference effect. For this illustrative example, the quantitative impact
of each theme against each hypothesis and juror’s probability weighting function is
shown in Table 3, wherein τiEl represents the effect of Theme l on the support for
hypothesis E for juror i.
To model these effects, new binary decision variables al must be introduced, which
equal one if Theme l is utilized and zero otherwise. The GPP under uncertainty can
be updated as follows. The objective function (9a) assumes the defense attorney
seeks to select a combination of themes to maximize the number of jurors favoring
a Not Guilty verdict prior to deliberation. The support update function for each
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Table 3. Parameter Update Coefficients Associated with Defense Themes
Theme(l)
Effect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
γ1 0 0 -0.088 0 -0.015 0 -0.05
δ1 0 0 -0.1 0 -0.025 0 -0.05
τ1Al -10 -5 5 -5 -5 -15 0
τ1Bl 10 -5 10 -5 5 -10 5
τ1Cl 0 10 -10 20 -10 30 0
τ1Dl 0 10 -10 20 -10 30 0
γ2 0.08 0.04 -0.15 0 0 -0.01 0
δ2 0.1 0.05 -0.002 0 0 -0.01 0
τ2Al -5 10 -5 -5 -5 -15 0
τ2Bl 10 5 -10 5 5 -10 5
τ2Cl 0 5 -5 10 -15 50 0
τ2Dl 10 0 0 0 -5 -5 10
hypothesis can be seen in Equation (9b), and the probability update functions are of
the form shown in Equations (9c) and (9d). Based on the context of our problem,
there are only two outcomes for each prospect: one outcome represents a gain and
the other outcome represents a loss. As rank order is preserved, the Prospect Order
Constraint Set is not required and, when coding the instance, we can take the b±ijk-





121). Binary complementarity also ensures the sum of judged probabilities
equals one, in accordance with Constraint (9d). For reference, Table 4 presents the
correspondence of constraints between the particular and general formulations for this





subject to Constraints (4d)–(4g), (2s)–(2aa),
s̄i(E) = ŝi(E) +
7∑
l=1




s̄i(A)k + wAc [s̄i(B)k + s̄i(C)k + s̄i(D)k]
, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, (9c)
pij2 = 1− pij1, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji. (9d)
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Solving the adapted persuasion program in BARON, an optimal solution is at-
tained in 0.08 seconds of computational effort. The defense attorney is able to per-
suade both jurors of his client’s innocence by utilizing the Themes 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6.
The respective difference in prospect values is 1.37 and 0.026 in favor of acquittal for
Jurors 1 and 2.
Table 4. Correspondence of Instance-specific and GPP constraints
Instance GPP Remarks
(9a) (2a)
(4d)-(4g), (2s)-(2aa) As presented
(9b) N/A Instance-specific constraint used to relate the
evidence strength metric to the judged prob-
ability value
(9c)-(9d) (4a)
However, we note that there are alternative optimal solutions in this setting.
For instance, if the previously reported optimal is disallowed via a new constraint,
BARON reports the combination of Themes 4, 6, and 7 as an optimal solution having
the same objective function value. Using this combination of themes, the respective
difference between acquittal and conviction is 0.187 and 0.29 for Jurors 1 and 2. To
distinguish between alternative optimal solutions, additional manpower, budgetary,
or strategic considerations can be included via a subset of new constraints. For exam-
ple, the number of themes to be utilized may be limited by the number of paralegals
available for research. In turn, the number of paralegals may be affected by the law
firm’s budget and total caseload. The inclusion of this dynamic in the constraints en-
ables the attorney to select an optimal defense strategy while considering concomitant
factors.
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Influence under Uncertainty without Evidence Strength Metric: Pen-
sion Enrollment.
In our final example, we consider a public agency reconstructing its pension pro-
gram for government employees (e.g., see Herald, 2016). The public agency has been
operating a legacy, pension-only system that is no longer affordable. The legacy pen-
sion system guarantees an annual pension of 50% of salary at retirement (µold) to
employees who stayed with the company for 25 years. Income during employment
with the company is based on a time-of-employment stair schedule and is readily pre-
dictable. Alternatively, the new mixed pension system reduces the annuity percentage
to 40% of the salary at retirement (µnew), but it includes an additional retirement
benefit based on employee contributions to a stock market fund over their duration
of employment. We assume that, if the stock market has increased in a given year, an
additional τ is provided to the retiree whereas, if the market has declined, a smaller
value of ρ is provided. All new hires will be switched to the new, mixed-pension
system, but the agency wishes to reduce future payroll costs by incentivizing cur-
rent employees to switch to the new retirement plan. Assuming a choice is made
contingent upon expected annual retirement income, the decision tree faced by these
employees can be seen in Figure 5. All outcome components of the decision tree are
fixed except for the continuous variable a. For this scenario, the variable a represents
the amount (in dollars) of an additional incentive called continuation pay which will
be provided to any employee for switching to the new retirement system. However,
this continuation pay can only be retained if the member choses to remain employed
with the agency until retirement.
To avoid complications with the time value of money, we assume all values have
been adjusted to current year dollars. The agency is considering four demographics
it would like to impel to switch into the new pension system. Each demographic has
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Figure 5. Pension Enrollment Decision Tree
varying values of µold, µnew, τ , and ρ parameters based on their projected income
at retirement, as reported in Table 5. Each demographic is assumed to utilize the
Cumulative Prospect Theory functions and parameters from Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), with a reference point of zero. The parameter values for these CPT functions
are not malleable.
The public agency is only able to affect the outcomes depending on the value of a.
As such, the rank order of outcomes in this setting is not permutable. We recognize
that the assumption of a reference point equal to zero may be subject to alternative
views; one could argue that an individual’s reference is their expected retirement
income. However, we justify herein the reference point of zero for both tractability
and demonstration purposes.
A compressed version of the decision tree for use in our persuasion program is
illustrated in Figure 6. As rank order is preserved, we assume the public agency has
polled its employees over the appropriate event disjunctions utilized in the probability
weighting functions. In this way, the agency directly assesses the judged probability
of its constituents for each event and utilizes them in the appropriate position to
calculate the decision weights. These values are also listed in Table 5. It is assumed
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Table 5. Parameter Update Coefficients Associated with Pension Persuasion
Parameters Demographic 1 Demographic 2 Demographic 3 Demographic 4
µold $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
µnew $16,000 $24,000 $32,000 $40,000
τ $3,000 $4,500 $6,000 $7,500
ρ $400 $600 $800 $1,000
p̂i11 0.35 0.1 0.3 0.4
p̂i12 0.2 0..2 0.25 0.55
p̂i13 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.05
p̂i14 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.075
p̂i1(1,2) 0.5 0.2 0.45 0.85
p̂i1(1,2,3) 0.8 0.6 0.75 0.95
p̂i21 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.9
p̂i22 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.1
that the event space associated with the uncertainty of each prospect cannot be
further subdivided. As such p̂i1(1,2,3,4) = p̂i2(1,2) = 1, ∀ i ∈ I, per Support Theory
axioms.
Figure 6. Compressed Pension Enrollment Decision Tree
The following adaption of the GPP under uncertainty allows the agency to de-
termine the minimum continuation pay it must provide to convince all demographics
to switch to the new retirement system. Table 6 presents the correspondence of con-
straints between the particular and general formulations for this instance. As with
the example presented in Section 2.4, note that the assumptions in this instance al-
low for the exclusion of selected GPP constraints. The outcome update functions
determining xijk-values correspond to the events depicted in Figure 5. It is assumed
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that, for each dollar a increases, each probability associated with the new retirement
system is positively incremented by, e.g., a value of 2.5× 10−6. Each ŷijk equals the
fixed elements of the associated outcome value (e.g., ŷi11 = µnew + τ).
min a (10a)
subject to Constraints (4d) – (4g) , (2s)–(2aa),
xi1k = ŷijk + a, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ {1, 2}, (10b)
xi1k = ŷijk, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ {3, 4}, (10c)
xi2k = ŷijk, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki2, (10d)
pi1Ωu = p̂i1Ωu + a ∗ (2.5× 10−6), ∀i ∈ I,Ωu ∈ Ci1, (10e)
pi2Ωu = p̂i2Ωu , ∀i ∈ I,Ωu ∈ Ci2, (10f)∑
i∈I
Φi = 4. (10g)
Utilizing this information and a value of ∆ = 0, the resulting persuasion program
is solved optimally with 0.69 seconds of computational effort by the commercial solver
BARON. A minimum continuation pay of $5,950 is required to impel the targeted
demographics to switch pension programs. Each demographic favors switching to the
new pension system by a margin of $525.53, $515.83, $615.80, $0.20, respectively, in
CPT-calculated value.
Table 6. Correspondence of Instance-specific and GPP constraints
Instance GPP Remarks
(10a) (2a)
(4d)-(4g), (2s)-(2aa) As presented
(10b)-(10f) (2b)-(2c)
(10g) N/A Instance-specific constraint ensuring all deci-
sionmakers are persuaded
Since Demographic 4 finds the two deals very similar, the agency may need to
consider resolving with a higher ∆-value if it wants to ensure all demographics switch
to the new system. Assuming the agency has determined the scaled continuation
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pay cannot exceed $7,000 without reversing the cost savings of the mixed pension
system, the program is resolved with ∆ = 200. The optimal solution indicates all
demographics will enroll in the mixed pension system with a minimum continuation
pay of $6,924 with margins similar to those aforementioned. This solution provides
more assurance on employee behavior, but may reduce agency cost savings. Thus,
in making its final decision on the continuation pay value, agency leadership must
balance this risk versus reward dynamic, potentially by utilizing traditional Decision
Analysis techniques.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The concept of influencing an individual to adopt a preferred course of action is an
ancient concept. The Ancient Greeks even personified persuasion in the goddess Pei-
tho (Theoi Project, 2017). It is also nearly ubiquitous. Commercial marketing cam-
paigns are persuasion operations wherein the desired prospect is a customer buying a
given product. Political campaigns are persuasion operations seeking to garner votes
for a particular candidate. Financial regulatory actions are persuasion operations
engaging corporations and individuals, both of which are susceptible to emotional
stimuli (Fairchild, 2014), with the objective of ensuring market confidence, finan-
cial stability, and consumer protection (Financial Services Authority, 2018). Addi-
tional application areas include management, deterrence, lobbying legislative bodies,
counter-terrorism, social marketing, and many other forms of interpersonal commu-
nication.
A new class of decision problems has been introduced to model this human be-
havior. We formulated a model rooted in fundamental behavioral economic concepts
such that a persuader can select an optimal strategy to meet a desired goal, subject
to selected restrictions. By doing so, we fill a gap in the Behavioral Operations Re-
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search literature by expanding the stream of research Franco and Hämäläinen (2016)
described as “[modeling] human behavior in complex settings” from a descriptive to
a prescriptive setting, and thereby strengthen the research stream’s connection to
the core of Operations Research study. Likewise, a similar observation can be made
when considering our work from the broader perspective of behavioral science; that
is, it leverages descriptive theories of choice to inform an agent’s optimal interac-
tion with a population. The models introduced in this research are unique in their
ability to address a variety of forms of persuasion under conditions of either risk or
uncertainty. It compliments psychological persuasion models (e.g., the Elaboration
Likelihood Method) that focus on how a persuasive message is processed by examining
how a persuasion campaign can be designed to achieve desired effects.
However, our models are limited by the lack of knowledge surrounding the func-
tional mappings of persuasion actions to their effect on Cumulative Prospect Theory
functional parameters and reference points. Future empirical studies in Behavioral
Operations Research and other, related disciplines are ultimately required to enable
the full potential of these models. Of particular interest are psychophysiological
studies (e.g., Leppänen et al., 2018) that capture the effect of emotion. Given the
potential effects of culture, background, age, and other factors to affect emotional
responses to persuasive stimuli, such experiments may requisite a significant number
of control variables and prove to be challenging-but-fruitful research endeavors. In
the absence of such data to inform regression of the parameter update functions, the
models set forth herein provide a framework to adopt for influence campaigns but
would necessarily utilize less quantitative estimation methods. Alternatively, prac-
tical implementation under current conditions could be facilitated by other robust
decisionmaking methodologies (e.g., Lempert et al., 2006).
Nonetheless, some of the first advances have already been shared in the litera-
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ture to develop these functional mappings with a view towards broader application.
Booij et al. (2010) provided a description of the risk attitudes of a variety of demo-
graphics in the Netherlands by characterizing the expected value of their Cumulative
Prospect Theory parameters. The respective characterization of external action on
the probability weighting function parameters by Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty (2014)
and Schulreich et al. (2014) provided the first empirical estimates of a probability
weighting update function. Future studies combining these methodologies can be
utilized to generate the data required to fit the parameter update functions related
to a specific persuasion action.
Other compelling areas for future research relate to the study of heuristic methods
applied to the GPP, and to the automated discovery of parametric input values. As
illustrated in Section 2.4, instances of our model can be constructed such that they are
difficult to solve quickly to optimality, even with a global solver. It is a worthy research
endeavor to explore under what conditions this behavior emerges and to develop
methods for its mitigation. The use of such methods or, alternatively, the heuristic
use of a global solver via the imposition of a time limit, are both promising strategies
to approach large persuasion problems in practice. Moreover, in a manner analogous
to that discussed by White et al. (2016), it may be possible to leverage big data
and/or sentiment analysis to describe changes in judged probabilities. Social media
provides a platform to either solicit or infer an individual’s evaluation of strength for
a given hypothesis and, if defined properly, their assessment of probability. If such
research is successful, the persuasion programs modeled herein have the potential to
shift the paradigm of strategic decisions regarding influence.
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III. Informing National Security Policy by Modeling
Adversarial Inducement and its Governance
Abstract
The distinction between peace and conflict in contemporary international rela-
tions is no longer well-defined. Leveraging modern technology, hostile action below
the threshold of war has become increasingly effective. The objective of such aggres-
sion is often the influence of opinions, emotions, and, ultimately, the decisions of a
nation’s citizenry. This work presents two new game theoretic frameworks, denoted
as prospect games and regulated prospect games, to inform defensive policy against
these threats. These frameworks respectively model (a) the interactions of competing
entities influencing a populace and (b) the preemptive actions of a regulating agent to
alter such a framework. Prospect games and regulated prospect games are designed
to be adaptable, depending on the assumed nature of persuaders’ interactions and
their rationality. The contributions herein are a modeling framework for compet-
itive influence operations under a common set of assumptions, model variants that
respectively correspond to scenario-specific modifications of selected assumptions, the
illustration of practical solution methods for the suite of models, and a demonstra-
tion on a representative scenario with the ultimate goal of providing a quantifiable,
tractable, and rigorous framework upon which national policies defending against
competitive influence can be identified.
3.1 Introduction
The role of a nation’s citizenry in models of interstate conflict is often captured
via the concept of audience costs. Introduced by Fearon (1994), audience costs char-
acterize the punishment levied by the population of a state upon its leader for backing
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down in a crisis escalation situation. This concept has been extended and tested by
numerous authors and is well-studied in the literature (e.g., Weeks, 2008; Moon and
Souva, 2016; Chiozza, 2017; Tomz et al., 2018). However, this research thread tends to
focus on the military instrument of national power and implies a binary relationship
between war and peace.
Conversely, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2018) underscore that multiple instruments of national power (e.g., diplomatic, in-
formational, military, economic) can be coordinated and applied to achieve strategic
objectives. Chinese and Russian strategists place similar emphasis on coordinating
instruments of national power in their respective doctrines of Unrestricted Warfare
and New Generation Warfare.
Moreover, “[conventional] Western concepts of war are incompatible and funda-
mentally misaligned with the realities of conflict in the twenty-first century” (Stowell,
2018). Empowered by modern technology, emerging national defense strategies, of-
ten described by the term hybrid warfare, frequently utilize tactics stopping short of
conventional war. The result is what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg clas-
sified as a “new and more demanding security environment where also there is a more
blurred line between peace and war” (Woody, 2018b). This perspective is further
elucidated in the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense,
2018) wherein interstate strategic competition of a multipolar, multi-domain, and
ambiguous nature is described as the primary concern to U.S. national security.
In such strategic competition, a nation’s citizenry may be explicitly targeted,
potentially by multiple instruments of power, often with the objective of influencing
their support for (or against) some prospect. This type of targeting can be witnessed
in recent Russian influence efforts in Ukraine (Stowell, 2018), the United States (DHS
and FBI, 2016), and the Balkans (Krastev, 2019). Moreover, as witnessed by the
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actions of China and North Korea in the 2016 American presidential election, multiple
adversaries may compete simultaneously over the public’s support (Silverstein, 2017;
Dupuy, 2018).
As such, in 21st Century interstate competition, the role of a nation’s citizenry
transcends the traditional concept of audience costs. In fact, as the decision-making
of a nation’s citizenry may be the object of competition, it is necessary to model their
framework for choices with high granularity.
From an offensive influence perspective, the persuasion programs set forth by
Caballero et al. (2018) can be leveraged to generate optimal strategies in a leader-
followers game. Within a persuasion program, an external entity known as the per-
suader acts to impel a certain decision (or certain respective decisions, in the case of
persuading a group of decisionmakers) by affecting (1) the underlying risk or uncer-
tainty, (2) subjective beliefs regarding payoffs, or (3) cognitive evaluation of the set
of prospects. Conceptually, their framework can be viewed as an adversarial Decision
Analysis problem wherein the persuader can affect the structure of an individual’s
decision tree (e.g., see Figure 7), and the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) pa-
rameters utilized in its evaluation (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In this manner,
the persuader and the decisionmakers adopt the roles of the leader and the followers,
respectively, in a bilevel programming context. However, the assumption of bound-
edly rational followers via the use of CPT allows for the problem’s reformulation to
a single-level form.
The research herein extends their methodology to a defensive setting wherein a
third party, henceforth referred to as a regulator, is responsible for ensuring the actions
of multiple persuaders fall within certain confines of acceptable behavior. We do so
by introducing prospect games and regulated prospect games. A prospect game can be
viewed as a persuasion program having multiple competing persuaders such that each
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Figure 7. Example Decision Tree
has a finite number of available actions, whereas a regulated prospect game considers
how a regulator would optimally interact with the persuaders in this setting. That is,
a regulated prospect game is a prospect game acted upon first by a rational external
entity (i.e., one who abides by Expected Utility axioms).
To inform the regulator’s decision on whether to intervene, the prospect game
should first be solved to identify outcomes in the absence of regulator action. Given
that a consensus on which game theoretic solution concept should be leveraged for a
given situation can be elusive, we recommend the consideration of alternative frame-
works to ascertain whether identified outcomes are robust to the choice of a solution
concept. Should analysis of the prospect game indicate that the predicted persuader
behavior is unacceptable, a similar set of regulated prospect games should be solved
to provide a collection of intervention options. Such a methodology is illustrated in
Section 3.4.
Depending on the nature of influence and regulation, both of the games described
herein may involve some form of communication. As such, they are related to signal-
ing (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008), cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), per-
suasion (Milgrom, 1981), and Bayesian persuasion games (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011). However, prospect games and regulated prospect games are unique in their
utilization of a behavioral theory of choice (i.e., CPT) to describe lower-level deci-
sionmakers’ behaviors. More formally, since many communication games adopt a
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leader-follower framework, they can be modeled and solved as bilevel programs. A
prospect game has a similar structure albeit with multiple leaders, and its agent-based
modeling approach, enabled by CPT, allows for it to be modeled as a standard, single-
level, optimization problem, and solved as a normal form game. This incorporation of
CPT allows for a similar transformation in regulated prospect games, from a trilevel
to a bilevel math programming formulation.
The two modeling constructs described herein incorporate quantitative psychol-
ogy and decision science theory within a mathematical programming construct to
enable the comprehension and regulation of competitive influence with the intent
of providing models capable of informing defensive security policy. The remainder
of this research details these contributions as follows. Section 3.2 formally defines
prospect games; describes how they relate to existing psychological, economic, and
neuroeconomic literature; and discusses appropriate solution methodologies. Section
3.3 defines regulated prospect games under a general game theoretic solution concept;
provides three mathematical programming formulations of these games under specific
game theoretic solution concepts; and explores suitable solution methods under vary-
ing baseline assumptions. An illustration of how these models can be used to inform
national security policy is provided in Section 3.4, followed by concluding remarks in
Section 3.5.
3.2 Prospect Games
Whereas the persuasion programs of Caballero et al. (2018) model a single per-
suader interacting with a group of decisionmakers, a prospect game (PG) considers
multiple persuaders simultaneously influencing the decisionmaker population. More
formally, in a PG, multiple persuaders simultaneously compete to alter a decision-
maker(s) decision tree, and/or the decisionmakers’ evaluation thereof. The persuaders
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act first, and then the decisionmakers (i.e., the populace) select a prospect. Such a
structure, as displayed in Figure 8, is consistent with many modern influence cam-
paigns.
Figure 8. PG with 3 Persuaders each having 3 Actions, and n decisionmakers
Each persuader is self-interested and desires the decisionmakers to each select
some respective prospect. These prospects may or may not coincide for any given
persuader-and-decisionmaker combination. The objective within a prospect game
is not to optimize a single persuader’s decision, but to model and understand the
strategic interaction between persuaders competing to influence the same populace
of decisionmakers. Once this interaction is understood, a decision can be made on
whether intervention is necessary. If intervention is required, the techniques described
in Section 3.3 describe how a collection of intervention strategies can be assembled.
The leaders-followers framework of a PG naturally lends itself to a bilevel pro-
gramming formulation. However, when solving a PG, the assumption that the deci-
sionmakers are boundedly rational in accordance with CPT allows for the problem’s
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transformation to a normal form game with CPT-determined payoffs. The incorpo-
ration of such boundedly rational decisionmakers is appropriate, given we model the
choices of humans in a descriptive, behavioral sense.
CPT was developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) via extensive human-
subject testing and has proven itself effective in the representation of human be-
havior. It is a descriptive theory of choice under risk and uncertainty that is an
alternative to the normative Expected Utility Theory. CPT is unique in its findings
that humans systematically overweight low probabilities, underweight high proba-
bilities, evaluate utility from a reference point, and experience losses stronger than
gains of the same value. Mathematically, these characteristics are represented by an
inverse-sigmoid shaped probability weighting function and an asymmetrical sigmoid-
shaped utility function (e.g., equations (19a)–(19d)). Although, there exists multiple
specific forms of these functions, they are all characterized by some parameters alter-
ing the subadditivity of the probability weighting function (e.g., γi in equation (19a)),
the decisionmaker’s loss aversion (e.g., λi in equation (19d)) and the utility function
curvature (e.g., αi in equation (19c)). Therefore, CPT provides a flexible, descriptive
and deterministic basis for modeling the populace’s behavior and, as explained later
in this Section 3.2, enables standard game theoretic techniques to be utilized when
solving a PG.
In this section, we formally define prospect games by incorporating the follow-
ing assumptions: (1) persuader action spaces are discrete; (2) the populace members
respectively make a decision from among a finite set of actions in accordance with
Cumulative Prospect Theory; and (3) decisionmaker prospects, CPT-related param-
eters, and the effect of exogenous actions on those parameters are known. This final
assumption indicates that PGs in the form presented are most useful in situations
wherein decisionmaker behavior is well-studied; however, as discussed in Section 3.3,
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PGs can be altered to a Bayesian context to accommodate more uncertain environ-
ments. Moreover, the models presented herein deliberately maintain generality of the
following options to ensure their versatility: (1) type of uncertainty (i.e., risk or ambi-
guity); (2) form of decisionmakers’ CPT utility and probability weighting functions;
(3) rationality of persuaders; and (4) specific nature of discrete persuader action.
Defining Prospect Games.
The behavior of persuaders in a PG depends upon the choices of the decision-
makers, which are in turn characterized by CPT. Given the persuaders’ actions, CPT
provides a deterministic model of the followers’ behavior that can be utilized to dis-
cern each leader’s utility and reduce the game to a normal form setting. Therefore,
the modeling of each respective decisionmaker via their CPT parameters and deci-
sion trees constitutes the foundation of the game and is accomplished utilizing the
following sets, and variables.
Sets
I : Decisionmakers upon which persuasion is being conducted of the form
I = {1, 2, ...}
P : Set of persuaders of the form P = {1, 2, ...}
A : Set of persuader action profiles such that A = A1 ×A2 × ..., where Ap
is a finite set of actions available to persuader p
S : Set of persuader mixed-strategy profiles such that S = S1 × S2 × ...,
where Sp is the set of all probability distributions over Ap
Ji : Set of ni prospects offered to each member i of the form Ji = {1, ..., ni}
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Kij : Set of mij events (i.e., outcomes) for member i in prospect j of the form
Kij = {1, ...,mij}
Ωu : Some subset of Kij such that {Ωu ∈ Kij : 1 ≤ |Ωu| ≤ mij}
CPT Variables
xijk : Gain/loss for member i for k
th event of prospect j after a ∈ A
pijk : Probability of k
th event of prospect j for member i after a ∈ A;
used in conditions of risk
pijΩu : Judged probability that the disjunction of events in Ωu occurs after
a ∈ A;usedinconditionsofambiguity
γi : Gain probability weighting coefficient for member i after a ∈ A
δi : Loss probability weighting coefficient for member i after a ∈ A
αi : Gain utility curvature coefficient for member i after a ∈ A
βi : Loss utility curvature coefficient for member i after a ∈ A
λi : Loss aversion coefficient for member i after a ∈ A
ri : Reference point for member i after a ∈ A
A given collective action a ∈ A by the persuaders establishes the decision setting
for each decisionmaker. We allow for the underlying probability weighting, utility
curvature, loss aversion, and reference point parameters to be altered, a modeling
choice we discuss in Section 3.2. Henceforth, the caret notation distinguishes be-
tween baseline CPT parameters and their updated values after action a (e.g., γ̂i and
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γi, respectively). Moreover, for each prospect j ∈ Ji, persuasive actions may alter the
outcome value (i.e., from x̂ijk to xijk) or the uncertainty (i.e., from p̂ijk to pijk and
from p̂ijΩu to pijΩu) associated with any k ∈ Kij. The variable pijk is utilized under
conditions of risk, whereas pijΩu is required for conditions of ambiguity in accordance
with the belief-based model of CPT by Fox and Tversky (1998). The generic structure
of a prospect game allows for each of these parameters to be updated as a function of
a; however, some may be assumed to be constant without loss of generality. The psy-
chological and neuroeconomic justification for such update functions is also discussed
in Section 3.2.
Each decisionmaker discerns the value for every prospect in accordance with CPT
as indicated in equations (11)–(17) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). A reader familiar
with decision science may recognize equation (11) as the sum of two Rank-dependent
Utility (RDU) functionals. CPT can be viewed as a generalization of RDU that
incorporates all three components of risk attitude: utility curvature, probabilistic
sensitivity, and loss aversion (Wakker, 2010).
Vij(a) = V
+
ij (a) + V
−
ij (a),where (11)















+(Eijl ∪ ... ∪ Eijz,a)−W+(Eij[l+1] ∪ ... ∪ Eijz,a), 0 ≤ l ≤ z − 1 (16)
π−ijl(a) = W
+(Eij[−y] ∪ ... ∪ Eijl,a)−W+(Eij(−y) ∪ ... ∪ Eij[l−1],a), −y ≤ l ≤ 0. (17)
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For each individual i, a prospect j, having mij total outcomes, is separated into z
gain outcomes and y loss outcomes, each having an associated value xijl gain/loss
from the reference point. The value of the prospect, Vij(a), is calculated as the sum
of the gain and loss values (e.g., V +ij (a) and V
−
ij (a)) that are respectively calculated
as the sumproduct of π±ijl and v
±. That is, each outcome’s gain and loss values are
determined via the decision weight and utility functions (e.g., equations (12) and
(13)). The decision weights are calculated as the marginal difference of the event
weighting function, W+ or W−, for gain and loss ranks, respectively, wherein a gain
rank of event k is the probability of receiving a better outcome, and a loss rank is
the probability of a worse outcome (Wakker, 2010). Likewise, the value function is
generally modeled in a piecewise nature allowing for different functional forms of gains
and losses (i.e., v+ and v−) .
Based on the results of Fox and Tversky (1998), the probability weighting func-
tions, w±, can be used as the event weighting function, W±, in conditions of risk or
uncertainty. However, these results hold under the assumption that judged probabil-
ities satisfy a non-extensional theory of subjective probability (i.e., support theory).
Therefore, the specific probabilities utilized in the weighting functions under condi-
tions of risk are different than those under uncertainty, as seen in equations (18a)
and (18b), respectively. The difference between the two equations derives from the
preservation of the extensionality property under risk and its loss under uncertainty.
That is, under uncertainty, the subjective probability of event Eijl∪ ...∪Eijs must be
solicited directly whereas, under conditions of risk, it can be calculated as the sum of
pijl, ..., pijs.












Maintaining consistency with Caballero et al. (2018), we adopt the original functions
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in our worked examples, as depicted in equations
(19a)–(19d). However, they are not fundamental to the modeling approach examined
herein, and an interested researcher may chose to adopt alternatives forms for either
the utility or probability weighting functions (e.g., see Prelec, 1998; Wakker, 2010)
w+(pijk,a) =
pγijk(









v−(xijk,a) = −λ(−xijk)βi . (19d)
Each player i is assumed to select the prospect j that maximizes equation (11).
The collective selection of prospects by all players in I determines the persuaders’
payoffs. This information is determined by the variables φip = f(Vi(a), qip),∀ i ∈
I, p ∈ P where Vi(a) is the CPT evaluation of all prospects Ji, qip is the prospect
persuader p desires decisionmaker i to select, and f : Vi(a)× qi → {0, 1}. It is helpful
to envision φip as constituting elements in a matrix Φ wherein a value of one in the
entry (i, p) indicates that decisionmaker i prefers the prospect desired by persuader
p, and zero otherwise.
For some a ∈ A, the utility vector for the persuaders is defined as
θa = {g1(Φ,a), g2(Φ,a), ..., g|P|(Φ,a)}, (20)
such that gp(Φ, a) calculates a persuader’s utility for the decisionmaker preferences in
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Φ and some collective action a = (a1, a2, ...) wherein each persuader p independently
controls the variable ap. A given persuader’s utility can be determined based upon
a myriad of factors, such as whether a decisionmaker prefers prospect qip or acted in
accordance to a competitor’s desire, as well as the amount of resources expended in
influential action compared to other persuaders. The θa-values can be aggregated to
form the set of vectors Θ = {θa, ∀ a ∈ A}. Therefore, since the action space A is
finite, we can define a normal form game via the tuple (P ,A,Θ).
On the Malleability of Prospects and CPT Parameters.
Human decisions are shaped by subjective evaluations of uncertainty and value,
emotions, and a variety of other psychological phenomena (Kahneman, 2011; Lerner
et al., 2015). Therefore, persuader actions in this research are allowed to affect
the perception of an outcome’s likelihood, the perception of an outcome’s value,
and/or an individual’s CPT-parameter values, and in this way the persuaders are
able to affect the populace’s evaluation of their respective decision trees. Because
such a perspective does not have consensus among decision-science scholars, we briefly
review the neuroscientific literature supporting this point of view. However, for a
more thorough literature review spanning multiple disciplines (e.g., neuroeconomics,
psychology, and management science), we refer the reader to Caballero et al. (2018).
The empirical evidence from economics studies suggesting the dynamic nature of
risk attitude is reinforced by pharmacological experiments in neuroscience. Crockett
and Fehr (2014) provided an overview of the evidence suggesting that the release of
certain neuromodulators affect behavior in risky choice. Studies have shown dopamine
to promote risky-choice (Imamura et al., 2006; Eisenegger et al., 2010; Crockett and
Fehr, 2014), and the ingestion of amphetamines has been shown to affect behavior
analogously (Onge and Floresco, 2009). Other research efforts are ongoing to deter-
68
mine how different neuromodulators, such as serotonin and norepinephrine, contribute
to establishing risk attitudes (Crockett and Fehr, 2014).
Louie and De Martino (2014) provided support to the malleable nature of risky
choice by invoking the neurobiological efficient coding hypothesis (Barlow, 1961). This
hypothesis postulates that, due to the brain’s inherent biophysical constraints (e.g.,
neuron firing rate and metabolic costs), efficient neural input-output functions are
formed based on some expected range of input values. Should the range of input pa-
rameters change, the associated neural function changes as well, in a process falling
under the general category of gain control (Louie and De Martino, 2014). This un-
derlying behavior of the brain at the neuronal level is related to the results of Stewart
et al. (2006) and Stewart et al. (2015), who linked phenomena explained by CPT with
an individual performing comparisons to previous experiences in working memory.
Taken collectively, these studies suggest some malleable, neurological phenomena
drives risk attitudes, and the impact of a persuasive action on it can be estimated.
Therefore, we proceed with the assumption that these factors have been estimated via
human subject testing; it is our intent that the following models and accompanying
solutions methods presented demonstrate the utility that can be gained from such
human subject testing and thereby motivate it within the discipline.
Solving Prospect Games.
The solution concept utilized for the game (P ,A,Θ) depends upon the persuaders’
assumed rationality. If they are assumed to be perfectly rational, then traditional
game theoretic concepts are applicable (e.g., Nash equilibrium, ε-Nash equilibrium,
trembling hand equilibrium, maxmin or minmax payoffs, et cetera), depending on the
context (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). However, if the persuaders are assumed
to be boundedly rational, solution concepts from behavioral game theory, such as
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the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) or quantal response equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), are appropriate and should be compared to solutions
found via perfect rationality analysis. In either scenario, these solution concepts are
expressed in terms of mixed strategies. That is, the solution is represented as a
collection of probability distributions S ∈ S. In a given solution, each persuader’s
strategy is probabilistic and denoted as the vector Sp composed of the elements Spl
for each l ∈ Ap.
In addition to the difference in underlying rationality assumptions, the algorithms
utilized in a perfectly rational or a boundedly rational setting have distinct character-
istics. For example, the computation of a Nash equilibrium for two-player games can
be computed efficiently as a linear program or a linear complementarity problem in
the zero-sum and general-sum cases, respectively. However, an n-player, general-sum
game requires a more complex formulation as a nonlinear complementarity problem.
Games also may have multiple Nash equilibrium and, in the worst-case, even a two-
player, general-sum game requires a solution time that is exponential in the number
of actions of each player (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). Moreover, even if all of
these equilibriums are found, it is difficult to distinguish among them systematically.
From this standpoint, the maxmin or minmax payoffs solution concepts are benefi-
cial in that they can be computed quickly and provide a single prediction (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2008). Such characteristics are shared by many boundedly ratio-
nal solution concepts. For instance, the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al.,
2004) can be computed efficiently and yields a single prediction for a given set of
assumptions.
In practice, it may be advisable to examine many games under varying assump-
tions of persuader effects. The utility garnered, by both persuader and decisionmaker,
in some competitive persuasion scenarios is difficult to discern and must be estimated.
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Therefore, inputs utilized by any solution concept involve an accumulation of experi-
mental error. By analyzing a variety of games that constitute some confidence interval
of utility and persuasion effects, a regulator is able to generate an expected range of
behavior and ensure greater robustness with respect to estimation error.
Finally, multiple solution concepts should be considered when analyzing a prospect
game, especially when the goal is to inform a regulator of expected outcomes under
null action. Generally speaking, multiple solution concepts should be examined to
garner collective insights since no single solution method dominates all others but
instead depend upon specific rationality assumptions. Therefore, in Section 3.4, we
utilize the solution concepts of the Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and
cognitive hierarchy model in an effort to understand persuader interaction.
3.3 Regulated Prospect Games
Regulated prospect games (RPGs) are an extension of PGs wherein an external
regulator attempts to affect persuader behavior in equilibrium. Figure 9 illustrates
this framework.
Figure 9. Structure of Regulated Prospect Games
We allow for the strategy space of a regulator to be continuous or discrete. As
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with the persuaders, no assumptions are made regarding specific means by which
their actions modify decisionmaker or persuader behavior. Such actions may change
the structure of the game or, potentially, the psychology of subsequent agents when
selecting a course of action.
An RPG can be considered a trilevel program wherein the regulator, persuaders
and the decisionmakers are the first, second and third level entities, respectively.
However, in this section, we describe how the PG reduction from the previous section
can be utilized to transform an RPG to a bilevel program and how the utilization of
specific game theoretic solution concepts enables further transformation to a single-
level form.
Examining the special cases of RPGs under the same three solution concepts (i.e.,
Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and cognitive hierarchy), we examine how the
problems can be solved. For some instances, a commercial solver is readily able
to solve an RPG. However, for those instances wherein a commercial solver proves
insufficient, heuristic methods to attain quality, feasible solutions for the regulator
are discussed.
Defining Regulated Prospect Games.
A regulator must chose some action b from a set of possible intervention strategies,
B, to affect the game (P ,A,Θ). The regulator may impact actions available to the
persuaders, alter persuader payoffs directly or via decisionmaker preferences effects,
or in the case of boundedly rational persuaders, their ability to think strategically.
An RPG maintains the same payoff structure as a PG for both decisionmakers
and persuaders, but it adds an additional element pertaining to the regulator’s payoff.
RPGs levy an additional layer of complexity to PGs, as their task is, essentially, to
modify the game to be played by the persuaders. Therefore, regardless of the assumed
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s.t.: S ∈ S(b),
where
φip = f(Vi(a,b), qip), ∀ i ∈ I, p ∈ P. (21)
The upper level problem dictates the regulator take an action b ∈ B to maximize
the objective function h1(S,b). In turn, this action can affect the set of feasible per-
suader strategies, S(b). For our purposes, we assume all possible actions of a player
p are included in Ap, and a regulator action b can only remove, not add, from this
set. Regulator action, in conjunction with the persuaders’ actions, may also alter
the decisionmaker preferences, and this effect is modeled generically by representing
the CPT prospect valuation vectors as Vi(a,b). Likewise, to account for instances
wherein the regulating action has a direct impact on a persuaders payoff (e.g., mone-
tary fines) the vector of regulating actions, b, is represented in the persuaders’ payoff
functions as gp(Φ, a,b). For a given b ∈ B, the persuaders’ payoffs are determined as
in a PG. Thus, the lower-level optimization problem is decentralized; each persuader
p controls a subset of the variables, Sp, and maximizes their respective objectives
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simultaneously.
An RPG has a PG embedded in its constraints, and can be viewed as a mechanism
design problem with a singleton set of joint type vectors. However, should a regulator
decide to analyze a set of games, such as those formed from a range of estimates with
respect to utility and persuasion effects, and calculate a probability distribution over
this set, the cardinality of the joint type vector can be expanded. In this case, the
RPG exists in a Bayesian setting and is more reminiscent of traditional mechanism
design problems. The resulting math programs are very similar except for a few
additional constraints. That is, the inequalities illustrated in the following programs
must be repeated for every game such that each has its own corresponding block
of constraints, and the objective function must be modified to an expected value
computation.
The bilevel program representing an RPG can be analyzed in a variety of ways
depending upon both persuader rationality assumptions and the adopted solution
concept. We continue by illustrating three special cases corresponding to persuaders
behaving in accordance with the Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and cog-
nitive hierarchy model solution concepts.
Perfect Rationality: Nash Equilibrium.
If it is assumed the persuaders are perfectly rational, and it is desired to discern
regulator action under a Nash equilibrium, the RPG can be reformulated as a single-
level program by adapting the framework of Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) with





















Spl = 1, ∀p ∈ P, (22d)
Spl ≤ h2(b, Spl), ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, (22e)
Spl ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, (22f)
where
φip = f(Vi(a,b), qip), ∀ i ∈ I, p ∈ P.
In this reformulation, the left-hand side of constraint (22c) represents the effect
of persuader p deviating from their respective Sp strategy to the pure strategy l. If it
is negative-valued, the persuader is better off not deviating. Therefore, if constraint
(22c) is satisfied for all persuaders and available actions, then no one has incentive
to deviate from their respective strategy Sp, and S is a Nash equilibrium. The con-
straints (22d)–(22f) ensure a persuader’s mixed strategy profile abides by the tenets
of probability theory, and they also allow for the possibility of a regulator removing
some action l in Ap for persuader p. That is, h2(b, Spl) is assumed to utilize the
regulator action (i.e., b) and an element of a persuader’s mixed strategy (i.e., Spl) as
inputs, and it maps them to the binary outputs, {0,1}, that form an upper bound on
Spl. Therefore, if this mapping yields an output of zero, the regulator has removed
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action l from consideration by persuader p.
Furthermore, this formulation implicitly adopts an optimistic regulator as detailed
in the bilevel programming literature (e.g., see Dempe, 2002; Colson et al., 2007), and
it assumes the persuaders will adopt the Nash equilibrium that is most beneficial to
the upper level objective function. All other Nash equilibriums are feasible, but this
optimistic assumption allows the regulator to distinguish between them, and their
associated objective function values. By setting the b-values that yield this opti-
mistic solution as parameters and resolving the program by minimizing the objective
function instead of maximizing it, the regulator is able to determine the associated
solution’s pessimistic solution. In this manner, the regulator is able to identify the
down-side risk associated with their optimistic solution.
Perfect Rationality: Correlated Equilibrium.
If persuaders are perfectly rational, but it is desired to discern regulator action
under the correlated equilibrium solution concept, the bilevel program can be sim-
plified further. A correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as relating to a public
signal. That is, if all players in a game prefer to abide by the “recommendations”
provided by an external agent, the resulting profile is a correlated equilibrium. In
this setting, the regulator’s task is to determine a probability vector S ′ composed of
elements S ′a for every a ∈ A such that no player prefers to deviate from a when it
is signaled. Utilizing the notation µa to signify the action profile a with a unilateral
deviation of µap by player p, and the function h3(a,b) → {0, 1} to indicate whether
regulator action b removed the possibility of persuader action a, the problem can be














∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, µap 6= l
(23c)
S′a ≤ h3(a,b), ∀a ∈ A (23d)
S′a ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A, (23e)∑
a∈A
S′a = 1. (23f)
where
φip = f(Vi(a,b), qip), ∀ i ∈ I, p ∈ P.
Constraint (23b) ensures the decision variables S ′ and b constitute a correlated
equilibrium. Constraints (23d)–(23f) constrain the signaled probabilities analogously
to how constraints (22d)–(22f) bound the persuaders’ mixed strategies. However, due
to the signaling nature of a correlated equilibrium, the assumption of optimism is no
longer required as in the previous Nash equilibrium formulation. Although a game
may have many correlated equilibria, the probability vector S ′ is actually controlled
by the regulator and they are free to select it in accordance with their preference.
Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Hierarchy.
The math programming reformulations presented thus far in this section focus on
the case of perfectly rational persuaders. Such a tendency for optimization models to
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assume perfectly rationality is due to the fact that many boundedly rational solution
concepts are heuristic in nature; they are designed to replicate imperfect psychological
processes that do not always translate, in a strict sense, to an optimization framework.
However, in this section, a boundedly rational solution concept is considered that
maintains the concept of utility maximization but relaxes assumptions regarding an
individual’s understanding of his opponents that allows for modeling via mathematical
programming formulations.
The cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) assumes players are defined
by the number of reasoning steps they compute in selecting an action, and their
beliefs with regard to the number of steps utilized by their opponents. Players do
not believe other agents can use as many reasoning steps as they do (i.e., a κ-step
player believes their opponents are [κ-1]-step players or less). A game is assumed to
be characterized by a true probability distribution over the number of reasoning steps
a player utilizes. Generally, a Poisson distribution defined by the parameter τ is used.
This true distribution, f̂(ζ), is assumed to be perceived accurately by a κ-step player
but normalized to inform their beliefs about their opponents (i.e., their beliefs of the
proportion of h-step players are represented as ρκh = f̂(h)/
∑
ζ<κ f̂(ζ).
Therefore, a structure similar to that utilized for modeling persuader behavior
under the Nash equilibrium solution concept can be adopted as follows with the in-
corporation of a set of new decision variables, Sκpl, that indicate the probability of
persuader p employing strategy l when utilizing κ-steps of thought. This model as-
sumes play will occur in accordance with the cognitive hierarchy model’s expectation





subject to b ∈ B, (24b)





























f̂(κ)Sκpl, ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, (24g)
∑
l∈Ap
Sκpl = 1, ∀p ∈ P, κ < M, (24h)
Spl ≤ h2(b, Spl), ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, (24i)
Sκpl ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, κ < M (24j)
Spl ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, l ∈ Ap, (24k)
where
φip = f(Vi(a,b), qip), ∀ i ∈ I, p ∈ P.
It has been shown that different game structures can generate alternative values of
τ (Camerer et al., 2004). This behavior is modeled via constraint (24c) by assuming
the function h4(b, τ̂) updates this value based on regulator action, and the value
τ̂ associated with the baseline persuasion game (i.e., null regulator action). This
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value is utilized in constraint (24d) to update the perceived probabilities of a κ-level
player wherein f̂(τ, h) is the Poisson probability density function of h with rate τ .
Constraint (24e) ensures all 0-step players randomize uniformly and constraint (24f)
ensures a κ-step persuader selects their perceived best response. The strategies of
all κ-step players are then aggregated as in Camerer et al. (2004) to provide the
behavioral predictions of play in the cognitive hierarchy model via constraint (24g).
The remaining constraints ensure the tenets of probability are not violated and allow
for the regulator to remove strategies via the function h2(b, Spl) as defined previously.
Camerer et al. (2004) assumed for simplicity that players would “randomize equally
if two or more strategies have identical expected payoffs” but acknowledged the cogni-
tive hierarchy model could address other methods. Therefore, no explicit assumptions
are made herein regarding how players distinguish between strategies yielding equal
payoffs.
Solving Regulated Prospect Games.
Optimally solving one of the aforementioned mathematical programs is not a sim-
ple task. To illustrate this point, first consider the determination of φip via equation
(21). The function f maps the persuaders’ action vector, a, and the regulator’s ac-
tion vector, b, into a binary response for a given persuader p and a decisionmaker i.
Therefore, aside from the trivial case wherein φip is constant, the function will exhibit
discontinuities when φip switches to either 0 or 1. The functions gp(Φ, a,b) will ex-
hibit similar discontinuities because they depend on these φip variables. Moreover, the
function f implicitly concerns a maximization operation coupled with a decision prob-
lem. That is, for some decisionmaker i and persuader p if qip = argmaxj{Vij(a,b)},
then φip = 1 and zero otherwise.
These difficulties are compounded by the nonlinearities associated with determin-
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ing the values in the vector Vi(a,b). To calculate these values, a sorting operation
that orders the prospects according to ascending outcome value is required for use
in equations (14)–(17). Once accomplished, further nonlinearities are encountered in
equations (19a)–(19d), albeit via an effect that depends on what CPT parameters are
assumed to be malleable by the persuaders and regulator.
Even if these difficulties are set aside, the underlying problem of ascertaining a
game theoretic solution (e.g., a Nash equilibrium) may be a non-trivial endeavor
(Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). Therefore, solving the induced PG for a given
b may itself be a difficult problem. This property is intensified in an RPG, as the
regulator is trying to build an optimal game with these equilibrium conditions in the
constraints.
Therefore, even though the characterization is ultimately dependent on the form
of the regulator action space and the possible effects of regulator or persuader action
on decisionmakers, in many RPG instances a global commercial solver is required
to find an optimal solution due to the aforementioned difficulties. However, in some
instances, even these tools may be inadequate.
Let us first consider a situation for which a global commercial solver can be applied
effectively. If a regulator is unable to affect decisionmakers’ preferences, the payoff
structure of the underlying PG can be calculated by determining the effect of each
a ∈ A on Φ. With this the baseline game structure, Φ is fixed and the agents’ payoffs
(regulator or persuader) depend only on b and S (or S ′). The three mathematical
programs previously introduced can then be solved to determine the optimal punitive
action b and the associated game theoretic solution value.
Conversely, if the regulator is able to affect decisionmaker preferences, the instance
may be more difficult to solve optimally. To illustrate this property, consider that
each outcome k ∈ Kij for every decisionmaker i and prospect j, must be sorted
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and classified as a gain or loss in order to determine each φip. Caballero et al.
(2018) constructed a set of constraints utilizing matrices of binary decision variables
that, when satisfied, ensured the CPT-valuations are calculated correctly. However,
commercial solvers are not designed to sort values and generally perform inefficiently
at the task. The technique utilized in Caballero et al. (2018) required 2|Kij|2 binary
indicator variables for each combination of i ∈ I and j ∈ Ji, and their technique
becomes computationally burdensome as instances grow large. Therefore, alternative
methodologies are proposed to solve these RPGs, depending upon the form of the
regulator’s action space.
If the regulator action is discrete, we can avoid the computational difficulty asso-
ciated with determining φip by enumerating all possible games a regulator action can
create. By calculating off line the decisionmakers’ choices for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
and replacing gp(Φ, a,b) with λp(Φ, a, ν
b) as seen in equation (25), the computational
difficulties associated with CPT are not encountered by the solver. Instead, their dy-
namics are incorporated in the off line calculations that determine persuader utility.





and adding the constraints
∑
b∈B
νb = 1; νb ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B.
Via off line calculation, the φip values are determined for each b, and the corresponding
gp(Φ, a,b) are calculated for each persuader b and action profile a. These values can
then be input into the RPG formulations as parameters and constraints (22b), (23b),
or (24b) can be removed, as appropriate, because the regulator’s action space has
been enumerated.
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If regulator action is continuous, an RPG no longer pertains to the selection of a
game among a countable set, but rather optimization among a continuum of games.
Therefore, the off line calculation method can no longer be leveraged as a simplifica-
tion tool. The dynamics of CPT-value calculation would need to be computed within
the solver and, as previously discussed, such a procedure is inefficient, especially when
there exists a large group of decisionmakers. Therefore, to solve such RPGs, the ac-
tion space can be approximated via discretization, or an alternative heuristic can be
utilized.
A variety of heuristic or meta-heuristic methods can be utilized to solve an RPG
(e.g., genetic algorithm or simulated annealing); however, since the objective function
depends upon the equilibrium (or alternative game theory solution concept) profile,
these methods still must solve a PG for each candidate solution. In light of the
aforementioned computational limitations in solving equilibrium problems, we suggest
B be searched via efficient sampling, and advocate for the use of a direct search
algorithm such as the Generalized Pattern Search (Lewis and Torczon, 1999) or Mesh
Adaptive Direct Search (Audet and Dennis Jr., 2006).
3.4 Example Application: Deterring Electoral Interference
In this section, we consider a notional example that illustrates the utility of PGs
and RPGs, and we demonstrate the analysis and insights they can generate for the
regulation of competitive persuasive interactions. More specifically, we consider the
problem of a democratic government deterring improper interference in its presidential
election. Such an application is particularly appropriate in a complete information
environment given the large amount of human-subject testing conducted with regard
to voting behavior.
The regulator is a democratic government; the persuaders are three organizations
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having vested interests in the electoral outcome, identified as Entities 1-3; and the
decisionmakers are a subset of targeted voters, as depicted in Figure 10. In this
scenario, we assume the regulator exerts limited (i.e., not authoritarian) control and,
as such, the government is unable to completely disallow any persuader strategy (i.e.,
h2(b) = h3(b) = 1, ∀ b ∈ B). Instead, the persuaders must be incentivized to take
a desired course of action. Likewise, given the political nature of an election, the
regulator is assumed to take no action that affects decisionmaker preferences directly.
Figure 10. Deterring Improper Electoral Interference as a Regulated Prospect Game
This example considers a political primary with eight candidates, six of whom
conform to traditional party standards (i.e., Candidates 1 through 6) and two of
whom represent a shift from the party’s conventional platform (i.e., Candidates 7
and 8). It is assumed that Candidate 7 is sympathetic to positions espoused by
Entities 1 and 2, whereas Candidate 8 holds positions aligned with to Entity 3.
Voters are partitioned among several blocks that respectively aggregate and rep-
resent voters who behave in a similar manner (i.e., voters within a block have CPT
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parameters, utilities and associated probabilities assumed to be identical). A deci-
sionmaker is therefore a representative voter from the block that decides for whom
to vote based upon the candidate’s appeal (xijk), which is interpreted as a gain or
loss respective to the sitting president, and their subjective assessment of him or her
winning (pijk). Whereas a voter could make a decision by explicitly considering the
actions of all other voters, in a manner analogous to that discussed by Levy (2003),
we model this scenario as a decision problem wherein a voter’s perception of the
preferences of others informs their likelihood assessment that a candidate will win.
We model n = 50 blocks of voters with static CPT-parameter profiles (i.e., persua-
sion does not affect risk attitude). More specifically, we assume voter blocks evaluate
the lotteries utilizing equations (19a)–(19d) in accordance with the randomly assigned
parameters listed in Table 7, wherein the initial gain/loss values (x̂ijk) and their as-
sociated probabilities (p̂ijk) can also be found. Each voter’s CPT-parameters are
sampled from a uniform distribution with a median estimate consistent with Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), and the prospect-specific parameters (i.e, x̂ijk and p̂ijk) are
established to allow heterogeneous initial voter perception. Since PGs and RPGs
require these parameters to be known, we primarily focus on a single instantiation
of the underlying PG in Sections 3.4 – 3.4 using the randomly generated point es-
timates. However, in Sections 3.4 and 3.4, we discuss how our models can inform
further analysis should these parameters be uncertain.
Table 7. Uniform Distribution on voter CPT-parameters, and x̂ijk- and p̂ijk-values
αi βi λi δi σi x̂ijk p̂ijk
[0.80, 0.96] [0.80, 0.96] [2, 2.5] [0.56, 0.66] [0.64, 0.74] [-1, 1] [0, 1]
Each persuader may take one of three actions with respect to the election by en-
gaging in an onslaught interference campaign (i.e., action O), illegal fringe operations
(i.e., action F), or law-abiding activity (i.e., action L). The collective action of these
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entities may affect each voters xijk- and pijk-values in the following manner:
xijk = x̂ijk +
∑
p∈P
tplijk, where l = ap
pij1 = p̂ij1 +
∑
p∈P
bplij1, where l = ap
pij2 = 1− pij1.
The parameters tplijk and b
pl
ijk are the effects that Entity p’s action l has on voter
i’s perception of the value and probability, respectively, associated with the k-th
outcome of voting for candidate j. Of note, the persuasion update for probabilities
is defined explicitly with respect to k = 1 for notational clarity in observance of
the axioms of probability. Each of the persuasion update parameters are randomly
selected in accordance with a uniform distribution over the range [-0.5,0.5] for tplijk
and [(1− p̂ij1)/3, p̂ij1/3] for bplij1 to allow for the possibility of meaningful persuasive
action.
Through their persuasive actions, each Entity p tries to maximize their own objec-
tive. Entities 1 and 3 are each assumed as seeking to maximize the number of voters
supporting their respective sympathetic candidate (i.e., Candidates 7 and 8 respec-
tively), whereas Entity 2 desires to create tension in the electorate by maximizing
support for both Candidates 7 and 8. Therefore, for any voter i, the corresponding
qip for Entities 1 and 3 correspond with Candidates 7 and 8, respectively, but Entity
2 has qip corresponding to Candidate 7 for half of the voter blocks and Candidate 8
for the remaining blocks.
Persuader utility is also affected by punitive measures imposed by the government
(i.e., the regulator). Mirroring the legislation proposed in the Deter Act in 2018
(Rubio and Van Hollen, 2018), this example considers possible regulating actions
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against two classes of financial assets (i.e., b1 and b2) in millions of dollars. These
sanctions affect each entity’s payoff as represented in equations (26)–(28):












The monitoring capabilities of the regulator are assumed to be robust such that the
true action taken by the persuaders can be detected. The coefficients assigned to a
sanction’s effect are notional but assumed to reflect the entity’s value calculus in the
mold of multi-objective decision analysis. For illustration purposes, this balance is
assumed to be identical across all persuaders.
Table 8. Regulator Objective Function Coefficient Values
Entity ξpO ξpF ξpL
1 -10 -2 1
2 -9 -3 1
3 -8 -1 1
The government would prefer all influence to occur in accordance with established
legal standards. However, if some form of interference by a persuader cannot be
prevented outright, the government’s preference is for fringe activity as opposed to an
aggressive, onslaught campaign. The negative effect associated with such interference
is assumed to vary depending on the entity’s capability and other political factors.
These notional effects are listed as ξpO, ξpF and ξpL in Table 8. Utilizing these effects,
the objective function of the government with respect to the Nash equilibrium or
cognitive hierarchy settings, and the correlated equilibrium setting can be seen in
equations (29) and (30), respectively. The two equations are conceptually identical
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− 0.01b1 − 0.02b2 (30)
Finally, the government’s decision variables b1 and b2 are both assumed to be
bounded within [$0, $60M ], and instances are considered such that they may take on
continuous values or discrete values on the order of millions of dollars.
Utilizing the models and methods described in Section 3.3, this RPG under the
solution concepts of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy
are applied utilizing the global solver BARON on an HP Z820 equipped with a 2.60
GHz Intel E5-260 processor and 192GB of RAM.
Perfectly Rational Persuaders: Nash Equilibrium.
To understand whether intervention (i.e., regulation) is necessary, it is advisable
to first analyze the PG generated with null regulation. In this example, a null action
by the regulator would consist of no punitive sanctions being imposed for election
interference.
Figure 11. Induced Prospect Game with No Sanctions Imposed
The payoff structure of this PG can be seen in Figure 11 wherein the tuple in
each cell represents the number of voting blocks supporting the preferred candidate
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of Entity 1, Entity 2, and Entity 3, respectively. The optimistic-Nash equilibrium
with respect to the government’s objective function consists of the following pure
strategies: Entity 1 conducts an onslaught campaign, and Entities 2 and 3 take
lawful action. Under this persuader action profile, Candidate 2 garners the support
of the most voting blocks at 12, whereas Candidate 8 is in a three-way tie for third
and Candidate 7 is in sixth place. Furthermore, the government’s objective function
for this baseline has a value of -8. Under pessimistic assumptions such that the
entities play the equilibrium that most negatively affects the regulator, Entities 1
and 3 conduct onslaught campaigns and Entity 2 engages in fringe operations such
that the government’s objective function equals -21, a lower bound on the optimal
solution to the RPG.
Since this preliminary analysis finds interference will occur with certainty in the
election, intervention strategies should be considered. Therefore, equations (26)–(29)
are incorporated into the math program described in Section 3.3, and it is solved find
an optimal b.
The optimal solutions for when B is a continuous space, or when it is a discrete
space assuming integer-valued increments of millions of dollar, are very similar. In
the discrete variant, the government selects b1=$60M and b2=$53M , whereas in the
continuous instance the government levies sanction of b1=$60M and b2=$53.109M .
These punitive actions result in the mixed strategy equilibriums seen in Table 9,
wherein each entity’s strategy vector lists the probability of conducting an onslaught
campaign, fringe operations, or lawful activity, respectively. Given the relative prox-
imity of these two solutions, only the discrete variant is discussed hereafter.
Under this solution, the regulator’s objective function value with optimistic as-
sumptions increases to -2.8. The results also imply there is a probability of 0.556 that
all entities involved choose to engage in lawful activity, whereas without intervention
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Table 9. Election Inference RPG - Optimal Optimistic-Nash Equilibriums
Sp Discrete B Continuous B
S1 (0.098, 0.000, 0.902) (0.097, 0.000, 0.903)
S2 (0.000, 0.259, 0.741) (0.000, 0.256, 0.744)
S3 (0.168, 0.000, 0.832) (0.168, 0.000, 0.832)
there is no possibility of such an action profile occurring. However, the probability
that at least one entity will engage in an onslaught campaign is approximately 0.25.
This result represents a reduction from the PG with null regulation wherein Entity 1
conducted an onslaught campaign with certainty. Therefore, the sanctions are a stabi-
lizing influence, increasing the probability that the electoral process proceeds without
unlawful interference. Furthermore, under pessimistic assumptions, the government’s
objective function value increases from -21 to -9.66. In fact, the entity’s strategy pro-
files under the pessimistic-Nash equilibrium with b1=$60M and b2=$53M coincide
with the optimistic-Nash equilibrium of the aforementioned PG: Entity 1 conducts
an onslaught campaign, and Entity 2 and 3 take lawful action.
As noted previously, the government does not take any action to directly influence
the voters. However, the sanctions to deter interference have second-order effects
based upon how it changes the persuaders’ behavior. These effects can be observed
in Figure 12 wherein the probability distribution for each candidate of finishing the
election in a given position is depicted.
Consider the government’s ideal persuader action profile wherein all entities con-
duct operations in accordance with the law. Should this occur, the ultimate candidate
ordering after voting yields the following: Candidate 2, Candidate 5, Candidate 4,
Candidate 3 (tied for forth), Candidate 1 (tied for forth), Candidate 8, Candidate
6, and Candidate 7. This result differs slightly from the expected ordering of the
candidates if the mean of each distribution from Figure 12 is utilized as a measure
of central tendency. Namely, Candidate 2 still would be expected to win, but the
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ordering of candidates in other positions changes (e.g., Candidate 5 is expected to
finish third and Candidate 8 to finish fifth).
Figure 12. Distributions of Finishes for Optimistic-Optimal Nash Equilibrium RPG
These results also differ from the baseline PG wherein no sanctions are imposed.
Under the optimistic-optimal solution of the RPG, Candidate 2 places first with a 0.60
probability instead of certainty; Candidate 8 places in the top two positions with a
probability of 0.25 instead of a third-place tie with certainty; and Candidate 7 finishes
in the bottom two positions with a probability of 0.90 instead of sixth with certainty.
In maintaining the integrity of the election, the government actually increased the
probability that one of the entity’s preferred opponents wins (i.e., Entity 3 favored
Candidate 8). Superficially, such a result is counterintuitive; however, it is in fact
consistent with the government’s goal of safeguarding the election’s integrity and not
explicitly supporting any candidate.
91
Perfectly Rational Persuaders: Correlated Equilibrium.
As in the Nash equilibrium instance, the PG depicted in Figure 11 is evaluated
first. In doing so, it is identified that the government’s preferred correlated equilibrium
is also the optimistic Nash equilibrium for the PG. Namely, with certainty Entity 1
conducts an onslaught campaign, and Entity 2 and 3 take lawful action.
Since Entity 1 will interfere with certainty in the election, intervention strate-
gies should be considered. Thus, equations (26)–(29) augment the math program
described in Section 3.3, and it is solved to find an optimal b and S ′.
The solutions for a discrete or continuous B coincide exactly with the government
instituting the maximum sanction values of b1 = b2 = $60M . The associated cor-
related equilibrium is depicted in Table 10 wherein a ∈ A is listed in order of the
entities (i.e., event FOL coincides with Entity 1 fringe operations, Entity 2 onslaught
campaign, and Entity 3 lawful activity). It can be observed that only 8 of the 27
possible collective actions are in the support, such that the remaining 19 have zero
probability of being signaled.
Table 10. Election Inference RPG - Optimal Correlated Equilibriums
S ′a Discrete B Continuous B
S ′LLL 0.659 0.659
S ′LLF 0.044 0.044
S ′LLO 0.093 0.093
S ′LFL 0.082 0.082
S ′FLL 0.082 0.082
S ′FFO 0.010 0.010
S ′FOF 0.029 0.029
When compared to the RPG’s optimistic Nash equilibrium solution, the govern-
ment can expect a higher probability of combined lawful actions by all entities. To
wit, in the Nash equilibrium variant, the government can expect such an event to
occur with a probability of 0.556 versus 0.659 in the correlated equilibrium instance.
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There also exists analogous reductions in the regulator’s objective function value,
and in the probability of one entity conducting an onslaught campaign. The optimal
objective function value increases from -2.8 under the optimistic-optimal Nash equi-
librium to -0.904 under the correlated equilibrium, and the probability of at least one
entity conducting an onslaught campaign reduces from approximately 0.25 to 0.132.
Such reductions are possible because all Nash equilibria are correlated equilibria (al-
though the reverse does not hold true) and, as such, the optimal objective function
of an RPG characterized by correlated equilibria is bounded below by the optimal
objective function when it is characterized by Nash equilibria.
However, the practical difficulty of utilizing a correlated equilibrium in this context
is that a regulator must signal publicly utilizing the distribution listed in Table 10,
and a realization of this signal may induce interference. By doing so, the government
is able to increase the probability of an interference-free election but at the expense of
accepting that some persuader interference may occur. Politically, such an admission
is problematic, yet should some regulating government find itself in a position of
insurmountable vulnerability, such a solution may be acceptable, and the political
effects can be potentially mitigated by signaling through ambiguous and/or conflicting
statements.
As with the Nash equilibrium RPG, the solution generated by solving the corre-
lated equilibrium RPG yields second-order effects on the election’s outcome. These
effects are similar to those found under the Nash equilibrium concept, but they gen-
erally exhibit less uncertainty. That is, the probability of a candidate’s mode position
from the Nash equilibrium RPG occurring increases across all candidate by reducing
the probability of other outcomes (e.g., the probability of Candidate 2 finishing in
first place increases from 0.60 to 0.785 by reducing the probability of a second and
fourth place finish from 0.212 and 0.194 to 0.132 and 0.082, respectively). Likewise,
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when comparing the expected election results under the correlated equilibrium to
the results under the government’s preferred persuader action profile of collectively
legal activity, there are only mild differences with regard to candidate ordering (i.e.,
the tie between Candidates 1 and 3 is broken in favor of Candidate 1). Such minor
consequences are promising in that they indicate the government’s regulating action
can be expected to produce minimal second-order effects on the electoral outcome.
Figure 13. Distributions of Finishes under Optimal Correlated Equilibrium RPG
Boundedly Rational Persuaders: Cognitive Hierarchy.
In modeling the bounded rationality of Entities 1–3, a value of τ̂=1.5 is utilized
(Camerer et al., 2004), and this value is assumed to be static for demonstrative
simplicity. As with the analysis under perfect rationality, we first consider the PG
depicted in Figure 11. The resulting cognitive hierarchy solution profile can be seen
in Table 11.
The cognitive hierarchy solution provides an expected distribution of selected
strategies provided the mean-level of thinking depth coincides with τ . The resulting
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Table 11. Election Inference PG - Cognitive Hierarchy Solution
Sp Strategy Profiles
S1 (0.599, 0.325, 0.074)
S2 (0.850, 0.074, 0.074)
S3 (0.409, 0.074, 0.516)
behavior for the sanction-free PG is unique when compared to the Nash equilibrium
and correlated equilibrium variants. That is, in the cognitive hierarchy PG there
exists a probability, albeit remote, of 0.0028 that all entities engage in legal activity,
and there is a probability of 0.96 that at least one entity conducts an onslaught
interference campaign. Conversely, the Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium
PGs conclude that an onslaught campaign will occur with certainty. Setting these
differences aside, the cognitive hierarchy PG still demonstrates a high probability of
interference and, as such, the deterring effect of sanctions should be explored.
Table 12. Election Inference RPG - Cognitive Hierarchy Solutions
Sp Discrete B Continuous B
S1 (0.111, 0.184, 0.705) (0.111, 0.184, 0.705)
S2 (0.075, 0.075, 0.850) (0.075, 0.075, 0.850)
S3 (0.075, 0.075, 0.850) (0.075, 0.075, 0.850)
The resulting optimal solutions for both discrete and continuous B are presented
in Table 12 wherein b1 = b2 =$60M . As with the correlated equilibrium RPG, these
solutions coincide for the cognitive hierarchy RPG.
Under this solution, the regulator’s objective function value increases to −2.43
and, similar to the other RPGs examined, the optimal solution of the cognitive hier-
archy RPG necessitates sanctions near the upper end of their feasible regions. The op-
timal sanction values also coincide with the correlated equilibrium solution; however,
the resulting behavior these sanctions induce is different. In the cognitive hierarchy
RPG, these sanction values induce collectively law-abiding behavior in the persuaders
with probability 0.509, and the probability that at least one entity engages in an on-
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slaught campaign is 0.236. These results stand in contrast to the optimal correlated
equilibrium RPG solution wherein the same sanction values induced probabilities of
0.659 and 0.132, respectively. Moreover, the cognitive hierarchy model produces the
most pessimistic results regarding the possibility of all entities acting in accordance
with the law, but project a higher value of the government’s expected utility than
the optimistic-Nash equilibrium RPG solution.
Figure 14. Distributions of Finishes under Optimal Cognitive Hierarchy RPG
With regard to the electoral outcome, the cognitive hierarchy RPG provides re-
sults that are more uncertain than the correlated equilibrium RPG and, depending
on the specific candidate, are either more or less uncertain than the Nash equilib-
rium RPG. This outcome can be observed by noting the differences in the ordinal
finish-related mode for all candidates between Figures 14, and either Figures 12 or
13. That is, the probability of the mode value occurring for all candidates is lower
in the cognitive hierarchy RPG than the correlated equilibrium RPG; whereas, for
Candidates 1 and 2, the cognitive hierarchy RPG solution yields a higher probability
of the mode value than the Nash equilibrium RPG solution and a lower probability
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for the remaining candidates. Moreover, when comparing the expected ordering of
candidates in the cognitive hierarchy RPG, more differences are observed with respect
to the government’s preferred persuader action profile of collective legal activity than
for the other two RPG solutions. The expected winner remains Candidate 2, but
more drastic changes occur in the overall ordering of candidates (e.g., Candidate 8
has a mean finish of fourth place instead of sixth).
Uncertainty in the Prospect Game Payoff Structure.
Depending on the regulator’s level of confidence in the point estimates utilized
in the previous analyses (i.e., the decisionmakers’ perceptions of the prospects and
their CPT parameters), the regulator may wish to consider PGs and RPGs under
differing assumptions. We illustrate the type of information that can be garnered
via a suitable approach for this uncertainty by utilizing additional information from
Table 7.
For a given set of input parameters, the models developed herein are determin-
istic. When considering parametric distributions, the regulator can gain insight into
system behavior by sampling a sufficiently large set of the requisite parameters and
analyzing each of the resulting PGs and RPGs. Space-filling designs are a particu-
larly useful tool for such endeavors; however, for demonstrative clarity, we illustrate a
regulator examining ten plausible scenarios generated randomly from the underlying
distributions.
For each of these ten scenarios, the analyses conducted in Section 3.4–3.4 are
repeated. Table 13 reports the results for each of four solution concepts: the Nash
equilibrium (NE), alternatively under optimistic (O) and pessimistic (P) perspectives,
the correlated equilibrium (CE), and cognitive hierarchy (CH). For each solution
concept and scenario, tabulated are the objective function value and the respective
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probabilities that at least one entity conducts an onslaught campaign or engages in
fringe action.
Table 13. Solutions of PGs for 10 Additional Scenarios
Scenario
Solution Result 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
NE
Objective (O) -5.15 0 -1 -6 3 -7 -7 1 -10 0.33
Prob Onslaught (O) 0.39 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 1 0
Prob Fringe (O) 0.93 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.67
Objective (P) -23 -9 -7 -20 -21 -24 -21 -20 -17.33 -16
Prob Onslaught (P) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Prob Fringe (P) 0.5 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 0
CE
Objective -3.7 0 -1 -2.79 3 -7 -7 1 -4.5 0.6
Prob Onslaught 0.4 0 0 0.054 0 1 0.5 0 0.5 0
Prob Fringe 0.8 1 1 0.51 0 0 1 1 0.5 0.67
CE
Objective -9.2 -8.77 -1.67 -17.17 -5.21 -20.06 -16.02 -9.96 -12.31 -12.03
Prob Onslaught 0.87 0.67 0.21 0.98 0.53 0.99 0.93 0.58 0.92 0.93
Prob Fringe 0.87 0.81 0.58 0.87 0.42 0.58 0.61 0.99 0.58 0.42
Utilizing this information, the regulator can consider conditions under which in-
tervention may be necessary. For instance, Scenario 1 yields a low objective function
value across all solution concepts and results in the least objective function value un-
der the pessimistic Nash solution. Analogous behavior can be observed for Scenarios
4, 7, and 9, implying that this subset of scenarios represent instances for which the
regulator is most vulnerable.
Conversely, Scenario 3 yields a relatively high objective function value across all
solution concepts and results in the greatest objective function value under the pes-
simistic Nash solution. Scenario 2 exhibits similar behavior and, collectively, they
represent the least vulnerable instances for a regulator. However, Scenarios 5, 6, 8
and 10 exhibit no discernible pattern across game theoretic solutions, indicating that
persuader behavior may be less predictable in these scenarios.
For a regulator examining each of the ten corresponding RPGs, Table 14 reports
the optimal sanction values and the resulting persuader behavior for each of the
scenarios and solution concepts. It can be observed that the NE and CE solutions
coincide for the majority of the RPGs. Likewise, for the less vulnerable block of
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RPGs (i.e., Scenarios 2 and 3) and three of the ambiguous RPGs (i.e., Scenarios 5, 8
, and 10), the optimal RPG solution is to not intervene with sanctions. Under these
scenarios, this implies that if the regulator believes the entities are perfectly rational,
inaction is the regulator’s optimal decision.
Table 14. Solutions of RPGs for 10 Additional Scenarios
Scenario
Solution Result 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
NE
b1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.77 0 58.87 0
b2 50 0 0 50 0 50 21.62 0 0 0
Objective (O) -3 0 -1 0 3 0 -3 1 -8.05 0.33
Prob Onslaught (O) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.897 0
Prob Fringe (O) 1 1 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0.15 0.67
Objective (P) -19 -9 -7 -19 -21 -22 -7.08 -20 -12.59 -16
Prob Onslaught (P) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.691 1 1 1
Prob Fringe (P) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
CE
b1 60 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 60 0
b2 26.67 0 0 50 0 50 35 0 42.86 0
Objective -1.83 0 -1 0 3 0 -2.97 1 -0.44 0.6
Prob Onslaught 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.13 0
Prob Fringe 0.71 1 1 1 0 0.67 0.92 1 0.14 0.67
CH
b1 60 60 41.76 46.12 35.79 60 60 60 60 60
b2 42.97 0 0 0.6 9.88 60 48.74 0 60 51.61
Objective -2.4 -2.18 -0.37 -1.86 -0.46 -3.09 -3.83 -1.71 -2.66 -2.36
Prob Onslaught 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.21
Prob Fringe 0.43 0.69 0.21 0.64 0.21 0.40 0.68 0.65 0.26 0.55
Alternatively, the CH solutions suggest a more aggressive approach is required
across all scenarios, even in the less vulnerable Scenarios 2 and 3. This result likely
stems from the fact that the cognitive hierarchy solutions are more conservative than
the optimistic Nash and correlated equilibrium solutions with regard to an entity
enganging in an onslaught campaign. That is, across all scenarios except Scenario 9,
the CH solution predicts a higher probability of one or more entities engaging in such
a campaign. Given the consequences of onslaught campaigns (i.e., see Table 8), this
probabilistic assessment yields lower objective function values for the CH solutions
relative to the other solution concepts.
Finally, across all scenarios and solution concepts (except the optimistic NE and
CE solutions for Scenario 5), the probabilities that at least one entity will attempt
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to interfere in the election is non-zero, even with regulator intervention. Such insight
indicates the regulator should focus efforts on deterring onslaught campaigns with
the knowledge that some fringe activity is likely to persist.
Discussion.
The probability of interference and the expected candidate ordering results from
Sections 3.4–3.4, combined with the behavior observed in Section 3.4, collectively indi-
cate that deterring improper influence for this application with minimal second-order
effects is more difficult when encountering boundedly rational rather than perfectly
rational persuaders.
In Sections 3.4–3.4, each of the RPGs provides similar results with regard to the
optimal sanction values. Each solution identifies that b1 should be set at its upper
bound of $60M , and only the Nash equilibrium RPG solution designates a b2-value
less than $60M .
Should the Nash equilibrium PG be solved with b1=b2=$60M , the government’s
optimistic objective function value decreases to -3.73, yielding a relative optimality
gap of 33%. Its pessimistic objective function value decreases to -9.8 from -9.66
with optimal sanction values (i.e., a 1.4% reduction). Therefore, if the government is
uncertain as to which game theoretic solution concept should be applied, by setting
b1=b2=$60M they may guarantee a quality solution under any of the three solution
constructs examined.
Conversely, if the regulator is not confident in the point estimates utilized to
predict decisionmaker behavior in Sections 3.4–3.4, the results of Section 3.4 provide
a method for continued analysis. PGs and RPGs do not provide definitive answers
under uncertain information, but can inform decision making by exploring alternative
scenarios. Likewise, their use in such settings can help identify candidate solutions
100
which can be further analyzed using other robust techniques.
3.5 Conclusions
In this research, we defined two new game theoretic frameworks, prospect games
and regulated prospect games, designed to inform defensive national security action
when multiple adversaries target a nation’s citizenry and attempt to influence their
decisions. Prospect games and regulated prospect games respectively model (a) the
interactions of competing persuaders affecting a populace and (b) the actions of a reg-
ulating agent to alter such a framework. Such games may take many forms, depend-
ing on the nature of persuaders’ interactions and assumptions about their rationality.
Thus, their general forms were presented, in addition to the illustrated instantiation
of three special cases concerning the Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and
cognitive hierarchy solution concepts. Furthermore, the utility of these games to in-
form regulatory decisions was illustrated for a contemporary application concerning
the deterrence of improper electoral interference.
In the models set forth herein, we require the decisionmakers’ available prospects
and methods of evaluation to be common knowledge. As such, they are most useful
in situations wherein decisionmaker behavior is well-studied (e.g., elections or com-
merce). Promising areas for future research pertain to the relaxation of the common
knowledge assumption and a more sophisticated treatment of uncertainty. Whereas
this relaxation would allow for the solution of scenarios wherein the requisite infor-
mation is incomplete, the problem reductions illustrated herein may no longer be
applicable, and the games would need to be solved via some alternative game the-
oretic (e.g., Harsanyi, 1967; Aghassi and Bertsimas, 2006) or simulation-based (e.g.,
Lempert et al., 2006) technique. Moreover, other promising areas of future inquiry
pertain to relaxing the assumption of a countable persuader action space and the
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utilization of alternative, scenario-specific theories of descriptive choice.
Prospect games and regulated prospect games are, ultimately, designed to be
decision support tools for regulating the activity of agents in an economy based upon
persuasion. As such, there exists a wide array of potential application areas for
which they can be utilized in commercial (e.g., Castañeda and Martinelli, 2018),
international political (e.g., Pamp et al., 2018), and domestic regulatory (e.g., Fedeli
et al., 2018; Brandt and Svendsen, 2018) settings. However, for the potential of
these models to be realized, future research must attempt to quantify the effects of
persuasive activity on a decisionmaker’s CPT-parameters, and their subjective utility
and probability estimates. In the interim, prospect games and regulated prospect
games provide a rigorous and quantifiable framework upon which regulation can be
constructed.
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IV. Robust Influence Modeling under Structural and
Parametric Uncertainty: An Afghan Counternarcotics Use
Case
Abstract
An entity often wishes to influence the decisions of others in a system. This dy-
namic is apparent in a variety of settings including criminal justice, environmental
regulation, and marketing applications. However, the central task of the influencing
entity is confounded by uncertainty regarding their understanding of the structure
and/or parameters of the decisions being made. The research herein sets forth a
modeling framework to identify robust influence strategies under such uncertain con-
ditions. Furthermore, the utility of this framework and its proper parameterization
are illustrated via an application to the contemporary, global problem of the Afghan
opium trade. Utilizing open source data, we demonstrate how counternarcotic pol-
icy can be informed using a quantitative analysis that embraces both the bounded
rationality of the economy’s decisionmakers and the government’s uncertainty re-
garding the degree of this deviation from rationality. In this manner, we provide a
new framework with which robust influence decisions can be identified under realistic
information conditions, and we discuss how it can be used to inform real-world policy.
4.1 Introduction
Persuading an individual to adopt a given decision among a set of alternatives
is an inherently difficult task. It requires a level of empathy to understand their
full decision framework that may be difficult to achieve. In designing an influence
strategy, a persuader must infer the answer to many questions: What other alternative
prospects does the decisionmaker perceive? How does the decisionmaker evaluate this
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set of prospects? How does the decisionmaker value each respective outcome? How
does the decisionmaker understand the uncertainty giving rise to these outcomes? In
what way will an influence action affect the decisionmaker and their perceptions?
The answers to such questions can be inferred via human-subject testing. How-
ever, the data collection requirements to do so with high confidence can be substantial,
and the resulting statistical insights are likely only relevant to a specific context. If
automated data collection efforts are suitable or if the underlying decision setting
is predictable, such difficulties are less problematic; whereas the data collection re-
quirements do not lessen, their assembly is facilitated. As the body of knowledge for
applying statistical or machine learning techniques grows to answer the aforemen-
tioned questions, existent literature (i.e., Caballero et al., 2018) describes how an
optimal influence strategy can be determined.
Unfortunately, there exist many situations for which automated data collection
efforts are infeasible, or wherein the underlying decisionmaking setting is less pre-
dictable. If either of these conditions hold, then direct application of the models
described by Caballero et al. (2018) is not possible; the parameter values required to
formulate their persuasion programs are unknown. However, if bounded intervals for
each these unknown parameters can be identified (i.e., an uncertainty set), alterna-
tive methods can be developed to generate robust influence actions that meet some
threshold of performance regardless of the true parameter values. This research sets
forth such a methodology by leveraging the models of Caballero et al. (2018) within
the Robust Decision Making (RDM) framework set forth by Lempert et al. (2006),
after which it demonstrates the methodology for a realistic use case.
The use case focuses on an application to a contemporary economic and national
security problem: reducing supply for the Afghan opium poppy trade. This ob-
jective is part of an enduring counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. The Afghan
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illicit opium economy has long been suspected to be a primary revenue stream for
the Taliban insurgency (SIGAR, 2018b), but development of a successful strategy
against it has proven elusive (SIGAR, 2018a). To aid policy development, multiple
economists have quantitatively modeled the effects of counternarcotic actions (e.g.,
Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2002; Clemens, 2008; Mejia and Restrepo, 2016); however,
such models generally rely on equilibrium analysis that implicitly suggests the ra-
tionality of decisionmakers in the illicit economy. This research takes an alternative
approach by considering the effect of counternarcotic strategies in a decision analytic
instead of a game theoretic framework. By doing so, we demonstrate how a better
understanding of a counternarcotic strategy’s effect can be gained by embracing the
bounded rationality of the illicit economy’s decisionmakers and by acknowledging the
associated uncertainty regarding their degree of departure from rationality.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
influence modeling paradigm, discusses the RDM framework, and introduces how the
concepts can be leveraged jointly to inform influence actions under parametric and/or
structural uncertainty. Section 4.3 illustrates the utility of our methodology via its
application to the reduction of Afghan poppy cultivation in the Badakhshan province.
Through this representative case study, we illustrate how policy decisions regarding
influence can be quantitatively informed via our methodology. Finally, Section 4.4
discusses the implications of this research and avenues of future inquiry.
4.2 Robust Decision Making and Influence Modeling
The persuasion programs set forth by Caballero et al. (2018) pertain to the optimal
manipulation of decision trees (e.g., see Figure 15). In a two-stage process, a persuader
starts by influencing how a decisionmaker (or set of decisionmakers) perceives the
underlying risk or uncertainty, values the payoff associated with each outcome, and/or
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evaluates the available set of prospects. After this persuader action has been taken,
the decisionmaker(s) selects a preferred prospect.
Figure 15. Example Decision Tree between Course of Actions (COAs) 1 and 2
Influence actions achieving such effects can take many forms. For instance, an
appeal to the representativeness heuristic could alter subjective probabilities (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1972), alternative frames could affect payoff valuations (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981), or emotional appeals could affect a decisionmaker’s risk atti-
tude (Kugler et al., 2012). Other examples, in addition to a survey on the literature
supporting such effects, are discussed in greater detail by Caballero et al. (2018).
Whereas the nature of the influence actions are assumed to be instance-specific,
Caballero et al. (2018) describe their effects within the Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) framework (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). CPT is an empirically-validated,
descriptive theory of choice wherein an individual’s decision is described by utility
valuations from a reference point; concave and convex utility for gains and losses, re-
spectively; loss aversion; and systematic weighting of probabilistic information. More
formally, consider a prospect f having n gain outcomes and m loss outcomes, respec-
tively indexed as 1 through n and -m through -1. Each outcome value xk measured
from the reference point is evaluated relatively via CPT as
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+(Ak ∪ ... ∪An)−W+(Ak+1 ∪ ... ∪An), 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (31f)
π−k = W
+(A−m ∪ ... ∪Ak)−W+(A−m,∪... ∪Ak−1), 1−m ≤ k ≤ 0, (31g)
wherein v(·) is a piecewise utility function concave for gains and convex for losses; W+
and W− are the event (outcome) weighting functions for gains and losses, respectively;
and π+ and π− are the decision weights utilized to determine the respective component
gains, V +(f), and component losses, V −(f).
The goal of a persuasion program is to maximize the number of decisionmak-
ers selecting some preferred course of action by altering (1) the xk-values, (2) the
uncertainty associated with event Ak, and/or (3) the specific forms of the W
±(·)
or v(·) functions. Accurately formulating a persuasion program requires a firm un-
derstanding of the structure of the decision tree, the baseline parameters (e.g., the
decisionmaker’s judged probabilities in the absence of influence), and how the per-
suader’s action will alter the decisionmaker and their perceptions. Human subject
testing (e.g. Booij et al., 2010; Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty, 2014; Schulreich et al.,
2014) is one potential method to gain this understanding but, for a variety of reasons,
it is not always practical and may not be feasible. Without these baseline parameters,
a persuasion program cannot be utilized directly.
However, if uncertainty sets (or collections) can be identified for each unknown
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factor, a robust influence strategy can be identified. Whereas the application of robust
optimization is the intuitive approach to do so, herein we illustrate how the RDM
framework set forth by Lempert et al. (2006) is preferable because of its flexibility.
Robust Decision Making.
RDM is an iterative decision analytic framework utilized in conditions of deep
uncertainty. Deep uncertainty describes situations for which analysts cannot agree
upon how to model the interaction of system variables, the underlying uncertainty, or
the desirability of outcomes. RDM addresses these conditions by leveraging modern
computer simulation, space-filling designs, and clustering algorithms.
To conduct an RDM analysis, it is necessary to identify the sets of available
strategies, ~S, and the future states of the world, ~F . The objective of RDM is to select
some s ∈ ~S that performs well across any future state of the world in ~F . Lempert
et al. (2006) propose the following five step iterative process to apply RDM: identify
initial candidate robust strategies, identify vulnerabilities, suggest hedges against
vulnerabilities, characterize deep uncertainties and trade-offs among strategies, and
consider improved hedging options and surprises.
In practice, these steps consist of building a database ~E = ~S× ~F (i.e., the futures
ensemble) with some robustness metric assigned to each strategy-future combination.
A candidate strategy scand is then selected, and a subset of future states in ~F for
which scand performs poorly is identified via clustering analysis. The next step is to
determine alternative strategies less vulnerable to these future states but comparable
to scand elsewhere, and select a new candidate strategy. This process is iteratively
repeated until an acceptable course of action has been identified. After each round,
there exists the potential to augment ~E with more strategies or future states of the
world as required.
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Therefore, RDM requires ~F to be a finite set. To account for this characteristic
while accommodating situations wherein the set of plausible futures is excessively
large (or infinite, as when defined on continuous domains of characteristic variables),
a finitely-valued but adequately representative set ~F can be generated via a space-
filling design of the region. Numerous space-filling designs exists and provide various
guarantees on how well the set of future states is explored.
Likewise, the effect obtained by utilizing some s ∈ ~S given a potential future state
is determined by a scenario generator (i.e., a computer simulation). The use of a
scenario generator, in combination with the set ~F , allows for the modeling of various
system variable interactions and their effect on system performance.
The raw values provided by the scenario generator are not the object of RDM
analysis. Instead comparisons are made across strategies using some measure of
robustness. Many alternatives measures exist (e.g., absolute or relative regret), but
the specific selection must ultimately be made in accordance with the problem setting
(Roy, 2010). For example, if the degree of variation from the best-case is important,
absolute measures may be appropriate. Alternatively, relative measures of robustness
(or regret) can help highlight systematic differences. Likewise, the evaluation criteria
utilized to distinguish across scenarios (e.g., minimize maximum regret, minimize
expected regret, or minimize upper quartile regret) are also problem specific.
The conceptual steps in an RDM analysis are static. However, the space-filling
design utilized to sample the true set of futures is contingent upon the underlying
uncertainties. If all uncertainty sets are connected, then standard space-filling designs
(e.g., a Latin hypercube) can be utilized; otherwise, less traditional designs capable
of incorporating categorical variables (e.g., fast flexible designs) may be required.
In either situation, multiple design candidates exists. Analysts must be cognizant
that this design selection, in addition to the particular clustering analysis utilized to
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identify vulnerabilities, may affect the final proposed strategy.
An RDM Approach to Influence.
In most influence settings, a persuader cannot be certain of many pertinent factors
in the decision setting. The persuader can infer the prospects a decisionmaker(s) is
considering but likely does not know these with certainty. Whereas the persuader
confronts similar uncertainty with respect to a decisionmaker’s judged probabilities,
outcome valuations, risk attitude, loss aversion, etc., it is likely that the persuader can
bounded these factors within some range and subsequently apply the RDM framework
to an influence setting.
As in Caballero et al. (2018), herein we assume a persuader is attempting to
influence a set of decisionmakers, I, to each select some prospect under conditions of
risk. The set of available influence strategies1, ~S, is known to the persuader. Each
decisionmaker i faces a finite set of prospects Ji such that each j ∈ Ji has a finite
set of associated, uncertain outcomes, Kij. That is, each decisionmaker is confronted
with a decision tree akin to that depicted in Figure 15. The persuader is uncertain
of the specific structural form of these decision trees, but we assume a persuader is
able to infer a finite collection of decision trees such that each decisionmaker’s true
decision tree aligns with one of them. More formally, the persuader can identify the
following uncertainty collections and uncertainty sets:
1Caballero et al. (2018) describe this set as A, but herein we maintain consistency of notation
with Lempert et al. (2006)
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Decision Tree Uncertainty Collections
Ji : A finite collection of prospect sets for decisionmaker i, one of which
is the true Ji
Kij : A finite collection of outcome sets for decisionmaker i and prospect j,
one of which is the true Kij
Decision Tree Uncertainty Sets
Ŷijk : Set of baseline raw values (ŷijk) for the k
th event of prospect j
for decisionmaker i
P̂ijk : Set of baseline probabilities (p̂ijk) for the k
th event of prospect j
for decisionmaker i
These uncertainty collections and sets describe all potential decision trees the
persuader believes the decisionmakers could consider. However, the manner in which
the decisionmakers evaluate the decision trees is also a source of uncertainty, as is
the effect of a persuader’s influence action on both this evaluation and the decision
trees themselves. Assuming the probability weighting functions and utility functions
from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) are utilized (i.e., equations (32a)–(32c)), these
sources of uncertainty can be described via the following uncertainty sets2.
2We note that alternative probability weighting functions (e.g., Prelec, 1998) or utility functions
(e.g., Wakker, 2010) can be substituted with relatively minor notational changes.
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Decisionmaker Uncertainty Sets
Γ̂i : Set of baseline gain probability weighting coefficients (γ̂i)
for decisionmaker i
D̂i : Set of baseline loss probability weighting coefficients (δ̂i)
for decisionmaker i
Âi : Set of baseline gain utility coefficients (α̂i) for decisionmaker i
B̂i : Set of baseline loss utility coefficients (β̂i) for decisionmaker i
Λ̂i : Set of baseline loss aversion (λ̂i) coefficients for decisionmaker i
R̂i : Set of baseline reference points (r̂i) for decisionmaker i
Influence Effect Uncertainty Sets
Fijk(s) : Set of influence effect mappings (fijk(s)) on the baseline raw
value for the kth event of prospect j for decisionmaker i
Gijk(s) : Set of influence effect mappings (gijk(s)) on the baseline
probability for the kth event of prospect j for decisionmaker i
Hθi : Set of influence effect mappings (h
θ
i (s)) altering decisionmaker
i’s baseline CPT-parameter θ̂ to θ, θ ∈ {γi, δi, αi, βi, λi, ri}
Moreover, this framework is also applicable to conditions of ambiguity per the
results of Fox and Tversky (1998); however, select modifications are necessary to
align the decision tree uncertainty sets with the tenets of Support Theory. That
is, for each Kij, an associated collection of sets Cij must be introduced, and the
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uncertainty set P̂ijk must be replaced with P̂ijΩu , respectively defined as follows:
Cij : Set of all non-empty subsets Ωu ⊆ Kij,
P̂ijΩu : Set of all baseline probabilities (p̂ijΩu) of event disjunction Ωu in
prospect j by decisionmaker i.
Conceptually, the decision tree uncertainty collections (i.e., Ji and Kij) describe the
structural uncertainty, and the remaining uncertainty sets describe the parametric
uncertainty. Collectively, they also constitute all known potential future states of the
system. To ensure flexibility, we have left their form general; however, when discern-
ing how to describe ~F , the specific properties of each uncertainty is paramount. If
all of the aforementioned collections are countable, then ~F could potentially be taken
via their enumeration. Otherwise, varying forms of space-filling designs should be
considered to form ~F . If Ji or Kij has a cardinality greater than 1, then standard
space-filling designs such as the Latin hypercube are not applicable. From the per-
spective of experimental design, each possible Ji or Kij is a categorical factor level.
Therefore, alternative designs such as a sliced Latin hypercube (Qian, 2012; Ba et al.,
2015) should be considered. Other complicating factors restricting which space-filling
designs can be utilized relate to the probabilistic nature of the uncertainty. When
influencing a decisionmaker under risk, the axioms of probabilities must be satisfied,
implying that the underlying design space is constrained. In such instances, the fast
flexible design by Lekivetz and Jones (2015) is an attractive alternative.
Once ~F has been determined, the value of each element in the futures ensemble ~E
can be identified utilizing the scenario generator. In modeling influence, the scenario
generator consists of a relatively direct application of CPT. Because each element of
~E considers a particular future, a specific element of each aforementioned uncertainty
113
collections or sets is provided. In turn, each decision tree and its respective deci-
sionmaker’s evaluation calculus is fully specified in its post influence state. As such,
once the outcomes for each prospect have been sorted and partitioned into gains and
losses, equations (31a)–(31g) can be applied to determine which prospect decision-
maker i prefers. More formally, for each decisionmaker i and a specified set of available
prospects and associated outcomes (i.e., Ji ∈ Ji and Kij ∈ Kij), a set of outcome
values and judged probabilities (i.e., yijk and pijk), and a tuple of CPT-parameters
(γi, δi, αi, βi, λi, ri) is defined by
yijk = ŷijk + fijk(s), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij,
xijk = yijk − ri, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij,
pijk = p̂ijk + gijk(s), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Kij,
θi = θ̂i + h
θ















αi , xijk ≥ 0
−λi(xijk)βi , xijk < 0.
(32c)
These values are utilized in equations (31a)-(31g) to determine which prospect has
the maximum value and is preferred by the decisionmaker.
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The persuader’s utility is in turn affected by the collective choices of the deci-
sionmakers. It may be the case that, for each decisionmaker and prospect set Ji, the
persuader prefers the decisionmaker to select some prospect q(Ji), in a binary manner
analogous to Caballero et al. (2018), or the persuader may value the decisionmaker’s
selection along some continuum. Therefore, the selection of this scenario generator
measure is ultimately instance specific and depends upon the persuader’s goal for
the system. The persuader also must determine whether the successful influence of a
plurality of decisionmakers is preferred or, conversely, if each decisionmaker’s choice
is weighted differently.
This selection of a scenario generator measure, in addition to the chosen robust-
ness measure, evaluation criteria, and clustering algorithm are RDM tailorable com-
ponents. Each must be selected in accordance with the persuader’s needs and, real-
istically, software availability. As with RDM in a generic setting, the selection of the
robustness measure and an evaluation criteria must be informed by the persuader’s
objective. For example, if deviations in natural units from optimal solutions in fu-
ture states are important, then the use of expected absolute regret is a well-suited
robustness measure. However, such an objective does allow for outliers to influence
a decision and a persuader may alternatively seek to minimize the expected relative
regret if this property is undesirable.
4.3 Case Study: Influencing Landowning Household Crop Choice in Badakhshan
Province
Since the 1980s, opium poppy cultivation has steadily increased in Afghanistan
(Ward and Byrd, 2004). Production soared when the Taliban took control in 1996
(Woody, 2018a), and today it has become an integral part of the rural Afghan econ-
omy (Byrd, 2017). In an unsecure and volatile environment, opium poppy cultivation
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is an appealing choice for Afghan farmers due to its high selling price, long shelf life,
and profitable byproducts that can be used for, e.g., heating and livestock feed (Mans-
field and Fishstein, 2016). The extent of poppy production is so vast that Afghanistan
has become the world’s largest producer (Woody, 2017, 2018a). Likewise, the opium
sector as a whole, including the licit and illicit activities it supports, is a major source
of revenue for the country; some experts estimate drugs constitute between a third
and a half of the overall Afghan economy (Felbab-Brown, 2016).
While the extent of opium poppy’s effect on counterinsurgency is contested (Mans-
field, 2018), much of the revenue associated with its trade is suspected to support the
Taliban (SIGAR, 2018b). For this reason, counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
have often been viewed as complementary campaigns by the United States. Unfortu-
nately, no policy enacted over the course of the conflict has been able to meaningfully
cripple the Afghan opium economy (SIGAR, 2018a). These failures are often at-
tributed to a policy’s poor underpinnings to economic, social and cultural realities
(Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). Whereas strategies considering such factors have
long been advocated by Afghan experts (e.g., Ward and Byrd, 2004; Ward et al.,
2008), the implementation of an effective counternarcotics policy has proven elusive
(SIGAR, 2018a).
In this section, we illustrate how our modeling paradigm can be used to formu-
late policy informed by socio-economic realities and aimed at achieving a portion
of the larger counternarcotics objective. Utilizing a variety of open source data, we
formulate and solve a representative use case aimed at deterring the farmers in the
northeastern province Badakhshan (Figure 16) from engaging in poppy cultivation.
We model this province because it has witnessed high levels of poppy cultivation
in areas under government control (UNODC, 2018a) and, as discussed by SIGAR
(2018a), a counternarcotic strategy requires such control to be effective.
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Figure 16. Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan
Seasonal Crop Decision by Badakhshan Landowners.
In this section, we illustrate how the structure of a farmer’s decision regarding
what crop to plant and cultivate in a given season can be inferred. Although we
utilize a variety of open source data over a variable time frame to inform this use
case, an official policy development would be best served with recent data, tailored
to the specific area of interest. As such, what follows is a representation of influence
modeling under structural and parametric uncertainty. It is not meant to promote a
specific policy, but instead to demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology.
Landowners in Afghanistan generally have small holdings (UNODC, 2003). The
same observation holds in the province of Badakhshan (Pain, 2010). The Central
Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (2013) categorized Badakhshan farmers into
three demographics: irrigated, rain-fed, and garden-plot farmers. On average, individ-
ual members of these groups own 4.2 jeribs (0.84 hectare), 6.4 jeribs (1.28 hectares),
and 1.1 jeribs (0.22 hectares) of land, respectively (Central Statistics Organization of
Afghanistan, 2013). Likewise, each demographic respectively constitutes 36%, 45%,
and 19% of the 135,000 landowning households in the province (Central Statistics
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Organization of Afghanistan, 2013). The irrigated farmer demographic can be fur-
ther subdivided based upon their irrigation system. A variety of irrigation systems
are used in Afghanistan, including shallow wells known as arhads and man-made
underground channels from aquifers known as karizs. Both of these systems are
drought-resistant; however, other more vulnerable systems based on rivers, springs,
and snow-melt also exist (Qureshi, 2002). With this understanding, the irrigated
farmer demographic can be subdivided into drought-resistant irrigated (DRI), and
drought-vulnerable irrigated (DVI) farmers. According to the Central Statistics Or-
ganization of Afghanistan (2007), between 35% and 45% of Badakhshan irrigated
farmers have drought-resistant systems, compared to the Afghanistan-wide estimate
of 24% (Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, 2018). Therefore, in this case
study we model a “representative” decisionmaker from each of the four demographics.
That is,
I = {DRI, DVI, RF, GP}.
The relative distribution of each demographic is assumed to be 13%, 23%, 45%,
and 19% of the total landowning population in Badakhshan in accordance with
lower bound drought-resistant estimate provided by Central Statistics Organization
of Afghanistan (2007). Likewise, we henceforth assume both rain-fed and garden-plot
farmers are vulnerable to drought conditions, and that a representative farmer from
each demographic owns the aforementioned average landholdings.
The crops available to Badakhshan farmers vary by district. However, there are a
few staple options (i.e., potato, wheat, and opium poppies) that are grown in every
district, excluding Shiki (Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, 2007). Other
options such as onions, tomatoes, and maize are also widely cultivated. Ideally, the
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influence model would consider all crop combination considerations; however, due
to open source data availability and the purpose of illustrating the RDM modeling
and solution methodologies, we limit the crops available to farmers as a combination
between wheat, potatoes, tomatoes, and opium poppies. To build Ji, we note that
according to the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (2018), the majority
of Afghan households cultivate one or two crops, and a minority plant up to three.
We assume each farmer demographic i has the option to cultivate their land as one
of the elements in the set Ji defined in equation (33).
Ji =

Plant Opium Poppies (100% of land)
Plant Wheat (100% of land)
Plant Crop X (100% of land)
Plant Opium Poppies, Wheat (50%, 50% of land each)
Plant Opium Poppies, Wheat (25%, 75% of land)
Plant Opium Poppies, Wheat (75%, 25% of land)
...
Plant Opium, Wheat, Crop X (33% of land each)
Plant Opium, Wheat, Crop X (50%, 25%, 25% of land)
Plant Opium, Wheat, Crop X (25%, 50%, 25% of land)
Plant Opium, Wheat, Crop X (25%, 25%, 50% of land).

(33)
By the definition of Ji, we assume a representative basket of available options for each
demographic includes three crops. Due to their widespread cultivation, we assume
opium poppies and wheat are part of this basket. However, we allow for uncertainty in
the third crop option (i.e., Crop X) which can be either potatoes or tomatoes. The un-
certainty collection Ji therefore has a cardinality of two for each farmer demographic
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i, wherein the definition in equation (33) is repeated for both possibilities of Crop X.
Moreover, due to the small acreage of landholdings, we assume that the allocation
strategies of 50-50 percent or 25-75 percent when planting two crops, and 33-33-33
percent or 50-25-25 percent when planting three crops are sufficient to approximate
actual behavior, providing 16 available prospects. Further behavioral experimenta-
tion could be considered to ascertain how the CPT-editing phase affects Ji to reduce
its size, but we refrain from doing so for this case study.
For this illustration, we assume a farmer considers two underlying uncertainties
that affect their crop yield, and that for any decisionmaker i and prospect j, Kij is a
singleton collection composed of the uncertainties defined in either equation (34) or
(35). The amount of rainfall in a given season is a primary concern, and, if planting
poppy, so is the possibility of an eradication raid by the government. Therefore, the
uncertainty associated with a planting decision including poppy is
Kij =












Having defined the decisionmakers and the decision tree uncertainty collections,
the general form of each farmer’s crop selection decision is depicted in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Generic Badakhshan Farmer Decision Tree
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We introduce the following alternative notation to improve readability of this use
case. The payoff (i.e., net income) associated with each prospect-outcome combi-
nation before influence (i.e., ŷijk) can also be denoted as ŷi(% poppy, % wheat, %
crop X, Rainfall Outcome, Raid Outcome). In the associated tuple, the first three
elements describe the selected prospect j, whereas the final two elements describe the
associated uncertain outcome k. A similar notational simplification is implemented
for p̂ijk which can be written as p̂i(% poppy, % wheat, % crop X, Rainfall Outcome,
Raid Outcome).
The uncertainty set Ŷijk is compiled by combining the gross income (e.g., produc-
tion per hectare, farm-gate price, etc.) and cost (e.g., ushr, labor, seed) estimates
by Kuhn (2010) and from drought effects estimated by the UNODC (2018b). Kuhn
(2010) provides net income projections per hectare for a variety of Afghan crops; how-
ever, these estimates were generated under the assumption of ample rainfall, judging
by the coincidence of the poppy yield estimate with the actual yields observed in the
2017 bumper crop season (UNODC, 2018b). As such, the estimates listed by Kuhn
(2010) are used as a baseline for a season with ample rainfall, and they are adjusted
based on observed data from the UNODC (2018b) to obtain net income estimates
in drought seasons. That is, we utilize the UNODC (2018b) data to inform poppy
income estimates and extrapolate the observed trends to other crops. Although this
technique is not ideal for modeling accuracy, we utilize this naive approach due to a
lack of data availability. As such, the resulting uncertainty sets Ŷijk for each demo-
graphic are formed by multiplying the respective lower and upper bounds of jerib net
income by the number of jeribs utilized for each crop based on the given prospect j
and outcome k. The per jerib income values are listed in Table 15. Note that labor
costs are assumed to be static at the rate listed by Kuhn (2010), who does not itemize
the price of irrigation maintenance.
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Table 15. Estimated Per Jerib Net Income Range
Label Farmer Demographic Crop Uncertain Outcome Net Income per Jerib
u1 DRI Poppy A, NR [$442, $1492]
u2 DRI Poppy D, NR [$342, u1 ]
u3 DRI Poppy A/D, R -$270
u4 DRI Wheat A, NR [-$1, $149] ]
u5 DRI Wheat D, NR [-$15, u4 ]
u6 DRI Potato A, NR [$130, $919]
u7 DRI Potato D, NR [$55, u6]
u8 DRI Tomato A, NR [$74, $377]
u9 DRI Tomato D, NR [$45,u8]
u10 DVI Poppy A, NR [$442, $1492]
u11 DVI Poppy D, NR [$202, u10]
u12 DVI Poppy A/D, R -$270
u13 DVI Wheat A, NR [-$1,$149]
u14 DVI Wheat D, NR [-$35, u13]
u15 DVI Potato A, NR [$130, $910]
u16 DVI Potato D, NR [-$50, u15]
u17 DVI Tomato A, NR [$74, $377]
u18 DVI Tomato D, NR [$5, u17]
u19 RF Poppy A, NR [$380, $1430]
u20 RF Poppy D, NR [$140, u19]
u21 RF Poppy A/D, R -$333
u22 RF Wheat A, NR [-$-1, 149]
u23 RF Wheat D, NR [-$35, u22]
u24 RF Potato A, NR [$130, $910]
u25 RF Potato D, NR [-$50, u24]
u26 RF Tomato A, NR [$74, $377]
u27 RF Tomato D, NR [$5, u26]
u28 GP Poppy A, NR [$504, $1554]
u29 GP Poppy D, NR [$264, u28]
u30 GP Poppy A/D, R -$208
u31 GP Wheat A, NR [$26, $177]
u32 GP Wheat D, NR [-$8, u31]
u33 GP Potato A, NR [$174, $964]
u34 GP Potato D, NR [-$6, u33]
u35 GP Tomato A, NR [$117, $421]
u36 GP Tomato D, NR [$48, u35 ]
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The net income estimates per jerib are disparate across demographics. For in-
stance, considering that the average Badakhshan household consists of nine individ-
uals (Nicolle, 2010), and that poppy harvesting is a culturally acceptable activity in
which Afghan women partake (UNODC, 2003), the garden-plot demographic can ac-
commodate labor requirements internally, even during the approximately two week,
labor-demanding poppy harvest. Conversely, rain-fed farmers with larger land hold-
ings are, at times, forced to hire contract labor. Analogous differences can also be
observed in the disparate effects drought is assumed to have on each demographic.
For illustration purposes, we assume farmers make their decisions under condi-
tions of risk. Likewise, since we assume independence between rainfall and poppy
eradication raids, the probability associated with any outcome is simply the product
of the associated rainfall and raid probabilities. A conservative approach is taken
regarding the probability of drought, and it is assumed to be between [0.25, 0.75]. In
accordance with the infrequent poppy eradication raids in Badakhshan in recent years
(UNODC, 2018b), we assume they are viewed as improbable events with a range of
[0.02, 0.05]. As such, for a prospect j with respective acreage allocations aW and aX




0.25 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.75,
0.25 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.75,
p1 + p2 = 1

where
p1 = p(ample rain) = pi(0, aW , aX ,A,NR), and
p2 = p(drought) = pi(0, aW , aX ,D,NR).
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For a prospect j including poppy cultivation with an acreage percentage aP , we have
P̂ijk =
 (p1, p2, p3, p4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0.25 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.75, 0.25 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.75,
0.02 ≤ p3 ≤ 0.05, 0.02 ≤ p4 ≤ 0.05
p1 + p2 = 1, p3 + p4 = 1

where
p1 = p(ample rain) = p1,
p2 = p(drought) = 1− p1,
p3 = p(raid),
p4 = p(no raid) = 1− p3,
and
pi(aP , aW , aX ,A,NR) = p1p4,
...
pi(aP , aW , aX ,D,R) = p2p3.
Finally, we turn to our attention to the parameterization of the decisionmaker
uncertainty sets. We leverage the works of Booij and Van de Kuilen (2009), Abdellaoui
(2000), and Abdellaoui et al. (2007) to inform the uncertainty sets associated with the
probability weighting, utility curvature, and loss aversion coefficients, respectively. In
the case of the utility curvature coefficients, the uncertainty sets are taken to be the
range of estimates from the literature provided by Booij and Van de Kuilen (2009),
whereas the experimental results from Abdellaoui (2000); Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
125
directly inform the probability weighting and loss aversion uncertainty sets. A more
simplistic approach is taken with the reference point uncertainty set, and it is derived
from Table 15 by the range formed via the product of the minimum and maximin unit
net income values with each demographic’s assumed landholdings. The resulting sets
are quantified in Table 16 wherein Li refers to the assumed size of demographic i’s
landholdings. Of note, demographic decisionmaker uncertainty sets are assumed to
be identical (except for the scale of R̂i) due to the high degree of ambiguity relating
to the manner in which Badakhshan farmers distinguish between prospects. To our
knowledge, no CPT-related studies have been conducted on this population to inform
more accurate model parameters.
Table 16. Decisionmaker Uncertainty Sets
Γ̂i D̂i Âi B̂i Λ̂i R̂I
[0.492, 0.708] [0.588, 0.812] [0.22, 1.01] [0.61, 1.06] [0.74, 8.27] [-333Li, 1554Li]
Influence Actions and their Effects.
In the Afghan conflict, multiple counternarcotic strategies have been attempted.
The influence actions these strategies rely upon can be broadly classified into four
categories (SIGAR, 2018a): eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and
political support mobilization. Eradication efforts focus on the destruction of a stand-
ing poppy crop, whereas interdiction efforts, to include narcotics seizures and the de-
struction of narcotics production facilities, are applied further along the supply chain.
Alternative development programs can be viewed as positive reinforcement relative
to the negative reinforcement of eradication. They are designed to reduce poppy
cultivation by increasing the attractiveness of licit livelihood opportunities. Finally,
political support mobilization is a wide ranging category including public awareness
campaigns and other efforts designed to strengthen Afghan institutions. Herein, we
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assume that the persuader’s task is to select some combination of these four actions
to reduce poppy cultivation in Badakhshan.
The effects of these influence actions is highly dependent of the specific form
of their implementation. For example, the alternative development program in the
Helmand Food Zone (HFZ) which focused on substituting wheat for opium poppy has
been criticized as ineffective and ill-advised (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). However,
alternative programs to build an enduring capacity with more profitable crops have
been viewed favorably (SIGAR, 2018a). A similar debate relating to the form of
eradication efforts (e.g., manual vs. aerial spraying) dominated much of the early
stages of the Afghan conflict (Coll, 2019).
For this case study, we adopt a strategic-level perspective and describe how each
influence effort can be expected to affect the decisionmaker and the decision setting.
Eradication campaigns, regardless of their form, target the farmers themselves. As
such, an increase in their intensity will necessarily coincide with an increase in the
probability of a poppy farming raid, and the reduced overall supply will result in in-
creased expected income for successful harvests (Martin and Symansky, 2006). Con-
versely, interdiction efforts have an indirect effect on farmers. By targeting upstream
entities, they serve to reduce the demand observed by the poppy farmers (Martin and
Symansky, 2006) and, in isolation, can be expected to decrease farm-gate values.
The effects of an alternative development program are varied. However, herein
we assume that such programs targeted at potential poppy farmers are designed to
increase the attractiveness of cultivating wheat, potato, or tomato via either reducing
costs or increasing profits. Likewise, the effects of political support mobilization
are diverse, but herein we assume such action is composed of a public awareness
campaign and provincial leader engagement with the following effects. The public
awareness campaign reinforces the criminality of poppy cultivation and underscores
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the financial risks associated with a destroyed crop, whereas the provincial leaders are
encouraged to increase poppy related taxes. As such, political support mobilization
can be expected to increase a farmer’s judged probability of a raid and decrease the
net income associated with poppy.
Table 17. Actions Included (Y) and Excluded (N) in each Influence Strategy
Influence Strategy (scand) s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16
Eradication N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N Y
Interdiction N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Alternative Development N N N Y N N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y
Pol. Sup. Mobilization N N N N Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
All available influence strategies (i.e., ~S) are listed in Table 17. Likewise, the
uncertainty sets for influence effects that account for these dynamics are displayed in
Table 18. For this case study, these uncertainty sets are assumed to be static across
all decisionmakers. Each strategy, if employed, is assumed to have an additive effect
on the associated parameter as listed. For example, for some decisionmaker i and
prospect j (including poppy) wherein outcome k represents the ample rainfall, raid
outcome, we have
Gijk(s2) = [0, 0.7],
pijk = p̂ijk + gijk(s2), gijk(s2) ∈ Gijk(s2).
Moreover, if an influence strategy employs multiple actions simultaneously, the cu-
mulative effect is assumed to be additive. For instance, if influence strategy s8 is
utilized instead of s2 we would have
gijk(s8) = gijk(s2) + gijk(s5), gijk(s1) ∈ Gijk(s2),
gijk(s5) ∈ Gijk(s5),
pijk = p̂ijk + gijk(s8).
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Any entry not listed in Table 18 is assumed to have a null effect. Likewise,in accor-
dance with Table 15, we assume that if a property is raided, the effect is certain (i.e.,
all poppy is destroyed with resulting damages).
Table 18. Influence Effects on Decision Setting
Influence Raid Probability Poppy Income (NR) Wheat Income Potato Income Tomato Income
s2 [0.00, 0.7] [-0.05ŷijk, 0.2ŷijk] - - -
s3 - [-0.15ŷijk, 0.1ŷijk] - - -
s4 - - [-0.25ŷijk, 5.00ŷijk] [-0.25ŷijk, 2.00ŷijk] [-0.25ŷijk, 3.00ŷijk]
s5 [-0.02, 0.05] [-0.2ŷijk, 0.1ŷijk] - - -
In this case study, the numerical effects of influence are considered utilizing uncer-
tainty sets meant to capture conflicting opinions and designed to allow for alternative
effects than those anticipated (e.g., s5 decreasing the raid probability). Such con-
flict is historically characteristic of counternarcotic policy discussions in Afghanistan
(Coll, 2019). Therefore, the notional effects in this case study are designed to be a
representation of the true policy-making environment.
RDM Tailorable Components.
Having defined the uncertainty collections and sets, the next steps in the RDM
approach consist of identifying a space filling design from which to build ~F , a scenario
generator measure, a robustness measure, an evaluation criteria, and a clustering
algorithm.
From an experimental design perspective, we are considering one categorical fac-
tor with two levels (i.e., Ji) and 70 additional continuous factors including each
decisionmaker’s CPT-parameter values, the respective influence’s effects, and each
crop’s profitability. To accommodate this setting, we utilize a sliced Latin hypercube
design because it allows for optimal space-filling properties to be pursued within and
between the categorical factor levels (Ba et al., 2015). The specific design used has
two slices and 1000 points in each slice, yielding a ~F with 2000 futures, and was
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calculated using the R-package SLHD with the simulated annealing parameter iter-
max set to 20. In this manner, the resulting design matrix has favorable space-filling
properties, and is convenient for calculation and adequate for illustration.
A variety of scenario generator measures could be used depending upon the pre-
cise nature of the persuader’s priorities. For instance, the persuader may wish to
reduce the total number of households cultivating poppy, or may wish to minimize
the total number of jeribs utilized for poppy cultivation. Both fall within the larger
counternarcotics objective, but are alternative metrics of success. Preferably, the se-
lection of such a measure would be informed based upon the specific nature of the
insurgency’s poppy-related income stream. Absent this information, we focus on the
latter scenario generator measure related to minimizing the total number of poppy
cultivated jeribs. In large part, this decision is made to align with the historical
priorities of US and UN policymakers (SIGAR, 2018a; UNODC, 2018a).
Furthermore, absolute regret is utilized as a robustness measure to facilitate com-
munication of results in natural units. The interpretation of this absolute regret
measure is the number of additional poppy cultivated jeribs in a given scenario from
the “optimal”. Moreover, the evaluation criteria selected is expected regret for similar
reasons. The number of poppy cultivated jeribs in Afghanistan has a direct impact on
the worldwide opium supply, and the retention of this conceptually-accessible mean-
ing is important when communicating regret to senior policymakers.
With regard to clustering, Lempert et al. (2008) advocate for the use of two
hierarchical clustering algorithms (i.e., CART and PRIM). The authors argue that
each of these clustering techniques have high interpretability because they segment
the area of interest into hyper-rectangular regions. Empirically, both algorithms are
shown to perform well; however, CART regions are guaranteed to be disjoint whereas
PRIM regions may overlap. For this reason, the CART algorithm is utilized in this
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study. Moreover, to limit the depth of the classification tree, the minimum leaf size
is bounded below by 35 futures in accordance with CART-application conventions.
Analysis and Results.
The result of each influence strategy on the number of jeribs produced for each
future in ~F is depicted in Figure 18. It can be observed that the null strategy (i.e.,
s1) and most influence strategies composed of singleton actions (i.e., s2, s3, s5) result
in a large number of expected poppy cultivated jeribs. Among the non-singleton
strategies, each of the strategies not including alternative development as an action
(e.g., s6, s8, s10, s13) results in many poppy cultivated jeribs as well, indicating the
importance of such actions in a successful influence strategy.
Figure 18. Distribution of Poppy Cultivated Jeribs over all Futures
The amount of variability in poppy cultivated jeribs for most of the strategies
depicted in Figure 18 coincides with the historical difficulties encountered by those
developing counternarcotic policy. Even strategies having the greatest potential ben-
efit may be ineffectual when applied. For instance, if one were to assume all futures
equally likely, s16 results in the lowest number of expected poppy cultivated jeribs
even though instances exist having no decrease in cultivation relative to the null
strategy.
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As such, the raw distributional data on poppy cultivated areas is not sufficient
to determine which of the sixteen considered strategies is robust. We cannot discern
the degree of which a strategy’s favorable futures coincide with that of any other.
Therefore, to continue with the RDM analysis, we introduce the robustness results in
Figure 19.
Figure 19. Distribution of Absolute Regret over all Futures
By observing this figure, we can discriminate better between strategies. Differ-
ences between s12 and s14 emerge based upon the sizes of their interquartile-regret
ranges. A similar observation holds for s7 and s16. Notably, we also see that s7, s12,
s14, and s16 all have an expected absolute regret of zero. However, s14 and s16 have
the smallest interquartile-regret ranges and are leading contenders for the candidate
strategy for policy implementation. Of the two, s16 has the lower 90th percentile
regret and, for this reason, is chosen as scand.
With a candidate strategy selected, the RDM methodology calls for hedging op-
tions to be explored. As in Lempert et al. (2006), each future’s output is transformed
into a binary response. The binary response coincides with an absolute regret thresh-
old set forth by senior policymakers. We assume for this use case that such a limit
is 2500 jeribs in regret. That is, if the number of poppy cultivated jeribs for scand
exceeds 2500 jeribs of the best strategy for some future, then that future is considered
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a vulnerability of scand.
Utilizing this technique, the CART algorithm clusters the space into eight regions
of interest. These regions are separated based on the effectiveness of select counternar-
cotics actions, and a subset of demographics’ perceptions on crop income. However,
one cluster stands out as having a high density of vulnerabilities and high average
absolute regret. It is characterized by the simultaneous effectiveness of interdiction
and political support mobilization on poppy income estimates, the ineffectiveness of
eradication messaging on the perceived raid probabilities, the DVI demographic be-
lieving poppy and wheat income high in ample rain conditions conditions, and the RF
demographic regarding poppy income as high in ample rain conditions and tomato
income as high in drought conditions. With this vulnerable narrative identified, the
tradeoffs between utilizing s16 or some other strategy in terms of expected absolute
regret can be examined.
Figure 20. Cluster Tradeoffs Between s16 and Other Strategies
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Figure 20 illustrates the tradeoffs between utilizing s16 vis-á-vis the alternatives in
terms of expected absolute regret. The coordinate location of a strategy is determined
by the expected absolute regret via two narratives: the vulnerability cluster and the
remaining futures. The four strategies not depicted in Figure 20 (i.e., s1, s3, s5, s10)
exceed 3× 105 in both narratives. A frontier of non-dominated strategy performance
is formed by s12 and s16, as depicted by the solid line. This indicates that only
s12 and s16 are non-dominated strategies under this narative bifurcation. It can be
observed that a persuader’s preference between the two depends upon the respective
weight (perhaps in terms of probability) placed on the vulnerable scenario and its
complement. If weighted equally, a strategy on the dotted line closest to the origin
is preferred. However, as one narratives is given more weight, the preference shifts
to strategies close to the origin on one side of the line. Therefore, the more (or less)
weight the persuader respectively places on the vulnerable scenario, the more (less)
attractive strategy s12 becomes visá-vis strategy s16.
At this point, the RDM process can be repeated with s12 as scand and, potentially,
with the inclusion of additional information (e.g., more crops or additional influence
actions). Conversely, the RDM analysis can terminate with a choice between s12 and
s16 based upon the persuader’s beliefs on the vulnerable and the remaining future
narratives for expected absolute regret.
Moreover, the RDM procedure could also be repeated utilizing a distinct scenario
generator metric. As mentioned in Section 4.3, a variety of counternarcotics measures
exist to assess a strategy’s success. Besides the total number of poppy-cultivated
jeribs, the total kilograms of opium produced from a harvest has historically been
a relevant measure to policy-makers. Therefore, utilizing historical kilograms per
hectare yield data (UNODC, 2018b), estimated best- and worst-case empirical CDFs
(e.g., Figure 21) for the tons of opium from the Badakhshan poppy harvest could
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inform an alternative RDM analysis under a different measure defined by a senior
policy-maker.
Figure 21. Empirical CDFs for s12 with Best- and Worst-Case Opium Yields
Discussion and Limitations.
The selection of s16 as an initial candidate strategy is reinforced by counternarcotic
doctrine proposed by Ward and Byrd (2004) and SIGAR (2018a) who envision it as
a multifaceted effort. Furthermore, the choice between s12 and s16 coincides with a
core issues at the heart of the Afghan conflict: the effectiveness of interdiction and
security cooperation efforts (SIGAR, 2018a). In our use case, if a senior policy-maker
believes interdiction efforts can decrease farmers’ poppy net revenues and, they are
also optimistic regarding the capability of Afghan partners and the coalition’s ability
to support them, then action s12 should be adopted. Otherwise, s16 is the preferred
strategy.
The modeling methodology also addresses some criticisms by Mansfield and Fish-
stein (2016) pertaining to faulty assumptions in Afghan counternarcotic policy de-
velopment. That is, we do not treat the Afghan farmer as a homogeneous entity
maximizing gross profit, nor one who makes a binary decision between opium poppy
and wheat. Instead our approach addresses the diversity of Afghanistan demograph-
ics, considers net profits, and examines a variety of crop selection profiles.
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However, the modeling methodology utilized is not a perfect representation of
reality. Although we addressed the diversity of Badakshan farmers, a higher fidelity
characterization may be required to inform policy decisions. Badakhshan is a mul-
tiethnic region comprised of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtos, among others (Fishstein,
2014). The effect of a farmer’s demographic on a crop decision may be non-trivial, es-
pecially when concerned with emotional stimuli (Gladwell, 2008). Moreover, a richer
characterization of the crops available for planting may also be required using district
rather than provincial level data. A diverse set of crop options are available to Afghan
farmers, and deterring poppy cultivation may require creative incentives among them.
Unfortunately, the data required to inform such decisions at this granular level is not
available in open source collections and would require an expansive data gathering
effort analogous to other UNODC projects.
Our models also only consider a portion of the interconnected Afghan economy,
of which farming is a critical component. It provides land-access (via sharecropping)
and income (via day labor) to the rural poor. As such, the crop selection of Afghan
landowners can have far reaching effects. Such effects were observed during the im-
plementation of the HFZ. While the program resulted in landowners deciding to plant
less poppy, these decisions resulted in less profitable sharecropping agreements and
less demand for on-farm labor (Mansfield, 2017).
As such, the program coincided with a migration of the landless poor into former
desert areas (e.g., Bakwa in Farah province) and an increase in poppy cultivation in
these regions (SIGAR, 2018a). Just as such effects were unforeseen by the planners of
the HFZ, so too would they be unforeseen in the analysis presented in this research.
The decisions of the landless poor could be included and linked to the our analysis
but, ultimately, the scale of the influence model must be determined based upon the
persuader’s underlying objectives.
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The influence models presented herein are static, closed system approximations
of a component in an open, dynamic system. The entirety of the dynamic system
cannot be modeled. Instead, the influence model should be contained to represent
only the relevant elements of the full system. In this study, we assume such elements
to be restricted to the landowners themselves.
Finally, the Badakhshan landowner influence model is designed to affect change in
a single growing season. Such a time frame is far too short upon which to build a com-
prehensive counternarcotics policy. Historically, successful policies have taken decades
versus months or years (Ward and Byrd, 2004) and, in this time frame, external mar-
ket factors not incorporated in this research become increasingly relevant. Therefore,
the models illustrated herein do not yield a panacea to stop poppy cultivation, but
they facilitate the development of counternarcotic policy toward incremental, gradual
change.
4.4 Conclusions
In this research, we presented a framework for modeling influence under parametric
and structural uncertainty and illustrated how robust decisions in this setting can be
identified. In this manner, a persuader can generate a robust nudge strategy (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2009) that relies upon System 1 (i.e., automatic thought), System 2
(i.e., reflective thought) influence, or a mixture thereof (Kahneman, 2011).
The utility of our methodology was demonstrated on the global, contemporary
problem posed by the illicit opium economy. Specific emphasis was applied to re-
ducing opium poppy supply from the world’s leading poppy producing nation by
targeting the Afghan province of Badakhshan. This province is an appealing target
for counternarcotic efforts because, in accordance with SIGAR (2018a) guidance, it
is relatively well-controlled by the national government. However, insurgent groups
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have a large enough presence regionally that they may be generating significant in-
come from the province’s illicit activities (Chughtai, 2018).
In addition to providing an alternative model for counternarcotic policy develop-
ment, the Badakhshan use case illustrates how an influence model can be developed
under uncertainty. The discussion in Section 4.3 exemplifies the level of empathy
and situational awareness required both to infer the underlying decision setting and
to estimate the effects of influence upon it. From a technical perspective, the use
case also demonstrates how the RDM framework can be tailored to fit a particular
influence problem and how iterative rounds of analysis ought to be performed.
However, it is also the technical application of RDM for which much work remains
to refine the methodology. The development of ~F is based upon a space-filling design;
however, there are a variety of options from which a modeler can choose. Future in-
quiry is required to determine when one space-filling design is preferable to another
and what sampling density is suitable. Another open question pertains to the use-
fulness of optimal space-filling designs in this setting. The scenario generator is not
particularly demanding from a computational perspective; in fact, it is a relatively
direct application of CPT. Therefore, future inquiry into the tradeoff between com-
putational effort and solution quality via random sampling, sub-optimal space-filling
designs, or optimal space-filling designs is a promising endeavor.
138
V. Leveraging Behavioral Game Theory to Inform Military
Operations Planning
Abstract
Since Thomas Schelling published The Strategy of Conflict (1960), the study of
game theory and international relations have been closely linked. Developments in
the former often trigger analytical changes in the latter, as evidenced by the recent
behavioral and psychological focus among some international relations and defense
economics scholars. Despite this connection, decisions regarding military operations
have rarely been influenced by game theoretic analysis, a fact often attributed to
standard game theory’s normative nature. Therefore, this research applies selected
behavioral game theoretic solution techniques to classical interstate conflict games,
demonstrating their utility to inform the planning of military operations. By reex-
amining classic Cold War deterrence models and other interstate conflict games, we
demonstrate how modern game theoretic techniques based upon agent psychology,
as well as the ability of agents to think strategically or learn from past experience,
can provide additional insights beyond what can be derived via perfect rationality
analysis. These demonstrations illustrate how behaviorally focused methods can in-
corporate the uncertainty related to human decisionmakers into analysis and highlight
the alternative insights a bounded rationality approach can generate for military op-
erations planning.
5.1 Introduction
For nearly two weeks at the end of October 1962, the events surrounding the Cuban
Missile Crisis arguably constituted the single most consequential decision setting in
history. Fortunately, Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and American president
139
John F. Kennedy both chose to back away from decisions that would escalate the
conflict, possibly into a nuclear armageddon. A disaster was averted.
The characteristics of a leader determine, at least in part, their strategic decisions.
History has shown that a leader’s intellect, temperament, background, biases, and
other psychological factors play a critical role throughout the course of a conflict and
in its resolution. Therefore, more than fifty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis,
one cannot help but wonder... what if Joseph Stalin had not passed away? What if
Richard Nixon had won the 1960 American presidential election? What if the Bay of
Pigs had not eroded President Kennedy’s trust in his military advisors? How would
the successive decisions made by these world leaders have differed? Unfortunately,
traditional game theoretic concepts used to analyze such situations provide no insight
to answer such questions.
In formal models of interstate conflict, states are often modeled as strategic-
thinking entities attempting to maximize their self-interest (Schelling, 1960, 1966;
Powell, 1990; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000). Insights are historically gained through an
application of some traditional game theoretic equilibrium concept. However, the
concept of an equilibrium imposes an additional assumption. Players are assumed to
form their responses based upon accurate beliefs of what their adversaries actually
do; that is, all players are mutually consistent (Camerer et al., 2004). An equiva-
lent, and more formal exploration of these conditions is considered by Aumann and
Brandenburger (1995). Although alternative explanations exist to describe how these
conditions arise (e.g., folk wisdom or instinct), one valid interpretation is to consider
decisionmakers in these models as perfectly rational actors.
Under such an interpretation, the human aspects of the respective nations’ leaders
are not considered. People are generally overconfident (Kahneman, 2011; Johnson
and Fowler, 2011). Their decisionmaking is affected by emotional factors (Thaler,
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1999; Shiv et al., 2005), and they are unable to objectively perceive uncertainty
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1979, 1982; Kontek and Lewandowski, 2017). The
interpretation of humans (e.g., national leaders) as perfectly rational decisionmakers is
further complicated by the prevalence of mental health disorders in society. Wittchen
and Jacobi (2011) estimated that, within any contemporary twelve-month period,
27% of adults in the European Union suffered from a mental disorder. Davidson
et al. (2006) estimated that 49% of American presidents between 1776 and 1974
suffered from some psychiatric disorder (e.g., depression, alcoholism), and McDermott
(2007) illustrated the profound effect medical and psychological illness have exerted
on presidential decisionmaking.
For these reasons, recent research in international relations and defense economics
has begun to consider behavioral and psychological factors (e.g. see Pittel and
Rubbelke, 2012; Phillips and Pohl, 2017; Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 2018; Apolte,
2019). Rathbun et al. (2016) and Kertzer et al. (2018) respectively studied behav-
ioral effects on foreign-policy beliefs and costly signaling in international relations.
Little and Zeitzoff (2017) incorporated behavioral factors into bargaining models via
evolutionary preferences. Hafner-Burton et al. (2017) provided an extensive review
of relevant behavioral theories, previous studies of their implementation, and their
collective implication for the study of international relations. Other recent examples
of behavioral studies questioning the role of rationality in political decisions include
the work of Caplan (2006), Andonie and Diermeier (2017), Thomas (2018), Lee and
Clark (2018), and Tóth and Chytilek (2018).
However, such a behavioral paradigm shift has not yet manifested itself in game
theoretic applications to military operations planning. The lack of emphasis on play-
ers’ humanity in traditional solution concepts has discouraged the application of game
theory to the planning of military campaigns. “Homo economicus rather than deontic
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logic have deterred [war]gamers from studying game theory, and thus the perceived
value of applying game theory to [war]gaming has been limited” (Hanley Jr., 2017b).
Whereas many scholars in recent decades have seen the potential of incorporating
game theory into the process (e.g. see Leibowitz and Lieberman, 1960; Taylor, 1978;
Athans, 1987; Cruz et al., 2001; McEneaney et al., 2004; Boardman et al., 2017), actu-
ally doing so has been limited by the military desire to “anticipate how the key players
may act” (Hanley Jr., 2017b) and the difficulty of anticipating human behavior when
assuming perfectly rationality of actors. Conversely, behavioral game theory (BGT)
“expands analytical theory by adding emotion, mistakes, limited foresight, doubts of
how smart others are, and learning to analytical game theory” (Camerer, 2011) and
focuses on describing how players actually interact.
Of the recent BGT developments, two frameworks are of particular importance for
military operations planning: the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model and Experience
Weighted Attraction (EWA) model. Camerer et al. (2004) developed the CH model
that formalized the intuition of Selten (1998) that the “natural way of looking at
game situations... is [through] a step-by-step reasoning procedure”. With relatively
few assumptions, the authors develop an empirically accurate model of play for one-
shot games based upon a parameter characterizing the players” strategic thinking
abilities. By comparison, the EWA model developed by Camerer and Ho (1998, 1999)
describes the empirical learning behavior of agents in a variety of repeated games.
The EWA model is defined with psychological parameters identifying the players”
tendencies toward regret, forgetfulness, and myopia.
From a military operations perspective, these models are particularly useful when
planning for a one-shot engagement, a new type of hostility, or a recurring conflict.
Instead of removing the underlying human uncertainties, these models incorporate
them into an agent-based approach, thereby addressing two deficiencies associated
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with legacy analysis techniques (Hanley Jr., 2017a). As such, in this research, we
illustrate how CH and, when appropriate, EWA can be effectively utilized to garner
insights for the conduct of military operations.
The remainder of this manuscript is structured as follows. We begin in Section
5.2 by reviewing each behavioral game theory model and their respective parameters.
These models are applied in Section 5.3 to classic interstate conflict games, illustrating
the alternative insights they derive relative to traditional methods and, in doing so,
exhibiting their utility for military operations planning in an accessible manner. We
also discuss how behavioral uncertainty can be incorporated to inform the planning
of a military operation and balance between the two command styles discussed by
Haywood (1954): planning against enemy capability vis-á-vis planning against enemy
intent (i.e., what the enemy is able to do versus what the enemy will do). Finally,
we discuss additional BGT models that can be used to inform military operations in
Section 5.4 and provide concluding remarks in Section 5.5.
5.2 Behavioral Game Theory
“Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and
psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior” (Camerer, 2011).
The field takes an experimental economic approach to game theory, and it utilizes
empirical results to guide theory. In this section, we review two prominent models
in the discipline: one which characterizes behavior in one-shot, normal form games,
and the other describing learning in repeated play. These models provide a basis
of play rooted in empirical results, but also provide more definitive predictions than
their standard equilibrium counterparts. For a given τ -parameter characterizing the
distribution of opponents” depths of strategic thought, the CH model provides a single
estimate of play, and when simulated many times, the EWA model provides a range
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of expected behavior. Likewise, these behavioral methods are readily adaptable to
games having a large number of players, whereas finding equilibrium in such situations
is a computationally burdensome task (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008).
Cognitive Hierarchy.
From the earliest application of game theory to interstate conflict, there has ex-
isted the concept of step-by-step reasoning. Schelling (1960) referred to this general
structure with regard to the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”, describing how the
Soviet Union and the United States interact in a game of preemptive attack. Schelling
described the problem as a process produced by successive cycles of “He thinks we
think he thinks we think... he thinks we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he
will; so we must”. Schelling (1960) noted that this structure can be formalized using
a potentially infinite set of probabilities composed of the products of the following
event probabilities and their reciprocals: P1 (i.e., the probability the opponent prefers
to attack), P2 (i.e., the probability opponent thinks we prefer to attack), P3 (i.e., the
probability opponent thinks I believe they prefer to attack), and so on.
In Schelling’s estimation, “the trouble with the formulation is that nothing gener-
ates the series” and that “each probability is an ad hoc estimate”. Instead, he sought
a reformulation of the problem to gain insights. However, the Cognitive Hierarchy
model set forth by Camerer et al. (2004) allows for analysis of player interaction in
its original step-by-step reasoning form.
The CH model assumes that players are defined by the number of reasoning steps
they compute in selecting an action, and their beliefs on the number of steps computed
by other players. Agents are overconfident, and they do not realize that other agents
can use as many reasoning steps as they do (i.e., a k-step player believes all others are
[k-1]-step players or less). A game is assumed to be characterized by a true probability
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distribution over the number of reasoning steps a player utilizes. Generally, a Poisson
distribution defined by the parameter τ is used. The larger the value of τ , the more
reasoning steps players utilize, on average. As players are overconfident, they are
unable to perceive this true distribution. Instead, Camerer et al. (2004) assumed the





where f(h) is the true probability of an h-step player being encountered from the
underlying Poisson distribution. That is, the true probabilities are normalized to
form a k-step player’s beliefs. Utilizing these beliefs, a player’s strategy is calculated
by maximizing their expected payoff. Namely, a strategy j for player i is selected






















is player i’s expected payoff for playing strategy j; π(sji , s
j′
−i) is player
i’s payoff for playing strategy j when his opponents play the strategy vector j′; m−i is
the number of possible opponent strategy vectors; and Ph(s
j′
−i) is the probability that
h-step players would actual commit to strategy j′. If multiple strategies are found to
achieve the same maximum payoff, the player is assumed to randomize equally among
them.
In this way, the CH model formalizes the step-by-step reasoning process by limiting
its depth and forcing convergence as k increases. As k grows sufficiently large, a k-step
and a [k+1]-step player have the same beliefs and therefore take the same action(s).
In practice, a game is solved via CH recursively by starting with 0-step players and
iterating up to this k-value. Thus, the assumption of 0-step player behavior is the
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bedrock for all higher order player actions. Such players are assumed to not think
strategically and randomize over the strategy space. In keeping with Camerer et al.
(2004), we assume 0-step players randomize over this space uniformly.
The CH model primarily characterizes behavior in a game by the Poisson param-
eter τ . In their study of a variety of games, including the beauty contest and market
entry games, Camerer et al. (2004) found that common estimates of τ are approxi-
mately in the range [1, 2] with the value 1.5 reliably predicting expected behavior in
new games. Likewise, as τ → ∞ the CH model will converge to any Nash equilib-
rium reached by finitely deleting weakly dominated strategies but, in general, such
convergence is not guaranteed.
In a military operations planning setting, it may prove difficult to derive enough
empirical evidence to estimate τ directly. However, qualitative estimates can be
identified by heuristically assessing the level of strategic thinking utilized by the
interacting entities. Alternatively, the interaction can be readily examined under a
large number of τ -estimates to obtain a range of expected behavior. Such an approach
is illustrated in Section 5.3 by examining all τ in the set {0, 0.1, ..., 50}.
Furthermore, the CH model is fit with τ -values corresponding to a population
of individual decisionmakers. In a military operations setting, the ultimate decision
authority may reside in an individual, but input is invariably received from a staff of
advisors. The decision process itself is often cooperative in nature. Therefore, it is of
interest for military operations planners to understand how this dynamic affects the
underling τ -value in one-shot games. We hypothesize that the collective input from
advisors will serve to increase the depth of strategic reasoning, but experiments must
be conducted to support or refute this conjecture.
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Experience Weighted Attraction.
Camerer (2011) noted that “there are no interesting games in which subjects
reach a predicted equilibrium immediately. And there are no games so complicated
that subjects do not converge in the direction of equilibrium”. However, standard
game theory does not explicitly address the expected behavior of boundedly rational
agents, nor does it address the temporal aspect of equilibration. In some games,
players quickly adapt and move to an equilibrium state but, in other games, it is a
process that may require years or decades (Camerer, 2011).
The EWA model developed by Camerer and Ho (1999) attempts to address these
concerns. It is a learning model that can be tuned to characterize the path players
take towards an equilibrium profile over repeated play. The EWA model assumes
players use reason to adopt a starting strategy profile which then evolves due to both
beliefs formed and reinforcement received over repeated interaction.
The EWA model is centered upon two key concepts: (1) an accumulated experi-
ence variable, and (2) attraction values toward given strategies. At time zero, each
player i is assumed to have some initial experience value, Ni(0), and some starting
attractions toward each strategy j, Aji (0). The initial experience value is assumed
to be derived from experience playing different games and introspection, whereas the
initial attractions are assumed to come from some strategic reasoning process (e.g.,
the CH model). Subsequent experience variables for player i at time t are represented
as
Ni(t) = φi(1− κi)Ni(t− 1) + 1, t ≥ 1. (38)
wherein φi is a decay factor representing loss of salience of previous interactions, and
κi is a factor describing the level at which the strategy space is explored or exploited.
That is, κi-values closer to 0 represent a tendency to explore, whereas κi-values closer
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to 1 represent a more exploitive framework. Collectively, the product of these two
parameters describes how past experience is discounted.
The attraction value player i allots to a given strategy j at time t utilizes the
experience variable and is calculated as follows:
Aji (t) =
φiNi(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) +
[







such that δi is an imagination factor placed on foregone payoffs, s
j
i is the strategy of
corresponding to Aji (t) support, si(t) is the strategy actually played by player i in
period t, and I(sji , si(t)) is an indicator function turning on and off the imagination
effect, as appropriate. That is, I(sji , si(t)) = 1 if s
j
i = si(t), and 0 otherwise.
These attraction values are then used to update the probabilities with which each
player utilizes a given strategy by







wherein λ represents sensitivity to attractions and may be influenced by perception,
rate of computational errors, or unobserved payoff components (e.g., desire for variety
of play).
The EWA model has been shown to generalize a variety of other learning algo-
rithms (e.g., reinforcement learning, belief learning, and weighted fictitious play),
depending on the values of κi, φi, and δi. If these requisite parameters are known (or
assumed), learning behavior is simulated by successively generating player strategies
based on the values of P ji (t) and updating Ni(t), A
j
i (t), and P
j
i (t + 1). Expected
insights from the model can then be gained via the aggregation of outcomes over
multiple simulation runs.
148
Alternatively, if observed behavior is known, the requisite parameters may be fit
by minimizing the likelihood function in a process analogous to that demonstrated
by Camerer and Ho (1998), or by performing multiple runs with a space-filling design
and selecting the parameter tuple minimizing the mean squared error of averaged
simulated path, similar to Roth and Erev (1998). The former is more computationally
efficient, but the latter is easier to implement.
With regard to the use of EWA in military operations planning, the characteri-
zation of learning behavior is extremely useful because many problems in combat do
not occur in a one-shot setting but repeat multiple times. Whereas an invasion or an
armistice may occur in a one-shot setting, other activities (e.g., reconnaissance) are
frequently revisited. For such missions, learning plays a definitive role in the interac-
tion. Utilization of the EWA model or one of its extensions (e.g. Camerer et al., 2002;
Ho et al., 2007) to the planning of military operations can incorporate this element
of repeated play and may provide heretofore hidden insights.
5.3 Applications to Military Operations Planning
The military operations planning process can be characterized by the following
five steps: (1) receipt of the mission, (2) development of situational awareness and
available courses of action, (3) analysis of opposing courses of action, (4) comparison
of courses of action, (5) selection of a course of action. Although the delineations
between the aforementioned activities may differ, such a general framework has been
used in the United States since before World War II (Haywood, 1954) and is a hall-
mark of modern, Western operations planning (Australian Department of Defence,
2009; U.K. Ministry of Defense, 2013; SHAPE, 2013; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017b).
Given such commonalities, we illustrate in this section how BGT can help analyze
and compare courses of actions for a military operation. Generally speaking, we
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refrain from adapting the lexicon of any particular planning paradigm (e.g., the Joint
Operations Planning Process); however, we do find it useful to highlight how each
of the examples relate to the six-phase Continuum of Military Operations: Phase
0 (Shaping the Environment), Phase 1 (Deterring the Enemy), Phase 2 (Seizing the
Initiative), Phase 3 (Dominating the Enemy), Phase 4 ( Stabilizing the Environment),
and Phase 5 (Enabling Civil Authority). For further information regarding these
phases, we refer an interested reader to Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017a).
In Sections 5.3-5.3, we treat the military planners as endogenous entities in the
respective BGT frameworks. That is, planning activities are conducted with the in-
corporation of friendly and adversarial bounded rationality. Such a perspective is of
particular utility in decentralized execution structures because a higher headquarters
does not always seek to directly control subordinate commanders’ decisions; instead,
these commanders are often granted a degree of autonomy to account for the velocity
of the decision making environment (Shamir, 2010). In these sections, we also illus-
trate how planners can incorporate uncertainty regarding behavioral parameters (i.e.,
behavioral uncertainty) into their analyses.
Conversely, in Section 5.3, we consider a setting wherein the military planners
are exogenous of the BGT frameworks. These planners are aware of the adversary’s
bounded rationality and seek to exploit it to their benefit. Such an approach is most
appropriate for centralized command and execution. For these settings, we illustrate
how planners can incorporate behavioral uncertainty to select robust courses of actions
in view of the enemy’s capabilities and intent.
Each of these sections utilize BGT in the analysis of well-known, interstate con-
flict models. Although these models are classical rather than contemporary, we utilize
them to ensure the accessibility of our results to a broad readership by striking a bal-
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ance between military relevance and technicality of illustration. However, in Section
5.4, we discuss how the BGT methods utilized herein and others introduced in Section
5.4 can be utilized in more complex game theoretic settings.
Brinkmanship: Nuclear Crisis Game.
We begin by analyzing a well-known metaphor for brinkmanship, namely the
the two-player, normal form game of Chicken in a one-shot setting (Russell, 1959;
Kahn, 1960; Rapoport and Chammah, 1966). Although often framed in the context
of nuclear deterrence, a variety of military activities at the tactical level exhibit a
similar structure (e.g., confrontations during Freedom of Navigation operations). As
such, we take the perspective of a higher headquarters planning for such a deterrent
activity in Phase 1 of the Continuum of Military Operations. The decision authority
for this interaction has been delegated to a subordinate commander, and the higher
headquarters wishes to understand the potential behavior of friendly and enemy forces
arising from a particular course of action.
The specific payoffs we utilize for this analysis can be found in Table 19. Should
this matrix game be analyzed with the assumption of perfect rationality, there are
two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed Nash equilibrium: (1) the row player holds
firm and the column player deescalates, (2) the row player deescalates and the column
player holds firm, or (3) both players deescalate with probability 0.9, and hold firm
with probability 0.1.
Table 19. Two-player Nuclear Crisis Game
Deescalate Hold Firm
Deescalate (0,0) (-1,1)
Hold Firm (1,-1) (-10,-10)
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If this assumption is relaxed, and players are assumed to be boundedly rational
by utilizing the step-by-step reasoning of the CH model, we arrive at similar, albeit
differing results. Since the higher headquarters is uncertain of the strategic thinking
ability of both forces’ leaders, the CH model is utilized with all instantions of τ in
the set {0, 0.1, ..., 50}. Figure 22 displays the probability that a player will choose
to deescalate as a function of τ ; the probability of holding firm is its compliment.
The three horizontal lines on the graph represent the three Nash equilibria. The
symmetry of the game lends itself to identical strategy profiles under CH for the row
and column players. Thus, Figure 22 applies to both players. Utilizing the suggested
value of τ = 1.5 for untested games (Camerer et al., 2004), the CH model predicts
that a player will deescalate with probability 0.8884. If this value of τ is correct, then
we should expect the mixed form equilibrium to predict behavior well. Furthermore,
the CH model has enabled differentiation between the three Nash equilibria. Our
results suggest that when τ →∞ the players’ strategies converge to the mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Figure 22. Player strategies as a function of τ
However, the CH model also yields an unexpected result. We can assume that war
occurs in this game if both players simultaneously choose to hold firm. Therefore, the
probability of war is the associated product of each players’ hold firm probabilities. As
the average depth of strategic thinking (i.e., τ) increases, war becomes improbable,
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converging to a 1% chance. However, there are oscillatory patterns which make
marginal increases in strategic thought dangerous. For instance, with τ = 1.5 there
is a 1.2% chance of war; however, a relatively marginal increase to τ = 2 corresponds
to a 6.2% chance of war. This illustrates a counterintuitive instance wherein a more
strategic population of decisionmakers is more likely to take action resulting in a worse
collective outcome. The importance of such results to military operations planning is
apparent when considering that this example is reminiscent of how Tuchman (1962)
described the onset of World War I.
Figure 23. Probability of war as a function of τ
We now focus on the subject of learning and consider how player strategies might
evolve when two forces repeatedly engage in brinkmanship. The EWA model is de-
signed to fit observed data. However, if no data exist, a strategist may be able to
qualitatively assess each actor’s tendency toward regret (δi), forgetfulness (φi), and
myopia (κi). Alternatively, they could utilize regressed parameters from other games
if they believe behavior will be similar. Therefore, in this notional example, we utilize
the parameters fit by Camerer et al. (2002) on the continental divide game such that,
for any player i, we have φi = 0.61, κi = 1, and δi = 0.75. The initial attractions
are found by inserting the probabilities derived from the CH model with τ = 1.5 into
equation (40) and solving for Aji (0). Likewise, for simplicity, we assume that for each
player i we have λi = 1 and Ni(0) = 1. One hundred simulations were run for one
hundred interactions each to explore how players of these types might learn in this
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game. The results of these simulations can be seen in Figure 24 .
Row Player
Column Player
Figure 24. Players strategies over time in 100 simulated EWA runs
The plots within Figure 3 illustrate a set of players that diverge from the mixed
strategy equilibrium and converge in the direction of one of the pure strategy equi-
libriums. That is, as one player decreases the probability of holding firm, the other
increases their probability of holding firm, and vice versa. Of note, the lowest the
probability of holding firm reached in all simulations was 0.07. While it never reached
zero, this is not an artifact of the EWA model but of the parameters chosen. For
instance, if the φi-values are increased to 0.81, players reach a zero probability of
holding firm.
The results depicted in Figure 24 are interesting, especially because they show
some instances wherein the players attempt to switch between the true pure strategy
equilibria. However, they also implicitly assume the brinkmanship game is repeatedly
played even if both sides hold firm. Alternatively, if one assusmes that war occurs if
both sides decide to hold firm simultaneously, the histogram in Figure 25 illustrates
the number of time periods our brinkmanship game was played until either a war
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occurred or the 100 limit maximum was reached, in bins of 5 time periods. It can
be observed that the majority of simulations end with a positive outcome: no war
occurs. However, approximately 30% of the simulations end prior to 10 stage game
iterations.
Figure 25. Number of time periods before nuclear exchange
The results of this BGT analysis, in effect, categorize the Nash equilibria. When
the game is first played, the CH model predicts that strategic reasoning enables players
to arrive at the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. As agents repeatedly play the game,
strategies diverge from this profile and converge toward one of the pure Nash equilibria
wherein one player deescalates with certainty. In general, this convergence process
takes time but is complete after 50 iterations of play. This result implies that the risk
of war is at its highest in early stages of brinkmanship and reduces drastically if war
is not triggered at this early juncture. Such an observation is supported by Figure
25 wherein war occurs infrequently after 10 repetitions of the stage game. Therefore,
for this game, the CH and EWA models do not necessarily supplant analysis from a
perfect rationality perspective but augment it.
Target Selection: D-Day Game.
We again consider a higher headquarters examining the ramifications of a par-
ticular course of action on the interaction between a subordinate commander and
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the enemy. Assuming an interaction occurring during Phase 3 of the Continuum of
Military Operations, a subordinate commander is tasked to achieve some objective
and is delegated targeting responsibilities. The enemy wishes to limit the damage of
such aggression by hardening the targeted location.
Such a setting can be modeled in a manner analogous to a simple Colonel Blotto
game. For example, the Allied invasion of German-occupied France in WWII can be
modeled via a modified Matching Pennies game (Crawford, 2003). The Allies and
the Germans can choose to attack or heavily defend, respectively, one of three sites:
Calais, Normandy, or Brittany. If the Allies invade a site the Germans have chosen to
heavily defend, they lose. Otherwise, they win. However, the game differs from the
standard Matching Pennies games in that there are three strategies, it is not zero-
sum, and selection of some strategies may incur an additional cost. The associated
payoff matrix, adapted from Kydd (2015), can found in Table 20.




Calais (0,1) (1,0) (1,0)
Normandy (1-cN ,0) (-cN ,1) (1-cN ,0)
Brittany (1-cB,0) (1-cB,0) (-cB,1)
For illustration, we assume that cN = 0.25 and cB = 0.4. This instance of the D-
Day game does not have a pure strategy (strict) Nash equilibrium, but it has a mixed
equilibrium with p(Calais) = 0.55, p(Normandy) = 0.3, and p(Brittany) = 0.15
for the Germans, and the Allies mixing uniformly over their available strategies.
Under this equilibrium profile, the Allies attack a well-fortified location (i.e., attack
a position heavily defended by the Germans) with probability 0.334.
By it’s nature, the D-Day game can only be played once. As such, we utilize the
CH model to understand how different levels of strategic thought affect the game’s
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likely outcome, and compare these results with analysis under the assumption of
perfect rationality.
Figure 26. Probability Allies attack a well-fortified location as a function of τ
We begin by analyzing the probability that the Allies attack a well-fortified lo-
cation. This probability as a function of τ can be seen in Figure 26. With smaller
τ -values, this probability appears to vary erratically, but begins to behave more sta-
bly as τ increases. However, the probability of attacking a well-fortified location in
the CH model appears to converge to approximately 0.38 as opposed to the 0.334 in
the Nash equilibrium, indicating the CH model is yielding a different strategy. The
resulting CH strategies of each player for τ ∈ {0, 0.1, ..., 50} can be seen in Figures
27 and 28.
The CH model provides different insights than would be expected from an analysis
assuming perfect rationality. At 0-level thinking, the Germans completely random-
ize across their strategies and as they increase in strategic thinking (along with the
Allies), their play begins to diverge from this profile. However, their strategy does
not converge to the mixed equilibrium. In fact, at τ = 50, the Germans are ex-
pected to randomize as follows: p(Calais) = 0.4053, p(Normandy) = 0.5296, and
p(Brittany) = 0.0651. In turn, the Allies, who begin at their equilibrium strategy,
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Figure 27. Allies’ strategies with τ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 50
largely avoid this profile for other levels of τ . For example, at τ = 50, the Allies
are expected to randomize with p(Calais) = 0.3966, p(Normandy) = 0.3824, and
p(Brittany) = 0.2210.
Figure 28. Germans’ strategies with τ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 50
Therefore, unlike the Nuclear Crisis game, the CH model does not appear to
converge towards the Nash equilibrium as τ →∞ for this game. Admittedly, it may
be necessary to increase τ well beyond the ranged tested herein to observe convergence
to the equilibrium, but it may also be the case that equilibrium in this game cannot
be reached by strategic reasoning alone. For the equilibrium strategies to be realized,
it may be necessary for the players to learn. However, given that the D-Day game
occurs in a one-shot setting, learning from repeated play cannot be realized. If this
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holds true, the assumption of perfect rationality would severely inhibit analysis and
lead to incorrect conclusions.
From an operational planning perspective, the CH analysis indicates that a bound-
edly rational subordinate commander might struggle to gain an advantage over the
enemy in this situation. Therefore, if conditions permit the centralization of this
targeting task, the results of Section 5.3 illustrate how knowledge regarding the en-
emy’s strategic thinking ability can be leveraged to develop a strategy that balances
planning between enemy capability and intent.
First Strike Decision: Preemptive War Game.
Schelling (1960) contrasted Cold War interaction between the United States and
the Soviet Union with regard to preemptive strikes via the “reciprocal fear of sur-
prise attack’. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Assurance games have been described as
two special cases of this dynamic (Kydd, 2007). However, such Phase 0 operations
in the Continuum of Military Operations are not a relic of the Cold War. They
have continued into modernity (e.g., the Korean Demilitarized Zone and worldwide
counterterror operations) and, in this example, we consider a higher headquarters
analyzing the effect of a course of action giving rise to such a scenario.
More formally, we illustrate one-shot behavior for both the Prisoner Dilemma and
Assurance games with the CH model, and we demonstrate how descriptive EWA-
parameter profiles can be captured from observed play with the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. The example payoff structures of both games utilized in this analysis are
presented in Tables 21 and 22.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma variant has a single Nash equilibrium of mutual attack
that can be found by the iterated removal of dominated strategies. As such, the CH
algorithm will converge to this point as τ → ∞. This result can be seen in Figure
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Table 21. Preemptive War: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
No Attack Attack
No Attack (3,3) (-1,4)
Attack (4,-1) (0,0)
Table 22. Preemptive War: Assurance Game
No Attack Attack
No Attack (8,8) (1,3)
Attack (3,1) (2,2)
29. As in the Nuclear Crisis game, the symmetry of the payoffs enables this graph to
describe each player’s behavior. However, the pure strategy equilibrium is not reached
until τ is approximately five. At lower levels of thinking, the probability of one side
choosing not to attack may be non-trivial. Therefore, a unilateral attack is conceivable
under bounded rationality, whereas this is not the case under perfect rationality
analysis. These results echo those of the brinkmanship example; the probability of a
collectively worse outcome (i.e., a bilateral attack) increases with the level of thinking.
Figure 29. Probability No Attack in Prisoner’s Dilemma as a function of τ
Conversely, the Assurance game variant has three Nash equilibrium strategies.
Two pure strategy equilibrium with both sides choosing to attack or not attack, and




CH algorithm, in this case, shows very encouraging results. In Figure 30, it can be
observed that as τ increases, the players both converge (due to symmetry) to a 100%
probability of not attacking. Therefore, according to the CH model, the Pareto opti-
mal equilibrium is met as players collectively begin to think more strategically. This is
an interesting result since analysis under perfect rationality is unable to differentiate
between these equilibrium without additional assumptions (e.g., signaling).
The CH model’s results for the Assurance game provide a foil to those of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game; the probability of a collectively better outcome increases
with the level of thinking. Thus, these results illustrate how BGT methods can begin
to quantitatively model individual deterrence situations contingent on the character-
istics of the respective leaders. Furthermore, the Assurance game shows convergence
towards the referenced equilibrium when τ is approximately five, akin to the afore-
mentioned Prisoner’s Dilemma variant. These two variants of the Preemptive War
game stand in contrast to the Nuclear Crisis game which continued to demonstrate
oscillatory behavior at τ = 5.
Figure 30. Probability No Attack in Assurance game as a function of τ
We now turn our attention to the descriptive characterization of players with the
EWA model from empirical data. In the Nuclear Crisis game, we demonstrated in
Section 5.3 how if the appropriate parameters can be estimated for a new game (i.e.,
players are assumed to play one game analogous to another), future learning behavior
can be estimated utilizing the EWA model. However, if instead empirical behavior
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has been recorded, the parameters for the game in question can be estimated directly.
Although the gathering of such data is a non-trivial endeavor, it may be facilitated
if a planner is willing to utilize either noisy data of past conflicts or data that is
sufficiently representative of the operational application.
Andreoni and Miller (1993) performed experiments wherein undergraduate stu-
dents repeatedly played the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Herein, we assume historical
data is assembled such that their strangers data set is representative of mean play
over ten time periods for the friendly and enemy players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game
as in Table 21. Assuming common parameters across players, we utilize a 50-point
spherical packing design on the relevant parameters which we assume are identical
for each player: φi, δi, κi, λi, and A
1
i (0). The respective bounds for these parameters
are set at [0, 1], [0, 1], [0, 1], [0.1, 2.1], and [0.1783, 0.2554]. Of note, the bounds of
A1(0) are selected to ensure the associate probability at time zero is in the range
[0.3, 0.4] when utilizing equation (40). For the sake of illustration, we assume N(0)
is known and equals one. Figure 31 presents the results of the best fit parameter
setting, namely φi = 1, δi = 0.4643, κi = 0.1404, and A
1
i (0) = 0.2554. The quality
of fit is via the sum of squared errors on the mean “No Attack” strategy over 200
iterations of the simulation.
Figure 31. Empirical vs. simulated mean for Prisoner Dilemma fitted EWA
As can be observed, the simulation appears to achieve an adequate fit with a
total sum of squared error value of 0.0051. However, if the CH model is assumed to
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generate initial conditions, an A1i (0) value of 0.4 corresponds to a τ = 0.22. This
result appears to indicate that, in the experiment conducted by Andreoni and Miller
(1993), participants began by selecting strategies nearly randomly. Such results are
not necessarily indicative of operational planning problems, but they do demonstrate
how insights with regard to levels of strategic thought can be gained by observing
empirical data.
Incorporating Behavioral Uncertainty.
Unless an planner is certain of the underlying behavioral parameters which de-
scribe a specific interaction, BGT does not provide deterministic results. It shares
this characteristic with standard game theory when multiple equilibria exist.
Since equilibriums are merely fixed points, mathematically we cannot determine
which equilibrium is most likely to occur. However, this conundrum does not nec-
essarily exist when utilizing BGT solution concepts. That is, if planner is able to
quantify the behavioral uncertainty in a model, quantitative confidence measures of
the resulting interactions can be generated. Herein, we discuss the ramifications of
such an approach when a higher headquarters is exercising either decentralized or
centralized control.
Consider the CH model as utilized in the previous examples wherein the planners
contemplate the effect of a particular course of action on the interaction between a sub-
ordinate friendly commander and an enemy commander. Therein, we adopted a naive
approach with respect to behavioral uncertainty and assumed that τ ∈ {0, 0.1, ..., 50}
with no additional information. Under these conditions, the brinkmanship example
of Section 5.3 bounds the probability either agent deescalates between [0.5,0.9]. If
probabilistic information is available on the distribution of τ , this information can be
further leveraged to create a probability distribution on the respective players’ mixed
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strategies, thereby quantifying the behavioral uncertainty. For example, assume τ is
distributed consistent with the results of Camerer et al. (2004) with a mean equal to
1.5, and the majority of its mass between [1,2]. Such a distribution could take the





, τ ∈ {0, 0.01, ..., 0.99},
9
1010
, τ ∈ {1, 1.01, ..., 2},
5
480000
, τ ∈ {2.01, 2.02, ..., 50}.
(41)
This information can be leveraged to create probability mass functions of mixed
strategies for the players (rounded to the second decimal) as in Figure 32. By ex-
plicitly recognizing and modeling the stochasticity inherent in the interaction, the
resulting explanations derived from the game theoretic analysis mathematically ac-
knowledge that empirical deviations may occur and provide expected magnitudes of
these deviations. Moreover, they can be constructed for all relevant actors to provide
planners with a more informed estimate of a course of action’s effects.
Figure 32. Row Player Probability Mass Function for Likelihood of Deescalation
Furthermore, such characterizations of behavioral uncertainty are extremely useful
when the higher headquarters exercises centralized control over a given task. That
is, they enable a balance to be obtained between planning against enemy capability
164
and planning against enemy intent. Haywood (1954) showed that planning against an
enemy’s capability is an inherently conservative approach akin to a maximin strategy.
When utilizing a capability-based approach, “a commander is required to assume
that the enemy can discover his decision and will adopt the most effective strategy in
opposition”. Conversely, planning against an enemy’s intent requires a commander
to anticipate the adversary’s decision and exploit it. If the commander’s assessment
of the enemy is correct, they may achieve a greater reward than a capability-based
approach; however, if the assessment is incorrect, they may also suffer a greater defeat.
Therefore, in what follows we describe three mixed approaches to the capability-
and intent-based approaches depending upon available information. The uncertainty
around the enemy’s intent is quantified, and an action is taken to maximize the
minimum payoff across this uncertainty.
Consider the D-Day example, but assume the perspective of the Allies. Since the
“best response [CH] dictates corresponds to what the highest-step thinkers do”, the
Allies can identify their preferred strategy by calculating the actions of an arbitrar-
ily large M -step thinker. If the Allies accept that their estimate of τ is subject to
error, they may identify robust solutions by quantitatively characterizing this uncer-
tainty. Such characterization may take the form of an uncertainty set (i.e., a range
of values), a probability distribution, or an ambiguity set (i.e., a set of probability
distributions), and the resulting robust solutions are akin to those derived from the
operations research techniques of robust optimization, stochastic programming, and
distributionally robust optimization.
Table 23 provides the data for an example of these modeling approaches, assum-
ing τ is in the uncertainty set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Absent probability information and
assuming the payoffs are adequately representative of reality, the Allies should select
a robust policy by maximizing their minimum payoff. That is, they would attack
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Table 23. Allies’ Payoff and Uncertainty Information
Values for Pure Strategies Probability Distributions
τ E(Value Calais) E(Normandy) E(Brittany) p1(τ) p2(τ) p3(τ)
0 0.667 0.417 0.267 0.05 0.10 0.05
1 0.491 0.505 0.355 0.10 0.05 0.05
2 0.271 0.615 0.465 0.50 0.30 0.20
3 0.318 0.499 0.534 0.25 0.25 0.20
4 0.432 0.348 0.570 0.05 0.01 0.40
5 0.629 0.135 0.587 0.05 0.20 0.10
Calais for a maximin payoff of 0.271. Conversely, if the probability distribution p1(τ)
is accepted as truth, the Allies should attack Normandy for a maximum expected
payoff (i.e., expectation over both τ and E(π(sji )) of 0.528. However, if the Allies
believe there is additional error in the probability distribution estimate and consider
three distinct variants (i.e., p1(τ), p2(τ), and p3(τ)), a distributionally robust policy
entails attacking Brittany to attain a maximin expected value of at least 0.472.
Analysis of this form is not unique to the CH model. By characterizing the
uncertainty in the EWA model (or any of the models discussed in Section 5.4), similar
examinations can be performed. Therefore, BGT does not only provide analysis
informed by human psychology, it also allows for the development of more nuanced
decision doctrines. Military decisions need not be based on a binary interpretation
between capabilities and intent, but can be informed by both.
5.4 Alternative Game Models and BGT Modeling Approaches
The games analyzed in Section 5.3 were considered to ensure their comprehen-
sion by a broad readership. However, our choice of illustration does not indicate the
inapplicability of BGT to more complicated models. CH can be utilized for games
represented in normal form. Scholarship concerning arms races and power transition
(e.g. Baliga and Sjöström, 2004; Fearon, 2011, 2018), or those utilizing the Colonel
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Blotto framework as a structural basis (e.g. Roberson, 2006; Golman and Page, 2009)
are promising venues for future application. Other models of conflict that emphasize
bargaining (e.g. Powell, 2015; Slantchev, 2005), especially those assuming imperfect
information, may be analyzed with CH when represented in normal form. Such be-
havioral analysis is especially relevant given the empirical results of LeVeck et al.
(2014), who showed the “irrational” behavior of political elites in bargaining situa-
tions. The methods described herein are also useful for studying repeated play (e.g.
Fearon, 2018), when learning is a foremost consideration. For example, they can be
adopted as an alternative to the analysis proposed by Fearon (1994) if time is dis-
cretized. Initial game play would be determined utilizing CH, and the subsequent
learning process modeled with EWA.
Moreover, we focused primarily on the concepts of step-by-step reasoning and
learning in a military operations with normal form (one-shot or repeated) games.
However, many other behavioral solution concepts exist for other game structures.
For example, the extended form deterrence games of Powell (1990) and Zagare and
Kilgour (2000), or the bargaining models of Slantchev (2005) and Powell (2015) can be
analyzed utilizing the Agent QRE model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). Likewise,
alternative EWA models that incorporate dynamic parameters, strategic teaching, or
reputation generation can also be considered in repeated play (Camerer et al., 2002).
These algorithms can be adapted to include emotional effects, perceptual error, and
uncertainty by perturbing the decision rules. For instance, in a manner analogous
to trembling hand equilibrium, it may be assumed that the aforementioned factors
cause a player to err in their selection of perceived best response strategies. However,
to maintain a behaviorist justification, further empirical testing on these adaptations
would be required.
Additionally, this research illustrates the need for more empirical work with re-
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gard to other considerations in behavioral game theory. For efficient use in military
operations planning, it is desirable to empirically test how group deliberation, exper-
tise, and other demographic factors affect the τ -values in the CH model, and/or the
parameters in the EWA model. Intuitively, one can postulate that group dynamics
affect both the reasoning and learning processes, but there does not currently exist
any empirical research to confirm this hypothesis. Moreover, the CH model assumes
that τ is population-based but, in a military operations planning setting, the effect
of player specific τ -values is a promising area of future work.
Other behavioral constructs informed by cultural understanding are likely imper-
ative in the study of deterrence with regard to the evolved character of 21st Century
military operations. Henry Kissinger noted that “the classical notion of deterrence
was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would
recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesnt operate in any com-
parable way” (Goddard, 2010). However, behavioral game theory may provide the
requisite tools to garner insight in this new era of deterrence modeling. For instance,
Henrich (200) described how members of the indigenous Machiguenga tribe of Peru
behaved decidedly different than players from Los Angeles when playing an Ultima-
tum game. Camerer (2011) provided an extensive literature review of other findings
elucidating this cultural effect, describing how some demographic groups tended to
behave in a manner seemingly inconsistent with perfect rationality predictions. How-
ever, the author concluded that the behavior originated from a misunderstanding
of the player’s utility functions and could be described with alternative structures
including emotional factors.
Therefore, if a suicide bomber is still governed by a value calculus, there is likely
some underlying systematic thought process upon which it is rooted, even if it initially
may appear irrational. The underlying logic need not be consistent for it to be
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understood, confronted, and deterred (Williams, 2008; Caplan, 2006). This behavioral
framework of deterrence focuses on the individual rather than the organizational level,
but given the unconventional structure of terrorist groups, this may be a necessary
evolution of thought and a productive area of future research.
5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
This research has taken a first step in integrating behavioral game theory with
the planning of military operations. To do so, we reviewed and summarized various
bodies of work in BGT, and revisited many classic interstate conflict games to demon-
strate how varying insights can be gained through modern, behavioral game theoretic
solution concepts. The application of BGT on such fundamental, foundational models
depicts in an accessible manner their potential value to military operations planning
for an audience having modest or extensive understanding of either military planning
or game theory. However, they also indicate the need for future theoretical BGT re-
search, as some more complicated game forms do not yet have behavioral foundations
(e.g., stochastic games).
In general, BGT techniques do not supplant the traditional Nash equilibrium
solutions but supplement them. As seen in Section 5.3, CH and EWA can provide
additional context for games having multiple equilibria by labeling each equilibrium
as profiles met through reasoning or learning, respectively. Alternatively, as in the D-
Day example, strategic thinking by itself may not allow for an equilibrium profile to be
reached, implying that for some interactions occurring only once, insights drawn from
perfect rationality analysis are inappropriate and may lead to incorrect conclusions.
Finally, as illustrated in Section 5.3, BGT is well-suited to incorporate uncertainty
into the underlying analysis, allowing for the development of a balanced capability-
and-intent based decision doctrine.
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In aggregate, our illustrative instances demonstrate a set of tools that provide
utility to inform military operations planning, and provide behavioral game theorists
with motivation to study the effects of group dynamics in strategic reasoning and
learning for this context. Behavioral game theory removes the deterrent of homo eco-
nomicus that limited the use of standard game theory in military operations planning,
supplanting it with a more representative analytic framework focused on describing
actual competitive interaction via the incorporation of psychological factors.
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VI. Identifying Behaviorally Robust Maximin Strategies for
Normal-form Games under Varying Forms of Uncertainty
Abstract
Recent advances in behavioral game theory address a persistent criticism of tra-
ditional solution concepts that rely upon perfect rationality: equilibrium results are
often inconsistent with empirical evidence. For normal form games, the Cognitive
Hierarchy model is a solution concept based upon a sequential reasoning process,
yielding accurate characterizations of experimental human game play. These charac-
terizations are enabled by a statistically estimated parameter describing the average
number of reasoning steps players utilize. If an arbitrary player were to know this
parameter ex ante, they could maximize their expected payoff accordingly. However,
given the nature of statistical estimation, such parameter point estimates are un-
known prior to experimentation and are susceptible to error afterward. Therefore, we
consider the normal form game as a decision problem from the perspective of an arbi-
trary player who is uncertain of opponents’ reasoning ability. Assuming such a player
is confronting a set of boundedly rational opponents whose play is characterized by
the Cognitive Hierarchy model, we develop a suite of six mathematical programming
formulations to maximize the player’s minimum payoff, and we identify the appro-
priate formulation for the level of information regarding an opponent population’s
reasoning ability. By leveraging robust optimization, stochastic programming, and
distributionally robust optimization techniques, our set of models yields prescriptive
strategies of play in a normal form game. A software package implementing these
constructs is developed and applied to illustrative instances, demonstrating how be-
haviorally robust strategies vary in accordance with the underlying uncertainty.
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6.1 Introduction
Game theory, the study of strategic interaction between self-interested decision-
makers, is arguably one of the most significant mathematical constructs of the 20th
Century. However, a complete understanding of one of the field’s most fundamental
question is paradoxically elusive: In a normal form setting, how should a human agent
play a game against human opponents?
An answer to this question depends on the game structure and the agent’s beliefs
about their opponents. For instance, a Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy profile such
that no player can improve their payoff by unilateral deviation. If an agent believes
their opponents to be utility maximizers who are mutually consistent (i.e., perfectly
rational), then their Nash equilibrium profile can be viewed as a prescriptive strategy
of game play (Camerer et al., 2004). Unfortunately, there exists much experimental
evidence illustrating that humans are not perfectly rational (e.g., Stahl and Wilson,
1995; Selten, 1998; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), and that Nash equilibrium profiles are
not necessarily predictive of human strategies in games (Camerer, 2011).
Any game theoretic solution technique relying upon perfect rationality may there-
fore be unable to adequately inform how a human agent should interact with oth-
ers. While this challenge seems to imply that some other theoretical background
(e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) must be adapted, the maximin concept is unique
among classical game theory in its resilience to the violation of the perfect rationality
assumption.
A maximin strategy is one that maximizes an agent’s minimum payoff over all
possible combinations of opponents’ strategies. In many game theoretic texts, the
importance of the maximin solution concept is conveyed via its relation to the Nash
equilibrium. Namely, by utilizing the results set forth by von Neumann (1928) it
can be observed that a maximin strategy in a two-player, zero sum game is a Nash
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equilibrium. Similar results have recently been generalized to a special form of n-
player games: zero-sum polymatrix games (Cai et al., 2016). However, the maximin
concept is interesting in its own right as a robust strategy that guards against a
worst case outcome. It does not make any assumption regarding the psychology of
an agent’s opponents and, for this reason, is resilient to rationality violations. The
tradeoff for this resilience is that the maximin strategy may guard against improbable
oppositional action and provide an overly conservative strategy.
In operations research, robustness has been utilized as a “decision criteri[on] other
than optimality” (Lempert and Collins, 2007). It is useful to do so when model
parameters and/or the problem structure is uncertain. As uncertainty regarding
either parameters or structure may significantly affect whether an a priori identified
solution is, in fact, optimal, robustness is used as a safeguard to ensure a solution is
prescribed that performs well across a range of problem instantiations.
Of particular interest to this research, solutions resilient to parameter value changes
in a mathematical program can be found utilizing robust optimization, stochastic pro-
gramming, or distributionally robust optimization approaches, depending upon the
nature of the parametric uncertainty (Bertsimas et al., 2011). Within a robust opti-
mization (RO) context, the uncertainty associated with parameter values in a math-
ematical program is characterized via uncertainty sets. These uncertainty sets can
assume a variety of forms (e.g., finite, interval-based, polyhedral); however, they all re-
frain from utilizing probabilistic information (Goerigk and Schöbel, 2016). Generally
speaking, research in RO seeks to identify a reformulation of the original mathemat-
ical program that incorporates parameteric uncertainty (i.e., a robust counterpart)
and provides a “worst-case” solution that is always feasible and performs well with
respect to the objective function.
Stochastic programming (SP) is applied in a similar context, but it assumes that
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there exists a probability distribution over the uncertainty set. By allowing for in-
feasibility of some parameteric instantiations, SP methods leverage the probabilistic
information via the expected value operator to identify solutions that are of high
quality and feasible in expectation.
By contrast, distributionally robust optimization (DRO) can be viewed as a “ro-
bust” generalization of SP wherein a set of probability distributions (i.e., an ambiguity
set) over the uncertainty set is considered. As with uncertainty sets, ambiguity sets
may be characterized in a variety of manners (e.g., moment-based, polytopic) and,
akin to RO, DRO guards against a worst-case instantiation. Such a solution is of high
quality and feasible in expectation for any possible distribution in the ambiguity set
(Gabrel et al., 2014).
In game theory, uncertainty with respect to payoffs has been addressed in multiple
ways. For example, games having uncertain payoffs characterized in terms analogous
to either RO or SP were explored by Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and Harsanyi
(1967), respectively. Likewise, uncertainty is considered in games of imperfect infor-
mation. Solution concepts, in any of these settings, also assume players seek robust
strategies.
Conversely, it is assumed herein that the game’s uncertainty derives not from
the potential payoffs (i.e., these are assumed known) but from the human oppo-
nents’ respective mental frameworks. These adversaries are boundedly rational, and
their behavior cannot be predicted perfectly. When playing a normal form game in
this setting, it is desirable to adopt a strategy that performs well against such uncer-
tainty. The maximin strategy is one such robust strategy to hedge against opponents’
bounded rationality; however, as previously noted, it may be overly conservative. To
address such uncertainty, this work introduces a suite of mathematical programs
that collectively modify a player’s maximin strategy to account for variable oppo-
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nent rationality by adapting the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model of Camerer et al.
(2004) to robust optimization, stochastic programming, and distributionally robust
optimization settings, alternatively. In this way, we are able to leverage behavioral
game theory and multiple optimization sub-disciplines, thereby contributing to the
emerging literature of behavioral robustness in games (Brown et al., 2014; Nguyen
et al., 2016a,b). The CH model is a behavioral construct describing players by the
number of steps of strategic thought they are able to compute of the form described
by Schelling (1960): “He thinks we think he thinks we think... he thinks we think
he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must”. CH is an effective tool for
modeling human behavior in normal form games (Camerer et al., 2004; Rogers et al.,
2009; Georganas et al., 2015) and is supported by neuroscientific research detailing
correlation between brain activity and differing types of strategic thought predicted
by the CH model (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Camerer et al., 2005; Bhatt et al., 2010;
Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
In this research, we analyze a game not as a holistic system, as is traditionally
considered in the literature, but as a decision problem from the perspective of an
arbitrary player. This perspective aligns our work with the contemporary focus of
the study of games in artificial intelligence, wherein supervised learning techniques are
utilized to inform an agent’s preferred strategy (e.g., Moravč́ık, Matej and Schmid,
Martin and Burch, Neil and Lisý, Viliam and Morrill, Dustin and Bard, Nolan and
Davis, Trevor and Waugh, Kevin and Johanson, Michael and Bowling, Michael ,
2017). However, our research is distinct in that a preferred strategy is developed
through behavioral theories versus supervised learning techniques, and uncertainty is
explored through uncertainty or ambiguity sets instead of experimentation.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the CH
modeling framework and formally defines the requisite terminology for the mathemat-
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ical programming formulations presented in successive sections. Section 6.3 provides
mathematical programming formulations to find maximin strategies in robust opti-
mization, stochastic programming, and distributionally robust optimization settings,
respectively, considering either finite or interval-based uncertainty sets for a scenario-
defining CH model parameter. Section 6.4 introduces the software package developed
for these situations and applies it to multiple games in order to illustrate the effect
of uncertainty on behaviorally robust play. Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the implica-
tions of this research and its potential for broader application.
6.2 Review of the Cognitive Hierarchy Model
Selten (1998) argued that “the natural way of looking at game situations...is not
based on circular concepts, but rather on a step-by-step reasoning procedure”. Fur-
thermore, Schelling (1960) referred to the naturalness of this reasoning structure with
regard to the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”, and he noted that it could be for-
malized using a potentially infinite set of probabilities composed of the products of
the following event probabilities and their reciprocals: P1 (i.e., the probability the
opponent prefers to attack), P2 (i.e., the probability opponent thinks we prefer to
attack), P3 (i.e., the probability opponent thinks I believe they prefer to attack), and
so on. In Schelling’s estimation, “the trouble with the formulation is that nothing
generates the series” and that “each probability is an ad hoc estimate” (Schelling,
1960).
Camerer et al. (2004) reinterpreted this concept of step-by-step reasoning into a
tractable form with the development of the Cognitive Hierarchy model for normal
form games. Their work reinforced the hypothesis of Selten (1998) regarding the
human use of sequential logic in strategic interaction via a myriad of experiments
illustrating the CH model’s goodness of fit to empirical data from human-subject
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testing.
Within the CH modeling framework, players are assumed to be defined both
by the number of reasoning steps they use to select an action and by their beliefs
regarding the number of steps utilized by other players. It is assumed that players are
overconfident; they do not realize their opponents may use an equivalent or greater
number of reasoning steps (i.e., a k-step player believes all others are (k-1)-step
players or below). The behavior of a group of boundedly rational players is computed
recursively starting with 0-step players up to some large k-value (kmax). Camerer
et al. (2004) assumed 0-step players do not think strategically and adopt a strategy
that randomizes uniformly over their action space, 1-step players compute responses
assuming all opponents are 0-step thinkers, and so on.
A game is characterized within the CH framework by some true probability dis-
tribution on the number of reasoning steps players utilize. The Poisson distribution
with mean τ is generally used, and its conventional adoption within CH is supported
by the empirical testing conducted by Camerer et al. (2004). A high value of τ indi-
cates players use more reasoning steps, on average. Since players are overconfident,
they cannot perceive this true distribution. As such, each k-step player forms their

















where fτ (h) is the true probability of an h-step player being encountered from the
underlying Poisson distribution with rate τ . With this information, a player’s action
is selected to maximize their expected payoff. More formally, player i chooses an




















i )] is player i’s expected payoff for playing action j, given player i is a
k-step player; π(sji , s
j′
−i) is player i’s payoff for selecting action j when his opponents
collectively play the action vector j′; m−i is the number of possible opponent action
vectors; and Ph(s
j′
−i) is the probability that h-step players commit to the action vector
j′. A k-step player adopts the pure strategy that maximizes their expected payoff. If
multiple actions are found to achieve the same maximum payoff, a player is assumed
to utilize a strategy that randomizes equally among them.
Therefore, the CH model formalizes the sequential reasoning process into a tractable
form by limiting its depth and forcing convergence as k increases. When k grows
sufficiently large relative to τ , the actions of a k-step and a (k+1)-step player are
indistinguishable; the players have the same beliefs and adopt the same strategy. As
such, given a specific τ , the model can be solved by recursively solving equation (43),
selecting a best response, and iterating across players until a sufficiently large k-value
(kmax) is reached. This recursive nature makes the assumed actions of 0-step players
foundational to the analysis and results of the CH model. Alternative assumptions
for 0-step player actions have been utilized in recent work (e.g., Chong et al., 2016);
however, in this research we utilize the assumptions associated with the original CH
model and set aside consideration of such alternative frameworks for future research.
6.3 Behaviorally Robust Strategies in Normal Form Games
We utilize the CH model to modify the maximin strategy such that a player of
interest can select a high quality strategy given their beliefs regarding the strategic
thinking ability of the population from which their opponent(s) derive. As noted by
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Camerer et al. (2004), “if the Poisson-CH model is correct for a given game, then the
best response the theory dictates corresponds to what the highest-step thinkers do”.
Therefore, if τ were known a priori, the player of interest would need only to run
the CH model and adopt the strategy chosen by an M -step thinker, where M is a
sufficiently large integer to observe convergence in successive step thinkers’ strategies.
In practice, τ is likely unknown to a player beforehand since it must be estimated
from observed data. Fortunately, Camerer et al. (2004) showed τ to exhibit reasonable
regularity patterns such that one can reasonably bound its value a priori within some
uncertainty set, U(τ). With this information, an M -step player i no longer associates
a scalar payoff EM [π(s
j
i )] with action s
j
i but a set of payoffs for each τ ∈ U(τ), where
EM [π(s
j
































, ∀τ ∈ U(τ), (44b)
since player i’s subjective beliefs about both encountering h-step players, gM(h, τ),
and their opponents use of the action vector j′, Ph(s
j′
−i, τ), depend upon τ .
Consider the column player’s choice in game 10 from the Stahl and Wilson (1995)
data set as depicted in Table 24. If it is assumed that this player is unaware of previous
testing on the game, and they utilize the point estimate for new games provided
by Camerer et al. (2004) of τ = 1.5, their calculated best response is sBcol (i.e., B)
because it yields the largest expected payoff of EM [π(s
B
col)] = 35.5. Conversely, Figure
33 illustrates the expected payoff associated with each action and τ -value should the
player assume τ is uncertain but exists within U(τ) = {0, 0.025, 0.05, ..., 12}. Whereas
the column player could select an alternative uncertainty set, a subset of the interval
[0, 12] is selected for illustration because it contains the τ estimates from Camerer
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et al. (2004) across the 12 games tested by Stahl and Wilson (1995).
Table 24. Game 10 from Stahl and Wilson (1995)
T M B
T (45,45) (50,41) (21,40)
M (41,50) (0,0) (40,100)
B (40,21) (100,40) (0,0)
It can be observed from Figure 33 that the consideration of the underlying un-
certainty regarding τ complicates the column player’s decision. There does not exist
a dominating single action across all levels of τ ∈ U(τ). For the set of intervals
{[0,0.30], [0.625,2.425], [2.925,2.975], [3.475,4.275], [6.1,6.225]} action sBcol is the best
response, whereas sTcol yields the greatest expected payoff otherwise.
According to the analysis of Camerer et al. (2004), the empirical data for this
game collected by Stahl and Wilson (1995) yields an estimate of τ = 11.33. As shown
in Figure 33, a column player selecting a best response of sBcol for a point estimate of
τ̂ = 1.5 would attain the least expected payoff when τ = 11.33. Therefore, to prescribe
a strategy when τ is uncertain, it is desirable to utilize all available information
regarding τ to reduce the likelihood of such unfavorable outcomes.
To do so, we first note that, for a known τ -value, player i’s optimal strategy in

















i ) = 1, (45b)
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi, (45c)
wherein the decision variables PM(s
j
i ) determine player i’s strategy, possibly mixed,
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Figure 33. M-step Column Player Expected Payoffs in Stahl & Wilson Game 10
among the mi available actions.
With an unknown τ -value, the uncertainty in problem Q stems from two col-
lections of intermediate parameters in equation (44a). Both player i’s perceived
probability of encountering h-step players, gM(h, τ), and the probability player i’s
opponents will collectively select action vector j′ when utilizing h-steps of thought,
Ph(s
j′
−i, τ), are uncertain because they are functions of τ . Whereas these terms can be
combined into a single uncertain parameter, as depicted in equation (44b), it is use-
ful to represent each intermediate parameter individually for the development of the
ensuing mathematical programs since they behave differently across τ -values. More
specifically, as discussed in Section 6.3, gM(h, τ) is continuous whereas Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) is a
step function.
In the remainder of this section we illustrate that, if player i can characterize
the uncertainty around τ , then behaviorally robust strategies for the game can be
developed. Associated with a Poisson distribution, the non-negative parameter τ is
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assumed to be bounded above by T , a sufficiently large real number1, in accordance
with the empirical evidence published by Camerer et al. (2004). Moreover, because
τ ∈ [0, T ] is a unidimensional parameter, its associated uncertainty set, U(τ), is
considered to be either finite or interval-based.
For both of these scenarios, we illustrate how varying levels of knowledge about
these uncertainty sets can be incorporated into strategy development. We provide
RO formulations to select maximin strategies when probabilistic information about τ
is unknown, SP formulations when a probability distribution over the uncertainty set
is available, and DRO formulations when an ambiguity set of probability distributions
is available.
Finite Uncertainty Set over τ .
If U(τ) is assumed to be some finite subset of [0, T ], then Problem Q can be
reformulated for RO, SP, and DRO. For such a finite uncertainty, the CH model
should be run iteratively for each τ ∈ U(τ) to identify the associated parameters
(i.e., gk(h, τ) and Ph(s
j′
−i, τ)) and inform the corresponding optimization model. As
such, for a robust optimization framework and a finite uncertainty set U(τ), Problem


















i ) = 1, (46c)
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi, (46d)
1M should be selected such that Ek[π(s
j
i ), τ ] has approximately converged in k when τ = T (i.e.,
fτ (k) are sufficiently small for k > M).
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wherein v represents the minimum payoff associated with a strategy over all τ ∈ U(τ).
The formulation is linear and, when solved to optimality, identifies a strategy PM(s
j
i )
that maximizes the lower bound v.
However, Problem R1 does not incorporate any probabilistic information regarding
U(τ) and, in situations where this information is available, Problem R1 may identify
solutions which are overly conservative. For example, Camerer et al. (2004) found
that τ ∈ [1, 2] characterized empirical behavior in a large density of their experiments.
If this information is utilized by player i to inform the estimation of a probability
distribution F over U(τ), then a behaviorally optimized strategy can be found via





















i ) = 1, (47b)
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi. (47c)
This formulation retains the general structure of R1 but leverages the proba-
bilistic information regarding τ with the expectation operator EF . For notational
consistency, the domain of PM(s
j
i ) remains unchanged; however, we note that an
optimal solution will exist in pure strategies, i.e., where PM(s
j∗




i ), τ ]} and 0 otherwise.
If player i has a high degree of confidence in the probability distribution F , then
the strategy attained by optimally solving Problem S1 should be utilized. Unfor-
tunately, the formulation of Problem S1 requires a single estimate F of the true
distribution of τ over U(τ), and it does not address the effects of estimation error.
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To safeguard against estimation error, player i can instead consider an ambiguity set
F of distributions. Empirical results from the work of Camerer et al. (2004) can be













wherein pτ is the probability that some τ in U(τ) is the true Poission distribution
parameter, c1 is the identified mean of the unknown distribution (e.g., 1.5 as refer-
enced previously), and c2 ∈ [0, 1] is some pre-specified, lower cumulative density of
τ between [c3, c4] (e.g., [1, 2] as previously discussed). Equipped with such an ambi-
guity set, a DRO variant of Problem Q having a finite set U(τ) can be constructed























i ) = 1,
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi.
Solving DR optimally yields the best strategy for player i, assuming the worst
possible distribution F ∈ F for each feasible strategy. A moment based ambiguity
set, as described in equation (48), is a type of polyhedral uncertainty as defined by
Bertsimas et al. (2011) and, since both the objective function and the ambiguity set
constraints are linear, the bilevel formulation can be reformulated into a single-level
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formulation by taking the dual of the lower-level minimization problem. Because


























pτ ≥ 0, ∀τ ∈ U(τ),
and its dual substituted into the original program to obtain the DRO variant of





c1z1 + c2z2 + z3







i ), τ ], τ ∈ [c3, c4],












i ) = 1,
PM(s
j




This DRO formulation complements the RO and SP variants, allowing a player i to
form a behaviorally robust strategy, depending on the level of uncertainty with respect
to the parameter τ . The formulations are linear and can be solved to optimality using
any number of available commercial optimization solvers. However, these features are
made possible by the assumption that U(τ) is a finite, countable set.
Should the assumption of a finite uncertainty set over τ ∈ [0, T ] not hold and
the uncertainty set is instead interval-based, two options exist to identify a CH-based
strategy for player i. First, the methods for a finite uncertainty set can be leveraged as
heuristics. Subject to the availability of computational resources, a high granularity
of finite values for τ ∈ [0, T ] can be examined within Problems R1, S1, or DR1,
accordingly. We implement such a procedure in the BRMaximin toolbox discussed
in Section 6.4. Alternatively, Section 6.3 presents RO, SP, and DRO formulations to
directly accommodate an interval-based uncertainty set, U(τ).
Interval Uncertainty Set over τ .
If U(τ) is an interval-based uncertainty set, analogous mathematical programming
representations can be created to form behaviorally robust strategies. However, the
finer fidelity of U(τ) is accompanied by an increase in complexity both to formulate
and solve the corresponding math programs.
We first examine how to create a behaviorally robust strategy within a RO frame-


























Of the four components on the right-hand side, PM(s
j






is a constant, and both gk(h, τ) and Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) are uncertain intermediate parameters
of the primary uncertainty τ . As such, a solution to the RO variant of Problem Q for
an interval-based uncertainty set U(τ), is determined by the product of the functions
gk(h, τ) and Ph(s
j′
−i, τ).
Based on the assumptions of Camerer et al. (2004), for given values of k and h,
gk(h, τ) is a rational function (i.e., the quotient of two polynomials) on τ ∈ U(τ) and,
since the denominator is always defined for τ > −1, is continuously differentiable on
U(τ), though it need not be convex. Moreover, the probability player i assigns to









where j′d is the action of each opponent d in the vector j
′, and Ph(s
j′d
d , τ) is the
probability any player d utilizing h-levels of thought (h < M) assigns to action j′d. Per
the assumptions of Camerer et al. (2004), Ph(s
j′d
d , τ) can only take on a finite number
of values; more formally, Ph(s
j′d
d , τ) : U(τ) 7→ {0, 1md ,
1
md−1
, ..., 1}. This implies that
Ph(s
j′d
d , τ) is a simple function. Likewise, since the product of simple functions is also





i ), τ ] is not guaranteed to be smooth or convex on U(τ) because
it is composed of the sumproduct of gk(h, τ) and Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) which are rational and
simple functions on U(τ), respectively. If only pure strategies were to be considered,
algorithms for non-smooth, non-convex unconstrained optimization, such as gradient
sampling (e.g., Burke et al., 2018) or quasi-Netwon methods (e.g., Lewis and Overton,
2013), could be applied to each action, j = 1, ...,mi, yielding the minimum values for
each EM [π(s
j
i ), τ ] over U(τ). A RO solution in this case would be the action j
∗ with
the greatest minimum value of EM [π(s
j
i ), τ ].
Although such a procedure yields a behaviorally robust strategy, its solution is a
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special case of the RO variant of Problem Q having interval-based uncertainty since
only pure strategies are considered feasible.
A general RO formulation, that allows for mixed strategies can be modeled in-
cumbent upon Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) being not just a simple function but also a step function
having values P µh (s
j′
−i) over a finite number γ of intervals that cover U(τ), such that
Uµ(τ) is the closure of any such interval µ . By considering the closure we relax the
assumption that opponents mix equally over actions that yield an equivalent maxi-
mum payoff, and consider alternative supports wherein a probability of zero may be
given to some combinations of these actions. Therefore, the resulting formulation is
less sensitive to the CH assumptions and is more tractable computationally.

































µ = 1, ..., γ, (50a)
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi.





2 the minimum and maximum values of gM(h, τ) in some
interval Uµ(τ) for some h. These can be found using any number of unconstrained
optimization techniques (e.g., line search) for continuous functions. By the Interme-
diate Value Theorem, the resulting interval-based uncertainty set of gM(h, τ) for each
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instantiation of constraint (50a) is [∆hµ1 ,∆
hµ
2 ]. Therefore, we can consider gM(h, τ)
directly by introducing the decision variables gµM(h) to represent their worst-case val-
ues in each interval Uµ(τ). Each optimization problem embedded within constraint





















subject to gµM(h) ≥ ∆hµ1 , h = 0, ...,M − 1, (51a)
− gµM(h) ≥ −∆hµ2 , h = 0, ...,M − 1, (51b)
and, by taking the dual of each such formulation, in a manner similar to Problem
DR1, we can express the robust counterpart of Problem Q with an interval-based




















1 −∆hµ2 zhµ2 ≥ v, µ = 1, ..., γ, (52a)
















µ = 1, ..., γ, h = 0, ...,M − 1, (52b)
zhµ1 , z
hµ
2 ≥ 0, µ = 1, ..., γ, h = 0, ...,M − 1, (52c)
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi,
wherein zhµ1 and z
hµ
1 are the dual variables associated with constraints (51a) and
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(51b), respectively. This single level reformulation is linear and can be readily solved
utilizing a commercial solver.
However, as previously mentioned, the form of Problem R2 depends upon Ph(s
j′
−i, τ)
being a step function, a condition proven to hold in Theorem 6.3.1.
For notational ease, we define Φhi(τ) to be the upper envelope of the collection of
functions {Eh[s1i , τ ], ..., Eh[smii , τ ]} for a given player i and level of thought h < M as





i , τ)] . (53)
As such, Ph(s
j
i , τ) > 0 for a given τ̄ ∈ U(τ) if and only if j ∈ argmax{Eh[π(sji ), τ̄ ]},
i.e., due to the assumptions of Camerer et al. (2004) regarding the selection of per-
cieved best responses.
Theorem 6.3.1 For any given action vector j′ and h < M , Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) is a step
function in τ .
Proof For any player d, action w, and h = 0, P0(s
w
d , τ) =
1
md
∀τ ∈ U(τ), and is trivially



















implying that Φ1d(τ) has no break points, Ph(s
w
d , τ) is a step function for w = 1, ...,md,
and P1(s
j′
−i, τ) is a step function as well.
Assume that Ph(s
w





ν , τ), and it has corresponding set of intervals of Uy(τ), y = 1, ..., λy covering















piecewise continuous in U(τ), and a rational function on each Uy(τ).
Call D the set of degenerate Uy(τ) intervals. If τ ∈ Uy(τ) ⊆ D, then Φhd(τ) is found via
equation (53) and, as such, Pn+1(s
w




|W ∗| for w ∈ W ∗ and zero otherwise,
where W ∗ is the set of actions with an expected payoff defining Φhd(τ).
Call N the set of non-degenerate Uy(τ) intervals. If τ ∈ Uy(τ) ⊆ N , we note the
following. For any two actions, w1 and w2, we can write En+1[π(s
w1






d ), τ ] =
D3(τ)
D4(τ)
, where Dδ(τ) are each polynomials of order Ḋδ. The points of
intersection of these two functions can be found by solving
En+1[π(s
w1




D2(τ)D4(τ) has no zeros in U(τ) since gk(h) is always defined in this domain. D1(τ)D4(τ)−
D2(τ)D3(τ) is another polynomial with order no greater than max{Ḋ1 + Ḋ4, Ḋ2 + Ḋ3} by
the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. Assuming En+1[π(s
w1
d ), τ ] − En+1[π(sw2d ), τ ] does
not equal the zero function (i.e., w1 6= w2), then it has a maximum number of zeros equal
to the order of D1(τ)D4(τ)−D2(τ)D3(τ).
Therefore, within any Uy(τ) ∈ N , there exists a finite number of intersections among
the set of functions {En+1[π(swd ), τ ]}, implying Φ(n+1)d(τ) has a finite number of intervals
within which some set of actions W ∗ defines the upper envelope and Pn+1(s
w
d , τ) is some
constant. That is, ∀Uy(τ) ∈ N , there exists a finite number λy of intervals Uyr(τ) that
cover Uy(τ) and wherein each Pn+1(s
w
d , τ) equals some constant β
w
d (y, r)
Collectively, these results allow Pn+1(s
w
d , τ) to be written as
Pn+1(s
w












wherein Iy and Iyr are indicator functions for the intervals Uy(τ) and Uyr(τ), respec-
tively. Therefore, Pn+1(s
w





d , τ). 
In this way, the uncertainty pertaining to intermediate parameter Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) can
be handled explicitly by partitioning U(τ) into the appropriate intervals wherein it
is constant. In practice, these intervals can be found by repeatedly finding the upper
envelopes in τ of each player’s payoff functions for a given action, opponent action
and level of thought, and recording for which τ -values we have Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) > 0.
The results from Theorem 6.3.1 are also useful in formulating the SP variant of




















i ) = 1,
PM(s
j
i ) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,mi.
We note that S2 has the same general form as S1. However, we can leverage the
fact that τ is a continuous random variable and the piecewise form of Ph(s
j′
−i, τ) to
simplify the objective function per the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3.2 For τ distributed by an arbitrary, continuous probability distribution
























where f̂(h, τ) is a gamma probability density function with rate parameter β = 1 and
shape parameter α = h+ 1.
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where Iµ is the characteristic function associated with the interval Uµ(τ). The denominator
in the summand is the sum of Poisson probability mass functions and, when M → ∞, it

































where f̂(h, τ) is a gamma probability density function with rate parameter β = 1 and shape
parameter α = h+ 1. 
The results of Theorem 6.3.2 faciliate the computation of the expected payoff
associated with each action j. Since the integral considers the product of two density
functions, f̂(h, τ) and f(τ), a modeler is potentially able to simplify it. After these






is found, S2 becomes a simple linear
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program with an optimal solution yielding a behaviorally robust strategy in a SP
setting.
The combination of Theorems 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 also proves useful for developing dis-
tributionally robust maximin strategies with an interval-based U(τ). Such a problem
utilizing the same ambiguity set F from Section 6.3 can be represented as DR. How-
ever, the results of this section allow for the development of a tractable approximate
DRO counterpart that converges toward the exact DRO counterpart as parameters
θ → 0 and M →∞.
Utilizing the properties of expectation and Theorems 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, the objective




















































We define Ub(τ) to be a finite set of γ̇ closed intervals of the form [ab1, ab2] covering
U(τ) that is at least as fine as the set of Uµ(τ) (i.e., γ̇ ≥ γ) such that a11 = min[U(τ)],
aγ̇2 = max[U(τ)], and ab2 = a(b+1)1 for b < γ̇. Moreover, we assume each Ub(τ) is
of equal length θ and all endpoints of Uµ(τ) correspond to endpoints among the γ̇
intervals. This property implies that all non-degenerate Uµ(τ) interval lengths are
multiples of θ (i.e., ∀µ ∃n ∈ N such that len(Uµ(τ)) = nθ where len(·) is the length
function).
Once a θ-value is set and Ub(τ) determined, we utilize them to approximate the
ambiguity set F . That is, we consider all stepwise probability distribution functions
194
(i.e., histograms) with intervals Ub(τ). Therefore, it is clear that as θ → 0, our
approximate ambiguity set converges to F . Since within each Ub(τ) the distribution

























h for Ub(τ) ⊆ Uµ(τ), Ω(h, Ub(τ)) = F̂ (h, ab2)−F̂ (h, ab1), and F̂ (h, τ)
is the gamma cumulative distribution function with α = h+ 1 and β = 1 for τ .






























i ) = 1,
PM(s
j














provided that θ has been selected such that c3 and c4 are endpoints to some interval
Ub(τ). This qualification is only necessary to ensure the correct calculation of con-
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straint (55a) and only relevant when the ambiguity set considers the dispersion of its
distributions.
Since all functions are linear, this bilevel program can be reformulated by tak-
ing the dual of the lower-level decisionmaker’s problem. The resulting single level


















∀b : ab1 ∈ [c3, c4],(ab1 + ab2
2
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This formulation is an approximate distributionally robust counterpart for the
ambiguity set F that converges to the true counterpart as θ → 0 and M → ∞.
Moreover, it allows player i to form a behaviorally robust strategy in a DRO setting
with an interval-based U(τ) via the solution of a linear program.
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6.4 Behaviorally Robust Strategies for the Stahl & Wilson Games
The appropriate behaviorally robust strategy varies based upon the information a
player has available regarding the parameter τ . This section examines such strategy
alterations for the twelve games provided by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and tests them
on their human-subject data.
We developed the BRMaximin toolbox and utilized it on these examples. This
software package includes a suite of MATLAB functions that implements the base-
line Cognitive Hierarchy model, plots all EM [π(s
j
i ), τ ] functions (i.e., belonging to
each action j) for a game across an uncertainty set, and identifies behaviorally robust
strategies for a finite or interval-based U(τ) in a RO, SP and DRO setting, respec-
tively. For each function, the input required consists of a payoff matrix, uncertainty
information, and an M -value. For model variants having interval-based uncertainty
sets, the BRMaximin toolbox leverages a discrete mesh approximation (with user-
defined spacing) over the region for the purpose of computational tractability and,
for SP2, uses a beta distribution due to its bounded continuous nature and flexibility
of shape. The software package and related documentation are available on both the
MATLAB File Exchange2 and GitHub3.
The Twelve Stahl & Wilson Games.
The twelve games utilized by Stahl and Wilson (1995) are symmetric matrix games
wherein each player has three available actions (i.e., T , M , andB). Game 10 of this set
is presented in Table 24. Stahl and Wilson (1995) conducted human-subject testing
on each game wherein 48 individuals adopted the role of the row player. Moreover,





For varying information sets regarding τ and for each of these twelve games,
we identify the column player’s strategies prescribed by the appropriate model from
Section 6.3. We subsequently evaluate the performance of these six strategies, as well
as the strategy that would be prescribed by Camerer et al. (2004) under an assumption
that the point estimate of τ = 1.5 is correct, against the responses of the 48 individuals
tested by Stahl and Wilson (1995). The specifications of the information conditions
considered for each game are presented in Table 25.
Table 25. Seven information conditions for Stahl & Wilson games
Information Condition Assumptions on true τ -value
PE τ = 1.5
R1 τ ∈ U1(τ) = {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3}
S1 Distribution F over U1(τ); (p0, p0.5, p1, p1.5, p2, p2.5, p3) = (0.02, 0.1, 0.15, 0.46, 0.15, 0.1, 0.02)
DR1 Collection of discrete distribution F over U1(τ) with c1 = 1.5, c2 = 0.5, c3 = 1, and c4 = 2
R2 τ ∈ U2(τ) = [1, 12]
S2 τ ∼ Beta(10, 75) over U2(τ)
DR2 Collection of continuous distributions F over U2(τ) with c1 = 1.5, c2 = 0.5, c3 = 1, and c4 = 2
These information conditions are selected to illustrate the effect an agent’s knowl-
edge regarding τ can have on their behaviorally robust strategy. The condition PE
utilizes the point estimate provided by Camerer et al. (2004) without quantifying the
uncertainty from which it was derived. Condition R1 examines the effect of a small,
finite uncertainty set; condition S1 considers a probability distribution over this set
with mean 1.5; and condition R1 considers all ambiguity sets over the uncertainty
with mean 1.5 and at least 50% of their density lying within [1,2]. Conditions R2,
S2, and DR2 similarly examine these different forms of uncertainty but on a larger,
interval-based uncertainty set for τ . Setting M = kmax = 40 and using a mesh spacing
of 0.025 for the interval-based instances, the resulting behaviorally robust strategies
for the BRMaximin toolbox functions are reported in Table 26.
The degree to which the information condition affects the resulting strategy varies
by game. In Game 1, every prescribed strategy corresponds to the (unique) maximin
strategy; the solutions do not differ by information condition. However, the solutions
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Table 26. Prescribed mixed strategies for all Stahl & Wilson games
Game PE R1 S1 DR1 R2 S2 DR2
1 (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)*
2 (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0.91, 0.09, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0.37, 0.63, 0)
3 (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0)
4 (0, 1, 0) (0.34, 0.66, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0.29, 0.71, 0) (0.62, 0.38, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0.33, 0.67, 0)
5 (0, 0, 1)* (0.75, 0, 0.25) (0, 0, 1)* (0, 0, 1)* (0, 0, 1)* (0, 0, 1)* (0, 0, 1)*
6 (0, 1, 0)* (0.53, 0.47, 0) (0, 1, 0)* (0.39, 0.61, 0) (0, 1, 0)* (0, 1, 0)* (0.32, 0.68, 0)
7 (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 0.30, 0.70)* (1, 0, 0) (0.65, 0, 0.35)
8 (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0.10, 0.90) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
9 (0, 0, 1) (0.54, 0, 0.46) (0, 0, 1) (0.50, 0, 0.50) (0.56, 0, 0.44) (0, 0, 1) (0.54, 0, 0.46)
10 (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0.97, 0, 0.03) (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0)
11 (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1) (0.30, 0.59, 0.11)* (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.04, 0.96)
12 (1, 0, 0) (0.90, 0, 0.10) (1, 0, 0) (0.36, 0, 0.64) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0.34, 0, 0.66)
* Strategy coincides with Maximin solution
to other games illustrate variability based on uncertainty conditions (e.g., Game 4).
One factor driving this behavior derives from the form of the EM [π(s
j
col), τ ] functions
in each game. Consider each of these functions for games 1, 4, and 10, as graphed
in Figures 34, 35 and 33. In both Figures 1 and 3, the expected payoff functions
exhibit multiple discontinuities and, within each figure, the upper envelopes of the
the set of functions corresponds to different strategies over multiple, disjoint intervals.
In contrast, the upper envelope in Figure 34 is defined by a much simpler piecewise
continuous function. The best expected outcome is EM [π(s
T
col), τ ] from τ = [0, 0.125]
and EM [π(s
M
col), τ ] elsewhere. Thus, the information conditions regarding τ have a
notable effect on prescribed strategies for Games 4 and 10 and no effect on prescribed
strategies for Game 1.
Table 27 reports the worst, average, and best performance of the respective column
player strategies prescribed in Table 26 for all 12 games, considering as opponents the
responses of the 48 players tested by Stahl and Wilson (1995). For each game, Table
27 also reports the regressed τ -values from Camerer et al. (2004) (i.e., τ̂) as well as
the payoff statistics for both the CH model’s best response (BR) strategy with the
regressed τ̂ and the standard maximin (MM) strategy. These results highlight the
effect a player’s understanding of the opponent population can have on their expected
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Figure 34. M-step Column Player Expected Payoffs in Stahl & Wilson Game 1
Figure 35. M-step Column Player Expected Payoffs in Stahl & Wilsom Game 4
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payoff. As some of the column player’s prescribed strategies are probabilistic, the
results are reported in terms of their expected payoff against this set of opponents.
Table 27. Descriptive expected payoff statistics versus 48 Stahl & Wilson players
Game τ̂ Statistic BR MM PE R1 S1 DR1 R2 S2 DR2
1
Min 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
2.93 Avg 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69 44.69
Max 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
2
Min 15 41.54 15 15 15 15 37.66 15 24.19
0 Avg 60 62.21 60 60 60 60 62.27 60 60.92
Max 100 74.61 100 100 100 10 74.53 100 79.79
3
Min 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
1.40 Avg 45.31 45.21 45.31 45.31 45.14 45.31 45.31 45.31 45.31
Max 80 92.38 80 80 100 80 80 80 80
4
Min 30 37 10 36.64 30 35.70 33.83 30 36.68
2.34 Avg 46.46 39.97 37.19 40.30 46.46 39.84 42.91 46.46 40.27
Max 100 46.50 45 46.68 100 46.43 65.57 100 46.66
5
Min 20 20 20 12.44 20 20 20 20 20
2.01 Avg 47.71 47.71 47.71 38.11 47.71 47.71 47.71 47.71 47.71
Max 50 60 60 87.77 60 60 60 60 60
6
Min 25 31 31 30.47 31 30.61 31 31 30.69
0 Avg 53.65 44.73 44.73 49.44 44.73 48.16 47.73 47.73 47.55
Max 100 60 60 76.88 60 69.87 60 60 66.50
7
Min 30 47.04 30 30 30 30 46.99 30 37.08
5.37 Avg 58.96 49.09 58.96 58.96 58.96 58.96 49 58.96 57.37
Max 100 52.82 100 100 100 100 52.46 100 91.15
8
Min 20 42.86 20 20 20 38 20.01 20 40
0 Avg 55 46.65 55 55 55 49.15 54.99 55 48.50
Max 100 50.45 100 100 100 55.01 99.97 100 52
9
Min 0 57.14 0 54.26 0 49.92 55.97 0 54.33
1.35 Avg 71.77 60.58 71.77 61.14 71.77 62 60.81 71.77 61.13
Max 80 65 80 65 80 65 65 80 65
10
Min 21 28.99 0 21 0 20.34 21 0 21
11.33 Avg 42.31 40.63 38.75 42.31 38.75 42.20 42.31 38.75 42.31
Max 50 43.32 100 50 100 51.58 50 100 50
11
Min 22 35.34 20 20 20 20 35.34 20 20.95
6.48 Avg 30.67 35.34 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 35.34 30.90 31.18
Max 100 35.34 51 51 51 51 35.34 51 50.39
12
Min 15 37.37 15 23.57 15 33.57 15 15 33.44
1.71 Avg 50.31 48.41 50.31 49.58 50.31 45.66 50.31 50.31 45.57
Max 70 65.26 70 68.19 70 69.65 70 70 70.75
The BR strategies are unknown prior to playing the game because the regressed
τ̂ -values require empirical estimation, implying that the BR model is best utilized
as a benchmark rather than a prescriptive model in its own right. The BR model
is designed to maximize a player’s expected reward; therefore, when utilizing the
average expected payoff as a comparative metric, it does generally yield the best
results across all nine models tested. Although there are two exceptions (i.e., Games
2 and 11), we suspect these results may relate to the quality of fit of these specific
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τ -estimates provided by Camerer et al. (2004)4.
The MM model yields the maximum of the minimum expected payoffs across
all games, but it generally sacrifices performance with respect to both the average
expected payoff and the maximum expected payoff. The conservativeness of the MM
strategies can be observed by comparing the BR and MM columns across the average
and maximum expected payoff results in Table 27.
Regarding the PE method, we note that the average expected payoff of its strate-
gies typically do not exceed those of the BR strategies (with the exception of Game
11). This result aligns with the theory presented by Camerer et al. (2004). Likewise,
for this particular set of games and empirical play, the PE strategies often yield both
lower minimum and average expected payoffs compared to the MM strategies (i.e.,
Games 2, 4, 10, and 11).
The behaviorally robust strategies (i.e., R1 – DR2) provide compromise solutions
between the conservative MM strategies and the unknown BR strategies. The behav-
iorally robust strategies trade improved average performance for decreased minimum
performance relative to the MM strategies; however, their success in doing so depends
upon the accuracy of the underlying information conditions. Consider Game 10 with
τ̂ = 11.33. Information conditions S1 and S2 both assume a high probability of τ
existing in [1,2] and a low probability of larger τ -values. As with the PE strategy for
this game, the S1 and S2 strategies are based upon an inadequate understanding of
the underlying uncertainty and yield poor minimum and average results compared to
the BR and MM strategies. Alternatively, for Game 4, each behaviorally robust model
appropriately balances an improved average expected payoff with a reduced minimum
4For Game 2 with τ = 0, we have CHrow = (0.33, 0.33, 0.33) whereas the empirical results of Stahl
and Wilson (1995) report RSW2 = (0.625, 0.25, 0.125). Running the CH model for Game 11 with
τ = 6.48 and kmax = 6, the resulting solution is approximately equal to the empirical results, RSW11,
of Stahl and Wilson (1995). That is, CHrow = (0.27, 0.07, 0.66) ≈ RSW11 = (0.27, 0.08, 0.65).
However, at such a low value of k in relation to τ , the CH solution has not yet converged. Increasing
to kmax=50, we have CHrow = (0.47, 0.19, 0.34) at approximate convergence.
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expected outcome because τ̂ = 2.34 is well represented in the information conditions.
Finally, we also observe that at least one of the behaviorally robust strategies always
weakly dominates the PE strategies for each game in terms of minimum, average,
and maximum expected payoff. Of note, the DR2 strategies weakly dominate the
PE strategies in terms of average expected payoff for nine of the twelve games and
strictly dominate them for four of the twelve.
6.5 Conclusion
The bounded rationality exhibited by humans in one-shot, simultaneous-move
games is a source of uncertainty complicating the decision for a player who confronts
them. For such a player to maximize his or her utility, they must accurately assess
their opponents’ ability to think strategically. The CH model developed by Camerer
et al. (2004) provides a framework for assessing such strategic ability, but the defining
parameter τ must be identified via empirical estimation. As such, it is unlikely to be
known precisely ex ante.
Within this research, we have leveraged robust optimization, stochastic program-
ming, and distributionally robust optimization techniques to develop six mathemat-
ical programming formulations to collectively identify behaviorally robust strategies
under varying types of uncertainty regarding τ . Solutions to these math programming
formulations provide a player with a prescriptive strategy in accordance with their
knowledge and beliefs regarding their opponents.
Moreover, we also developed a software package, BRMaximin, to identify behav-
iorally robust strategies under varying forms of uncertainty and utilized these tools
to analyze the 12 games introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1995). The results illus-
trated the differing strategies obtained in accordance with a player’s understanding
of the uncertainty about τ . Likewise, we tested these strategies against the empirical
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play from the human subjects in Stahl and Wilson (1995) to demonstrate how the
accuracy of this knowledge affects a player’s actual received payoffs.
Notwithstanding these results, there exists substantial opportunity for future re-
search in this setting. One such opportunity involves revisiting the models presented
herein by varying the underlying CH assumptions. For example, specific τ -values may
be incorporated for each opponent population instead of the global opponent τ -value
utilized herein. Additional avenues for future inquiry include the modification of our
mathematical programs to other nonequilibrium structural models (e.g., Chong et al.,
2016) or the automation of exact interval-based uncertainty solution methods via a
computer algebra system. In pursuing such an agenda, researchers will be better able
to advise players on their interactions against boundedly rational opponents and fur-




In this research, we have developed multiple models that inform the offensive
application of and defensive measures against persuasion in a national security setting,
by way of completing five specific research goals in two related research threads.
In the first research thread pertaining to offensive and defensive behavioral influ-
ence models, an offensive modeling framework is created to identify how an entity
optimally influences a populace to take a desired course of action, a defensive mod-
eling framework is defined wherein a regulating entity takes action to bound the
behavior of multiple adversaries simultaneously attempting to persuade a group of
decisionmakers, and an offensive influence modeling framework under conditions of
ambiguity is developed in accordance with historical information limitations. In the
second research thread pertaining to behavioral and behaviorally robust approaches
to deterrence, we demonstrate the alternative insights behavioral game theory gen-
erates for military operations planning, and we define behaviorally robust models for
an agent to use in a normal form game under varying forms of uncertainty in order
to inform deterrence policy decisions.
In accomplishing these goals, we provide military and civilian planners with frame-
works to better conduct and counter political warfare, and with alternative tools to
develop deterrence policy that addresses and exploits uncertain adversarial behavior.
Moreover, whereas the efficacy of influence in international strategic competition
is well-known (Clarke, 2018; Heath, 2018; McClintock, 2018; Robinson et al., 2018),
its effectiveness is difficult to quantify (Boot and Doran, 2013). By leveraging quanti-
tative psychological theories, this research provides methods to mathematically model
these operations and, in doing so, extends this scope of operations research applica-
tions beyond conventional warfare and prepares it for future use in the age of political
warfare.
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Appendix A. Expected Utility Influence Model
The GPP can be readily adapted to alternative assumptions of an expected utility
maximizing decisionmaker. To illustrate this point, we model the persuasion problem
previously referenced as follows. Note that the i, j suffixes have been dropped for
notational convenience because there is only one decisionmaker and two prospects,
with q being equivalent to prospect B. Likewise, we assume ∆ = 0.
max Φ
subject to a2 + a3 ≤ 400
a1 ≤ 0.1
EU(A) = 250
EU(B) = (0.4 + a1)(300 + a2) + (0.6− a1)(a3)





a1, a2, a3, s
pos, sneg ≥ 0
Φ,Ψ ∈ {0, 1}.
Solving this model with BARON yields an optimal solution of Φ = 1 and (a1, a2, a3) =
(0.170, 197.714, 202.286). This solution is one of a set of alternative optimal solutions
that may exist. If desired, additional constraints can be added to the formulation
to preclude the identification of this optimal solution, and the perturbed instance
resolved to identify an alternative optimal solution. Such a process can be iteratively
repeated to explore the set of alternative optimal solutions.
206
Appendix B. IISE Proceedings: Challenges and Solutions
with Exponentiation Constraints using Decision Variables
via the BARON Commercial Solver
207
Proceedings of the 2018 IISE Annual Conference
K. Barker, D. Berry, C. Rainwater, eds.
Challenges and Solutions with Exponentiation Constraints
using Decision Variables via the BARON Commercial Solver
William N. Caballero, Alexander G. Kline, and Brian J. Lunday
Department of Operational Sciences
Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB, OH 45433
Abstract
We observe and explore a persistent issue encountered with the commercial global optimization solver BARON,
wherein the solver falsely declares problem instances of a particular math programming formulation as infeasible.
Problematic to BARON, the formulation contains constraints having exponentiation with decision variables in both
the base and the exponent. We compare BARON’s performance for this math programming problem against other
commercial solvers, explore the potential cause of the false infeasible termination, and demonstrate how to mitigate
this error by perturbing the formulation.
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1. Introduction
The Branch and Reduce Optimization Navigator (BARON) is a preeminent global optimization solver that utilizes
“constraint propagation, interval analysis, and duality in its reduce arsenal with advanced branch-and-bound optimiza-
tion concepts" to find optimal solutions to non-convex mathematical programming problems [1]. Foundational work
with respect to its nonlinear function relaxations, range reduction strategies, and branching methods was developed by
Tawarmalani and Sahinidis [2]. With specific regard to fractional programming problems (i.e., functions which can be
decomposed as the sum and products of univariate functions), the authors discuss methods to develop a convex relation
to a factorable function, and the creation of a polyhedral outer-approximation to this relaxation. That is, the described
methods serve to create a linear approximation of some factorable function by first creating a convex approximation
which is, in turn, approximated linearly with hyperplanes. The iterative application of these techniques incorporated
into a branch-and-bound framework with the node partitioning and fathoming rules set forth by Tawarmalani and
Sahinidis [2] form the foundation of BARON’s algorithmic procedure. The Sahinidis Group [3] provides a systematic
comparison of BARON to four other leading global optimization solvers on 1740 test instances which shows BARON
is able to solve instances much quicker than other commercial solvers. Extensive testing has also been conducted by
Neumaier et al. [4] who concluded that BARON is the fastest and most robust global solver currently available.
For these reasons, BARON has earned its developers much recognition, including the 2004 INFORMS Computing So-
ciety Prize and the 2006 Beale-Orchard-Hays Prize from the Mathematical Optimization Society [5, 6]. It is available
for use under a variety of algebraic modeling languages, including AIMMS, AMPL, and GAMS. Likewise, BARON
has been utilized for supply chain design, integrated process water networks, scheduling, molecular design, manufac-
turing, and healthcare [7–11]. Its reputation as a reliable and effective global solver is such that BARON is commonly
used as a benchmark for heuristics [12, 13].
Despite this success, Lastusilta et al.[14] suggest the solver AlphaECP outperforms BARON over the test instances
available in MINLPLib. Likewise, Neumaier et al. [4] reference errors wherein BARON falsely reports an instance as
infeasible. We expand upon these results by demonstrating a persistent issue encountered with BARON resulting in a
false declaration of infeasibility for a class of problems which have a constraint with a decision variable exponentiated
to another decision variable, henceforth referred to as a power program. In Section 2, we describe a specific power
program formulation inducing the error, examine the potential cause, and provide programmatic perturbations to
address it. Numerical tests in Section 3 illustrate the prevalence of these errors and the efficacy of our perturbations.
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2. Rank Dependent Power Program
The presented power program is related to multiple individuals being offered many risky prospects with the objective
to maximize the sum of perceived gain probabilities across all individuals. Concepts are borrowed from Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT) in this formulation in terms of ranking outcomes and probability distortion, but the programs
are meant to stand alone as an example and do not necessarily abide by the tenants of CPT [15]. Of note, we utilize
neither the concept of a reference point nor the cumulative probability weighting function.
We consider a scenario wherein individuals in a set I are offered a variety of prospects. Each individual i ∈ I is offered
ni prospects from a set Ji, each of which has mi j outcomes, indexed on the set Ki j. We assume an external decision
maker is able to alter the offered outcomes’ raw values and probabilities by some constant amount through some bi-
nary persuasion action. In doing so, this decision maker wishes to maximize the sum of perceived probabilities of
positive outcome values across all individuals and prospects. We continue by introducing the requisite parameters and
decision variables.
Parameters
x̂i jk : Baseline raw value for k-th outcome of prospect j for individual i before persuasion
p̂i jk : Baseline probability of k-th outcome of prospect j for individual i before persuasion
ε : Arbitrary sufficiently small positive real number
M : Arbitrary sufficiently large real number
f̂i jk : Persuasion effect on outcome k raw value for prospect j and individual i
ĝi jk : Persuasion effect on outcome k probability for prospect j and individual i
Primary Decision Variables
T+i jkk′ : Equal to 1 if xi jk is the (mi j−1+ k′)th greatest gain for k = 1, ...,mi j ,
and 0 otherwise; defined for all (i, j) combinations
T−i jkk′ : Equal to 1 if xi jk is the (k
′)th greatest loss for k = 1, ...,mi j,
and 0 otherwise; defined for all (i, j) combinations
γi : Gain distortion coefficient for individual i after persuasion
ai : Binary variable indicating action taken against individual i.
Equals one if action taken, zero otherwise.
Intermediate Decision Variables
xi jk : Gain/loss for individual i for k-th outcome of prospect j after persuasion
pi jk : Probability of k-th outcome of prospect j for individual i after persuasion
t+i jk′ : Ascending rank based list of xi jk gains corresponding with mapping T
+
i jkk′
t−i jk′ : Ascending rank based list of xi jk losses corresponding with mapping T
−
i jkk′
b+i jk′ : Corresponding probabilities for sorted t
+
i jk′ outcomes
b−i jk′ : Corresponding probabilities for sorted t
−
i jk′ outcomes
π+i jk′ : Distorted gain probability for i on kth outcome of prospect j after persuasion
Many of the intermediate decision variables could be eliminated and substituted with their explicit functional form in
the constraints. However, they are maintained for tractability purposes and to facilitate the performance of GAMS/BARON
in accordance with published documentation [16]. Using these sets, parameters, and decision variables, we define our
Rank Dependent Power Program.
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xi jk = x̂i jk +ai f̂i jk, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k ∈ Ki j (1b)
pi jk = p̂i jk +aiĝi jk, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k 6= mi j (1c)






























T−i jkk′xi jk, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Ki j (1i)
t−i j(k′+1) ≥ t
−
i jk′ , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k = 1, ...,m j−1 (1j)
t+i j(k′+1) ≥ t
+
i jk′ , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k = 1, ...,m j−1 (1k)
t+i jk′ ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Ki j (1l)










T−i jkk′ pi jk, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Ki j (1o)
π+i jk′ = (b
+
i jk′)
γi , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k′ ∈ Ki j (1p)
ai ∈ {0,1},γi ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I
T+i jkk′ ,T
−
i jkk′ ∈ {0,1}, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, k,k′ ∈ Ki j
The objective function (1a) maximizes the sum of distorted probabilities for gains across all individuals, prospects, and
outcomes. Constraints (1b) through (1e) serve to update the offered outcomes and their probabilities. Constraints (1f)
through (1o) ensure all prospects are sorted in ascending order and labeled as a gain or a loss depending on the values
of T+i jkk′ and T
−
i jkk′ . Constraints (1f) through (1m) create the mappings, T
+
i jkk′ and T
−
i jkk′ . Constraints (1f) and (1g) enforce
a bijective mapping. Constraints (1h) and (1i) perform the actual mapping calculation for outcomes, and Constraints
(1n) and (1o) do likewise for probabilities. Constraints (1j) and (1k) ensure the values are in ascending order, and
Constraints (1l) and (1m) enforce the positivity and negativity of gains and losses, respectively. Constraint (1p) serves
as an intermediate decision variable of the terms summed in the objective function. This equality is responsible for
converting the formulation into a power program.
For a given set of ai decision variables, Constraints (1b) – (1p) are completely determined. This is readily noted by
observing that the decision variables ai dictate the values of xi jk and pi jk, which in turn control all remaining decision
variables except γi. The values T+i jkk′ and T
+
i jkk′ are easily found by sorting the xi jk-values and observing their signs.
The remaining intermediate decision variables can then be found by simple calculation. Furthermore, this formulation
always has a feasible solution, regardless of parameter values. This can be observed from the following: (1) Constraints
(1b), (1c), (1d), and (1p) assign a value to free decision variables, and (2) A subset of these assignments is used in
Constraints (1f)–(1o) to assign more free variables or sort them in ascending order of their associated outcome.
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Using these results and observing that increasing γi always decreases the objective function value based on the domain
of b+i jk′ , finding an optimal solution to this program can be simplified to searching among all possible combinations
of ai decision variables. This combinatorial construct is not necessarily helpfully for large instances, but allows us to
easily find optimal solutions to small instances of the program for testing purposes.
BARON is unable to directly handle a function xy when both x and y are decision variables [17]. In order to process
such functions, GAMS/BARON transforms the function to ey log(x). However, the domains of the two functions are not
equivalent. For example, the original function is defined at x = 0, whereas the transformation is not.
In an effort to resolve this conflict, we introduce the reformulations A1 through A4. Each perturbation is based on the
hypothesis that pre-processing bounds for pi jk are not communicated to b+i jk′ and an error is triggered when BARON
observes the possibility of taking log(0). A1 removes the intermediate decision variable, against the general guidance
of GAMS documentation. However, by removing the intermediate decision variable, any error associated with its
bounds should be eliminated. A2 and A3 attempt to add a small real number to the intermediate decision variables in
(1p) to avoid a domain violation in the transformation. A4 provides a similar solution by lower bounding the sorted
probabilities by some very small real number. That is, b+i jk′ is explicitly stated as greater than zero. Strictly speaking,
such a lower bound makes the program infeasible. However, if chosen small enough (e.g.,1×10−16) , the lower bound
is essentially treated as a roundoff error while remaining defined in the transformed power function.
Alternative or Additional Constraints






i jk substituted for (1p)
A2 : π+i jk′ = (b
+
i jk′ + ε)
γi substituted for (1p)
A3 : π+i jk′ = |b+i jk′ + ε|γi substituted for (1p)
A4 : b+i jk′ ≥ ε, b−i jk′ ≥ ε added to the base model
3. Testing and Analysis
We compare BARON’s performance on 100 instances of the base Rank Dependent Power Program with two individ-
uals each being offered two prospects, for which there respectively exist two potential outcomes, to that of five other
solvers. Of these five solvers, one is a global solver (i.e., SCIP) while the other four (i.e., DICOPT, LINDO, SSB,
and AlphaECP) are primarily used for solving convex MINLPs. The 100 random instances draw parameters from
the following distributions such that xi jk ∈ [−6500,6500], pi jk ∈ [0.01,0.99], and eγi log(b
+
i jk) is always defined: x̂i jk ∼
U[-5000,5000], p̂i jk ∼ U[0.25,0.75], f̂i jk ∼ U[-1500,1500], and ĝi jk ∼ U[-0.249,0.249]. To calculate the optimality
gap, the action space in each instance is enumerated and its effect on (1b) – (1p) manually calculated as previously
discussed.
Testing is performed on an HP ZBook equipped with a 2.70 GHz Intel i7-4800MQ processor and 32GB of RAM.
Each solver is provided a relative optimality termination criteria of 0.001, an iteration limit of 3000, and a time limit
of five minutes. Table 1 details the termination criterion invoked for each solver over the 100 random instances. Only
AlphaECP correctly identifies all instances as feasible. The global solvers BARON and SCIP struggle to find feasible
solutions and terminate with a conclusion of infeasibility for 100 and 85 instances, respectively. DICOPT does not
label any of the instances as infeasible but is only able to return a solution for 16 of the instances. SSB and LINDO
incorrectly terminate by designating 8 and 12 instances as infeasible, respectively. Taken collectively, the global
solvers appear to underperform their convex MINLP counterparts.
With regard to BARON, we compare the alternative formulations and examine the termination criterion. It can be
observed in Table 1 that A1, A3, and A4 all conclude that 95 instances are feasible. Surprisingly, alternative A2
concludes that only 2 instances are feasible. However, upon examination, the evaluation of the objective function
is found to be incorrect. These two observations are excluded from further analysis. We postulate the difference in
performance between A2 and A3 derives from the pre-processing technique utilized for the absolute value function.
Although the alternative formulations A1, A3, and A4 greatly improve performance, erroneous infeasible terminations
still occur. AlphaECP is the only solver which correctly identifies the feasibility of all instances. However, Table 1
shows that, for the instances BARON identifies as feasible, it has the lowest average optimality gap.
Caballero, Kline, Lunday
Table 1: Feasibility and Optimality Comparisons
Solver # Feasible # Infeasible # Timed Out Avg RelGap Avg AbsGap
BARON (Base Model) 0 100 0 - -
BARON (A1) 95 5 0 0.59% 0.0141
BARON (A2) 2 98 0 - -
BARON (A3) 95 5 0 0.42% 0.0102
BARON (A4) 95 5 0 6.72% 0.1611
SCIP (Base Model) 15 85 0 36.68% 0.5227
DICOPT (Base Model) 16 0 84 37.18% 0.5525
AlphaECP (Base Model) 100 0 0 17.74% 0.3097
SSB (Base Model) 92 8 0 14.64% 0.3236
LINDO (Base Model) 84 12 4 17.68% 0.3798
4. Conclusions
We have examined a problem which belongs to the very challenging class of power programs. The program analyzed
proves to be problematic for the GAMS/BARON solver combination. In its base form, an incorrect infeasible termina-
tion is reached in the Rank Dependent Power Program for each of the hundred instances examined which is the worst
result over all solvers considered. These results are believed to be due to the GAMS/BARON transformation utilized
for xy when both x,y are decision variables. Accounting for this transformation, alternative formulations are examined
which yield promising results in terms of solution quality, but still conclude with incorrect infeasible terminations for
some instances.
Although, BARON is advertised as not requiring an initial seeded solution, for problems such as ours, it may be a
helpful tactic to mitigate the observed error. Since AlphaECP seemingly is the most effective software in terms of
finding a feasible solution, a combined approach of using AlphaECP to find a starting point which is then fed into
BARON may prove efficacious.
Fortunately, there always exists a feasible solution for the examined power program in this research. However, our
results demonstrate the potential for BARON to yield a false infeasible termination, which is problematic for instances
without a guarantee of feasibility. In order to mitigate this issue, we have provided a collection of programmatic
mitigation techniques for practitioner use.
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